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This thesis will perform a conceptual analysis of legitimacy and  conclude that 
legitimacy is an essentially contested concept. While most literature pertaining to 
legitimacy assumes specific conceptions of legitimacy, this discussion performs a 
conceptual analysis of normative (as opposed to descriptive) legitimacy. I will 
investigate what is the content of legitimacy as a concept detached from its individual 
conceptions is, explore the nature of this concept (substantive or procedural?; claim 
right, liberty or moral power?), illustrate its relationship with neighbouring concepts 
such as authority, and conclude that it is an essentially contested concept, i.e. that there 
can be equally reasonable, evidenced and well-argued conceptions of this concept, 
without an independent argument solving the dispute between the competing 
conceptions.  
To properly understand the concept of legitimacy, it must be conceptualised under a 
trichotomy. At the top tier of the pyramid (Tier 1) lies legitimacy in its most abstract 
from (legitimacy in abstracto), which is a vague standard of properness. At the next 
level of the pyramid (Tier 2), legitimacy becomes more specific and relevant to legal 
material,) because here it is attached to the four object types of legal form (what can be 
legitimate or illegitimate?), namely individual law, action, actor, and legal order. 
Analysis of the concept of legitimacy at Tier 2, concludes the truth value of the claims 
that normative legitimacy is incompatible with nihilism, that, following Applbaum, 
although it is conceptually possible to understand normative legitimacy as entirely 
procedural, it is best understood as at least partly substantive and, again relying on 
Applbaum, that legitimacy is neither a claim right nor liberty right as so far understood 
in the literature, but moral power. With the appropriate framework for the discussion of 
legitimacy, this thesis will analyse the connection of the concept of legitimacy with 
neighbouring concepts, especially authority, and also with conceptions. Then, the thesis 
will illustrate what essentially contested concepts are and proceed to its main claim, i.e. 
that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept. Finally, the thesis will proceed to 
Tier 3, the level of normative conceptions, and analyse an important conception of 
legitimacy of international law, namely justice in the sense of protecting human rights, 
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1.1. Research Context 
As history unfolds, certain truisms of human nature become evident. Like all animals 
our nature is deeply, though not fully, determined by some major instincts: our instinct 
to feed and survive, the sexual instinct to reproduce, and, as Aristotle identified, our 
need to live in the company of other fellow human beings. Indeed, unlike solitary 
animals that spend the majority of their lives alone apart from when needing to mate, 
human beings live in the company of other fellow beings. Formation of societies and 
consequent need of social order for the survival of the species is intrinsic to human 
nature. The need for maintaining social order is satisfied by regulation of external 
behaviour of the members of the society. Traditionally, habitual norms, custom and law 
have developed, as a matter of social convention, to satisfy this need. Indeed, certain 
primitive societies aside where habitual norms and custom may have played the role of 
regulating social behaviour to avoid chaos, this social order has been maintained by a 
legal order.  
 
As complex human beings, however, aside from the aforementioned human instincts, 
we have other intuitions that may occasionally create tensions with the need to live in 
organised societies. A distinct element of the human condition contrast to other animals 
is indeed our inherent tendency for moral reflection and deliberation. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ 
are not only concepts that have developed for evolutionary reasons of survival (wild 
beast – bad, food – good), but at least from the formation of societies, they have 
obtained a moral touch. From a purely sociological/descriptive standpoint, human 
beings have formed moral beliefs (regardless of whether the beliefs are true or false in 
terms of objective morality) even before the rise of great civilisations of antiquity, from 
the formation of primitive societies. Even the few supporters of moral nihilism (the 
view that there are no moral facts; a view that will be explained in this discussion) 
recognize that human beings have always had moral intuitions and reflections, 





which maintains social order and regulates our external behaviour is thus an inevitable 
human tendency intrinsic to our very nature.  
 
There is also a practical utility in moral reflection in general and moral evaluation of 
law in particular. The former helps us become, not necessarily always better human 
beings, but at least more consistent in our moral beliefs – this is how moral philosophy 
helps us improve as human beings, at least to the extent to which we call ourselves 
rational. The latter, moral evaluation of law in particular, is not only a manifestation of 
our natural instinct and tendency for moral reflection, but also a practical need to 
improve the way with which we restrict our freedom in order to regulate behaviour and 
maintain social order necessary for our survival: law. 
 
Hence, the sharp contrast between legal validity and legitimacy. The Kosovo Report, 
which, as we will see, drew a sharp contrast between legality and legitimacy of an 
action (attack against a sovereign state), did not construct this distinction between 
legality and legitimacy out of a legal argument, or by stretching the limits of legal 
imagination. The distinction between legality/legal validity and legitimacy is inherent in 
our interaction with the law as such. On the one hand, legal order is by definition a 
legally valid order; on the other hand, since a legally valid order is one that is by large 
effective, which is a descriptive, not normative fact, legality does not necessarily (nor 
contingently for that matter) entail legitimacy. Indeed, a legal order may be illegitimate 
under any standards of legitimacy – one need not only think of the past, such as Hitler’s 
Germany with the holocaust, Stalin’s Soviet Union having killed more people than 
Hitler, Mao’s China – regime that exterminated even more, but also current regimes, 
such as North Korea. Legitimacy is still an issue. 
 
So far, we have identified legitimacy with morality; if so, is there any difference? If 
Austin’s classic quote in philosophy of language ‘no modification without aberration’ 
stands true, we are not unjustified in being predisposed to find a difference between 
legitimacy and morality. If these two words meant exactly the same, they would not 
have both survived. The chances are, as is indeed the case, that they are different. 
Morality is set of principles about what is right and wrong and what is good in general. 
Its object (what can be moral?) are human beings, and human actions and decisions, 





connected with several object types. A legal order can be legitimate, and an argument 
can be legitimate, whereas we can also use the concept of legitimacy in family contexts 
like family relation, like in calling someone a ‘legitimate daughter’. Legitimacy of law 
in particular, as we shall also see, has a limited number of object types. Although 
legitimacy of law is best understood, as it is often understood, in a moral sense, there is, 
conceptually speaking, as we shall see in Chapter 2, room for a merely procedural 
conception of legitimacy. This thought has already revealed one of the most important 
tenets of this discussion: that the concept of legitimacy lends itself to more than one 
conception. 
 
This does not mean, however, that there can only be two conceptions, namely 
moral/substantive and procedural. As we will see in this discussion, the concept of 
legitimacy is open ended, in the sense that what projects content in the concept of 
legitimacy is the specific conception in question, not the concept of legitimacy itself 
detached from any conceptions. If it is the case that different conceptions of a concept 
are advanced, and it can be objectively determined that one of them correct, then the 
concept is contested between several conceptions. If it is the case that there are several 
conceptions of a concept, all of them are supported by evidence and are well argued, 
and there is no independent argument to resolve the dispute between competing 
conceptions, then the concept is essentially contested. In order to reach this important 
claim about legitimacy though, we must go through conceptual analysis of legitimacy, 
which will lead us through a trichotomy, or three tier pyramid, with the most abstract 
sense of legitimacy at the top, and the normative conceptions at the bottom. 
 
In this discussion, I claim that legitimacy as a concept, i.e. without a specific conception 
being assumed or implied, properly be understood in a trichotomy, is an essentially 
contested concept. 
 
1.2. Significance of the Discussion 
Before outlining the argument, one important question needs to be answered: why is it 
important to properly conceptualise legitimacy, understand what kind of right it is and 





prior question, namely why is legitimacy of law important at all? After all, law is what 
it is, legitimate or not.  
 
A reason why legitimacy is important lies in what has already been mentioned but it 
needs to become more explicit. Legitimacy of law, especially to the extent that it 
pertains to morality, helps improve law. The observation that the Nazi regime, Stalin’s 
Soviet Union, Mao’s China, the 18th century US legal order providing for slavery, North 
Korea, etc. are examples of illegitimate legal orders, makes it clear that such legal 
orders ought to be avoided. This observation supports the importance of the moral 
evaluation of law, which is the conception of legitimacy in this instance; we are yet to 
identify a reason why legitimacy per se is important to discuss. 
 
Indeed, from Plato until recently, legitimacy in a legally relevant context has been 
discussed particularly in the context of political legitimacy, i.e. justification of coercion 
in domestic legal orders. In other words, the question of legitimacy is traditionally 
understood to be the following: what justifies the government to use coercion and 
restrict individual liberty? Justification is extremely important as it identifies normative 
relations of the individuals with the government. Just because an authority exercises 
power as a matter of fact, that does not necessarily entail that it is justified in doing so. 
One can draw a parallelism with factual ‘being obliged’ and legal ‘being obligated’. 
Being asked by a gunman under the use/threat of force to hand in your property is being 
obliged, as per Hart’s famous example, contrast to being obligated to pay taxes by law. 
Similarly, an authority lacking justification, in other words an authority which exercises 
power as a matter of fact but is illegitimate, or de facto authority, is an authority that is 
seen very differently, in normative terms, by its subjects, compared to legitimate 
authorities. Indeed, unless I am brainwashed by the regime of North Korea, I identify 
very different reasons of action towards that authority, compared to when I am in the 
UK. Aristotle, Hobbes. Locke, Rousseau etc. have addressed such questions.  
 
A manifestation of the importance of conceptual analysis of legitimacy thus becomes 
obvious. If the addressee of law is to understand that being obliged means he is forced 
to do something whereas obligated means he has a moral or legal obligation regardless 
of whether he will actually be forced, how is he to understand a legitimate law? Does it 





claim right. If legitimacy is a liberty right, then even though there are good reasons for 
the law to have been established, the addressee of legitimacy does not necessarily have 
a moral obligation – no obligation would exist as corollary to legitimacy. What if 
legitimacy is neither a claim right nor liberty right, but a second order right, namely a 
moral power? How would his normative relationship vis a vis the law be changed? In 
order for the addressee of law to understand his normative status vis a vis the law then, 
he is required to have understood the nature of legitimacy, which stems only after a 
conceptual analysis, detached from normative conceptions.  
 
At this point in time, it is safe to say that the predominant conception of legitimacy in 
domestic legal orders (not in international law) is liberal democracy. Legitimacy is even 
used as shorthand for ‘democratic legitimacy’. Not only the times of kings has long 
ended and royalty is nowadays restricted in a symbolic role, but any defeats of 
democracy, such as coups, totalitarian regimes or radical religious regimes such as the 
Taliban, are regarded as defeats of humanity and problems which need to be addressed. 
The question that arises in such cases is not what justifies the coup or totalitarian regime 
in question, but how we ought to assist the democratisation of the regime.  
 
The prevalence of the democratic conception of legitimacy has had an unintended 
negative side effect. It has created the false impression, perhaps even the erroneous 
assumption, that there can be no other conceptions of legitimacy, or it has made us not 
wonder what conception of legitimacy is being deployed in each instance in which the 
concept of legitimacy is being used. The legitimacy discussion is often structured in a 
way that prevents us from asking exactly what it is we are supposed to be asking: we 
often ask whether an object of legitimacy is legitimate, without asking the logically 
prior question, i.e. which conception of legitimacy is assumed. 
 
The question would not arise if legitimacy was in full overlap with morality, i.e. 
identical with moral evaluation of law. But we have already seen that the political 
legitimacy discussion has brought democracy as the prevalent conception. Democracy 
and morality are two different conceptions of legitimacy. Based on the discussion so 






What is also important to note, is that they may also refer to different objects of 
legitimacy. Democracy is often (though not exclusively) used as the standard of 
legitimacy of legal orders, whereas morality is often used for a variety of objects. If the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), an international body, is legitimate because it 
significantly contributes to peace and stability and helps prevent wars protecting human 
lives across the planet, the conception of legitimacy is morality, not democracy, since 
only a handful of the member states of the UN are members of the UNSC.  
 
In order to make sense of legitimacy, one must approach legitimacy in terms of 
conceptions and object of legitimacy. What exactly is being asked here, whether the 
UNSC itself is legitimate, or whether one specific action of the UNSC, such as a 
resolution authorising an attack, is legitimate? It could be the case, that a legitimate 
entity occasionally issues illegitimate decisions. What is, the next question follows, the 
standard/conception of legitimacy in each instance – of the UNSC and of a specific 
action?  
 
The last question, i.e. what conception of the concept of legitimacy is being used, 
already assumes the possibility of there being more than one conception of legitimacy 
of the same object (such as the UNSC). If there are indeed different conceptions of 
legitimacy (for the same object), then legitimacy is a contested concept. If more than 
one conceptions are well evidenced, well argued and there is no independent argument 
solving the dispute between the competing conceptions, then legitimacy is an essentially 
contested concept. If legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, then even after 
identifying the conception of legitimacy used as correct and appropriate, we do not 
necessarily (though that depends on the context and the object of legitimacy; there are 
instances where only one conception of legitimacy stands) exclude all other possible 
conceptions as inappropriate.  
 
Not answering the question of essential contestability of legitimacy leads to confusions 
and miscommunications in the legitimacy discussion. We may think we agree, yet we 
disagree. Suppose the following two sets of claims as examples. The first claim is that 
the US/UK attack on Kosovo was legitimate and the conception of legitimacy assumed 
is that it stopped Milosevic from exterminating more innocent civilians (protection of 





because although the NATO bombings exterminated more innocent civilians than 
Milosevic, it applied the western plans for the area. One can regard a referendum as 
illegitimate because it divides a country at crucial moments when unity is essential, 
whereas another may regard the same referendum as illegitimate because the stipulation 
of the question was misleading. Hiding the contrasting conceptions under the word 
‘legitimacy’ gives the illusion of agreement, whereas the substantial disagreement 
remains hidden and the discussion may continue on false premises. 
 
By answering the question of essential contestability of legitimacy, we frame the 
discussion of legitimacy properly. It becomes clear that there are, or at least can be, 
depending on the case, different conceptions of legitimacy, so the first 
response/clarification to statements or questions of legitimacy should be what the 
standard/conception is, unless of course that is obvious. Then, we ask whether all the 
different conceptions are well argued and well evidenced and whether there is an 
independent argument solving the dispute between competing conceptions, in order to 
determine if, in the given instance, legitimacy is an essentially contested concept. If not, 
then we have good reason to attempt to determine which is the correct or best 
conception of legitimacy of the given object of legitimacy. By contrast, if in the given 
instance legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, then we understand that the 
object of legitimacy can be evaluated by different standards and that will essentially 
change the discussion form one of legitimacy, to whatever the conceptions are. 
‘Legitimacy’ will no longer be the correct rhetoric to use as it will be causing more 
confusion than clarity, hiding essential disagreements and conflating essentially 
different evaluations of, and thus different discussions on, the same object. 
 
Furthermore, there is the question of the nature of the concept. If legitimacy is not an 
essentially contested concept, then we know we ought to attempt to identify the correct 
conception in each instance. We know that legitimacy is a concept which always has a 
fixed content, depending on which conception is correct. We know that we do not have 
to be too tolerant towards competing conceptions but be predisposed to reject other 
conceptions once it has been proven that one conception is correct. If, however, 
legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, we are more inclined to exercise caution 
when examining different conceptions of legitimacy, even after one has been proven to 





one correction being correct. To understand legitimacy, we need to understand whether 
it is an essentially contested concept.  
 
Let’s put this in context. Democracy is indeed a well-evidenced and well-argued 
conception of political legitimacy. If legitimacy is not an essentially contested concept, 
then the quest for the standard of political legitimacy has ended. It is a dead issue. We 
ought not seek for any other standard, as we have found the one. If other conceptions do 
arise, assuming the concept is contested but not essentially contested, we are 
predisposed to assume one conception is correct and the other is wrong with all this 
entails. It is only when understanding that legitimacy could, though not in every 
instance, be an essentially contested concept, that we understand that it is not strange if 
there are more than equally well-argued and evidenced conceptions. 
 
It becomes clear then that legitimacy receives its content from conceptions. If so, how 
come there is a concept of legitimacy at the first place? If advanced conceptions are 
conceptions of the one concept of legitimacy, what is the content of the concept that 
these conceptions specify? If there is a concept of legitimacy, it has to have a minimum 
content detached from any conceptions, that is specified by conceptions. If legitimacy is 
not an essentially contested concept but it has predetermined conceptions, then it cannot 
have any fixed meaning or content detached by its conceptions, so legitimacy per se is 
meaningless, it is a non-concept. As stated above, this minimum content of legitimacy 
detached from its conceptions is a vague standard of properness.  
 
The essential contestability of legitimacy, if so, may be able to account for legitimacy as 
a unified concept within and also outside law. If legitimacy is not an essentially 
contested concept and its content is predetermined by given conceptions, then 
legitimacy when used in law is bound to have an entirely different meaning than in 
instances like ‘legitimate argument’ and ‘legitimate daughter’ which we shall soon 
discuss. However, if legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, then it may have a 
minimal content (vague properness), which becomes more concrete in context. As we 
shall see, this scheme leads to the trichotomy of legitimacy, which is the fundamental 






1.3. Thesis and Thesis Structure 
Indeed, the argument begins with the trichotomy of legitimacy. In the next chapter, I 
will give examples of the concept of legitimacy used in different contexts, with law 
being merely one of those contexts. Amidst different contexts, in order to identify one 
concept of legitimacy, it will be necessary to climb high on the ladder of abstraction, to 
what I call Tier1: legitimacy in abstracto. Indeed, in its most abstract form, legitimacy is 
a vague standard of properness. At this high level of abstraction, legitimacy as a concept 
is not specified by any conceptions and it is not matched with any object of legitimacy. 
Tier 1 consists merely of the concept of legitimacy detached from any conceptions. 
Then, we will climb one step down in the ladder of abstraction, Tier 2, thus matching 
the concept with specific objects – what can be legitimate? Given the topic of the 
discussion obviously pertaining to law, we will not be referring to legitimate arguments 
or legitimate children, which are instances of legitimacy of the same tier but with 
different objects, but we will refer to legitimacy of the four object types of legal form, 
namely individual law, action, actor, and legal order. This is where the gist of 
conceptual analysis takes place. In Tier 2, the discussion must proceed to certain 
distinctions, which are necessary for legitimacy to be properly understood, before 
proceeding to individual conceptions of legitimacy (Tier 3) which give concrete 
meaning to legitimacy. I will illustrate this by the conventional distinction between 
normative and descriptive (or sociological or perceived) legitimacy and clarify that this 
discussion pertains to normative legitimacy. I will then try to refute nihilism and explain 
how such a refutation is necessary for understanding normative legitimacy and then 
claim that although there is conceptually room for understanding legitimacy as entirely 
procedural, it is best understood as at least partly substantive. Following Applbaum, I 
will end Chapter 2 by rejecting two views well established in the literature, namely that 
legitimacy is a claim right on the one hand and a liberty right on the other. I will 
conclude that legitimacy is a second order right, namely moral power. This claim, 
although already made by Applbaum, is extremely important for conceptual analysis 
and thus this discussion in overall, as it determines the nature of the concept in terms of 
the normative status of the addressee.  
 
In Chapter 3, I will discuss the relation of the concept of legitimacy with neighbouring 





the former, I will first explain how it is that, assuming legal positivism, so called ‘legal 
legitimacy’ is essentially a non-concept (‘legal legitimacy’ refers to a specific 
understanding, rather say misunderstanding, of legitimacy; it is irrelevant to what I 
referred to above as ‘legitimacy of law’ which means legitimacy in the context of law, 
such as legitimacy of a legal order, legitimacy of a government, legitimacy of an 
individual law, which was meant to exclude uses of legitimacy irrelevant to law such as 
‘legitimate daughter’ and ‘legitimate argument’). Then, I will analyse the neighbouring 
concept of legitimacy, namely authority, and explain the relationship between the two. 
At the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the relation of legitimacy with 
conceptions of legitimacy. Relying on Gallie, I will start by explaining what essentially 
contested concepts are. I will then briefly explore how the concept vs conception 
distinction was discussed by Hart, Rawls and Dworkin. Finally, I will illustrate how it is 
that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, which is the thesis, the claim of the 
argument, and the main contribution of this discussion to knowledge.  
 
In Chapter 4, I will enter Tier 3, the level of conceptions of legitimacy, discussing 
legitimacy of international law in particular. Just like Tier 2 could be legitimacy 
matched with any object, such as an argument, as in ‘legitimate argument’, Tier 3 could 
consist on any conception of an object of legitimacy. As mentioned above, legitimacy 
has traditionally been heavily discussed in terms of political legitimacy; also, in 
political legitimacy, the conception of democracy dominates, thus making it hard to see 
legitimacy as an essentially contested concept. By contrast, legitimacy in international 
law has been discussed relevantly only recently, especially after the US/UK attack on 
Kosovo. I analyse Buchanan’s conception of legitimacy of international law, namely 
justice in the sense of protecting human rights, because this conception of legitimacy, as 
I explain, renders legitimacy as an essentially contested concept. Towards the end of the 
chapter, I briefly discuss two other, yet related conceptions of legitimacy of 
international law, namely Buchanan’s later view on legitimacy, namely the 
Metacoordination view, and end with Ratner’s twin-pillar conception consisting of 
advancing peace and respecting, in the sense of not violating, basic human rights.  
 
Unlike political legitimacy, legitimacy of international law helps us see legitimacy as an 





legitimacy of international law in particular to be discussed, that it occupies such a great 
extent in this discussion?  
 
1.4. Significance of Legitimacy of International Law 
The concern about legitimacy of international law rose with facts, which directly and 
dramatically affected the lives of many people around the globe, and in some ways, they 
still do. Indeed, although the obvious reason why we care about legitimacy of 
international law and international institutions is that we might want to know whether 
they are worthy of our support,1 it is relatively recent facts, which sparked the interest in 
legitimacy. In particular, after the Cold War, attempts to establish the rule of law in 
international relations have rather failed. Some typical examples of this failure which 
are often cited is the inconsistent and drifting response of the international community 
to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the half-hearted, abortive intervention to rebuild a 
shattered civil order in Somalia, the world’s paralysis (or indifference) in the face of 
genocide in Rwanda, the absence of a genuinely global, multilateral response to global 
terrorism.2 These facts prompt us to start morally theorizing international law. However, 
theorizing alone does not make the world a better place and theorizing international law 
is not creating international law. Therefore, the question regarding the significance of 
legitimacy of international law amounts to: how is moral theorizing of law important if 
it does not lead to better legal rules? 
 
Some writers on legitimacy maintain that moral theorizing of international law is 
important because it provides “prescriptive principles that will provide substantial 
guidance for at least most of the important issues with which international law must 
deal or which it could profitably address.”3 The idea here is that the reason why 
international law failed to address the problems mentioned above (dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, etc.) is not fully explained just by states which have the 
resources to further the rule of law not committing themselves to do so, but also by lack 
of moral principles. International law has plenty of legal principles in its armoury, but it 
																																																								
1 See, e.g. Daniel Bodansky, ‘Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations’ in	 Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International 
Relations (CUP 2013), 326; ‘worthy of our support’ means only that and does not include moral 
obligation to obey. 
2  See, e.g. Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law (OUP 2003), 9. 





does not have a moral guidance to apply them consistently. Examples of inconsistent 
application of legal principles are plentiful.  
 
During the Yugoslav crisis, the United States and other Western powers 
sometimes appealed to the hoary principle of the territorial integrity of 
existing states, sometimes to the stirring but vague principle of 
self determination (that perennial threat to the territorial integrity of states), 
sometimes to the principle of uti possidetis (according to which boundaries 
are to remain fixed unless changed by mutual consent), and sometimes to 
the principle of democracy (which on some interpretations implies 
self determination for minority groups, but on others overrides it). But so 
too did those massive violators of human rights, Milošović and Tudjman. 
Responses to the break up of the Soviet Union revealed the same 
confusion about principles. Americans felt indignant when Gorbachev said 
it was inconsistent for them to revere Lincoln for preserving the Union and 
condemn him for resisting the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yet few 
could explain precisely why his analogy was mistaken.4 
 
Although it is admitted that the content of legal rules ultimately depends on legal 
practice which in turn also depends on political will, it is believed that a set of moral 
principles will make legal principles more consistent and coherent and thus more 
effective. I find this reasoning very well intended in an effort to make this world 
somehow better, but I also find it slightly presumptuous. There is no doubt that 
consistency will increase what Franck would call “pull to compliance.”5 Indeed, legal 
rules which are less ambiguous, more specific, more consistent, are more likely to be 
enforced.  
 
However, in order for it to be true that a set of moral principles will make legal 
principles more consistent, there ought to actually be a set of moral principles. These 
moral principles must either be fully agreed upon, as a matter of convention, or they 
must necessarily derive from international law itself, or law as a phenomenon. There is 
no indication that there is such an agreement, either in the world of international 
relations, or in the world of international theorists. On the contrary, states and political 
leaders seem to widely disagree on any such moral principles. The People’s Republic of 
																																																								
4 Ibid. 
5 Thomas M Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 The American Journal of 
International Law 705, 705; see also, ‘Legitimacy and Fairness’ in Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (OUP 2011) where he explains that the degree to which a rule is perceived as legitimate is 
itself affected by certain intrinsic properties both of that rule and of the process by which it was made, 
and the process of its interpretation by judges and officials and he discusses four indicators of legitimacy 





China tends to see international law much more about protecting state sovereignty and 
maintaining the status quo, as is seen both in her policy in surrounding seas and the veto 
in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding interventions for protecting 
human rights, whereas the US presumably sees international law more about protecting 
human rights, even if that entails violating the status quo and state sovereignty, 
presumably for human rights, as it claims to have done, for example, when attacking 
former Yugoslavia. There seems to be disagreement about such principles, if there are 
any, in the world of international theorists as well. Whereas some theorists would 
advance justice in the sense of protecting human rights as these moral principles, as 
opposed to peace, others would advance a two-pillar system comprising of advancing 
peace and respecting, in the sense of not violating, human rights, whereas one could 
consistently hold that peace/stability is another conception of legitimacy of international 
law.6  
 
A great contribution of this discussion is that it identifies what is offered by such 
theories in the field: by arguing for such standards of legitimacy, they are advancing 
substantive conceptions of the concept of legitimacy. In other words, they make 
substantive arguments why such conceptions of legitimacy are better candidates for the 
concept of legitimacy. But the contribution of this discussion moves further than that. It 
identifies essential internal tensions within these theories on the one hand, and on the 
other hand it answers the question of what the relation between these conceptions of 
legitimacy is. Thus, this discussion illustrates two ways with which legitimacy of 
international law is an essentially contested concept: by the conception itself being 
essentially contested (e.g. justice) on the one hand, and by the absence of an argument 
solving the dispute between well argued conceptions (e.g. protecting human rights, 
peace + refraining from violating human rights). Indeed, although certain remarks on 
values will result from the analysis, the present discussion does not attempt to present 
another substantive moral argument in favour of a different/better conception/standard 
of legitimacy, but it analyses the concept of legitimacy per se, it asks what lies in the 
concept of legitimacy detached from its conceptions, and what we can and cannot 
logically derive from this concept without taking a stand in a substantive moral debate.   
 
																																																								





For the purposes of this part of the discussion regarding the significance of legitimacy 
of international law as a topic worth pursuing and a question worth asking, it suffices to 
say that it is presumptuous to assume that just because there is a need of moral 
theorizing of international law, there necessarily are such moral principles to start with, 
which are perfectly consistent with each other in the absence of internal tensions 
between them. The latter simply does not logically follow from the former.  
 
Therefore, the significance of the discussion of legitimacy of international law is not to 
necessarily find more moral principles or a better moral standard of international law, 
but first to carefully examine what the question really means, explore the nature of the 
concept of legitimacy, and only then investigate whether, in terms of substantive 
conceptions, there are indeed any such moral principles or that one moral standard 
which can function not just as goals, but also as the correct conception of legitimacy of 
international law. Assuming that the existing set of moral principles or moral standard is 
not merely goal(s) international law pursues and/or ought to purse, but also the most 
appropriate conception of legitimacy, already changes the question of whether there is a 
(moral) standard of legitimacy to the question which that standard is. Since moral 
principles are often enshrined in human rights, claiming that there are such moral 
principles, already seems to answer the question whether there is a fixed standard of 
legitimacy, and moves on to answer the next question, claiming that standard to be 
human rights. This kind of hasty discussion seems to have answered the question of 
legitimacy by having found the correct standard, when barely having asked the question 
of the nature of the concept of legitimacy and possible internal tensions within the 
advanced standard, let alone other conceptions. The importance of the inquiry is exactly 
to figure out if there are such principles, if so, what are they, how it is that they function 
as not only a goal but also a standard of legitimacy and why we should accept them 
among other alternatives; and if there aren’t any other well argued alternatives, what 
does the question really mean? Indeed, the question of legitimacy will show that moral 
theorizing of international law, as in law in general, has more to do with understanding 
the nature of legitimacy as a concept, our fundamental understanding of what law is 
and, perhaps more importantly, what it is not, and internal tensions within advanced 






All this may sound very disappointing, as the reader may feel that the discussion may 
yield no ‘practical’ results. Yet, clarifying misconceptions of other theories which 
attempt to yield such results, establishing the right framework for the legitimacy 
discussion and understanding the nature of the concept of legitimacy, yields a much 
more useful result: a clearer understanding of international law as legal system and of 
law in general as a phenomenon.  
 
Proper conceptualization of the discussion can induce agreement. Without a proper 
conceptualization of legitimacy, inflation of theories presenting substantive moral 
arguments as standards of renders the concept of legitimacy a perpetuating battleground 
of antagonising standards of legitimacy with no light at the end of the tunnel. One writer 
arguing for justice in the sense of protecting human rights, another writer arguing for 
peace and respecting, in the sense of not violating, human rights, and then the first 
writer moving to another view (Metaoordination view which we will refer to very 
briefly in the end of the discussion) does not lead the legitimacy discussion to any 
fruitful results. By contrast, by understanding the nature of legitimacy as an open-ended 
concept, i.e. a concept with no predetermined content, apart from a vague standard of 
properness (Tier 1 of the trichotomy of legitimacy), that obtains content from 
substantive conceptions, which will depend not only on objective criteria but also on the 
object in question and the context (circumstances), one understands that legitimacy 
being an essentially contested concept does not imply that the concept is essentially 
contested in all instances. Besides, the barriers between concept and conceptions may 
chang. 7  Clearly, ‘legitimate daughter’ is hardly contested, let alone essentially 
contested, but even with objects of legal form, legitimacy being an essentially contested 
concept means that it can be so, not that it is always so. In the case of legitimacy of 
international law, it is indeed so because of the way it has been construed. 
Understanding that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept because of the high 
level of abstraction of its minimal content (vague standard of properness), helps us 
frame the legitimacy discussion properly: instead of projecting predetermined criteria to 
legitimacy, it is best to, when deploying the concept of legitimacy to evaluate an object 
																																																								
7 “The distinction between a concept and its conceptions is not hard and fast. It might shift over time as 
ideas get settled and then unsettled again. It might shift in the course of a single conversation, as we 
struggle to clarify where we disagree, and make judgments about whether, for a particular question, 
ordinary linguistic usage is more or less illuminating than stipulative definition, or whether highly 
moralized thick terms are more or less useful than relatively thin descriptions.” Arthur Isak Applbaum, 





of legitimacy, consider first what is the appropriate standard given the object and the 
context, and then consider whether the standard itself does not suffer from internal 
tensions such as a plurality of principles without hierarchy, sufficient prioritisation or 
specificity in order to yield content concrete enough to act as standard. Proper 
understanding of legitimacy will render us immune to becoming victims of misleading 
narratives. I will get back to such final reflections when I conclude the discussion.  
 
For now, having stated the thesis, that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, 







Trichotomy of Legitimacy – Tiers 1 & 2 
 
2.1. Introduction: Trichotomy of Legitimacy 
We think through language. Concepts are expressed with words. Inevitably, to reach a 
concept, we must start with words/terms used to express the concept. In doing so, one 
must be careful so as not to use words that merely refer to certain meanings of the 
concept. For example, a complete account of the concept of ‘justice’ is impossible if 
one traces uses of the term that refer merely to the Rawlsian conception of justice, as 
that would entail losing sight of the traditional conception of justice, which is protecting 
or not violating human rights. What we reach by accounting for all uses of a concept is 
the most abstract account of a concept, i.e. the concept in its most abstract form. This is 
what I call Tier 1. We can imagine this level of concept being at the top of the pyramid, 
or the ladder of abstraction. As we climb down the pyramid, or lower the concept in the 
ladder of abstraction, the concept becomes more specified. In the second level, Tier 2, 
legitimacy is related to law. In particular, legitimacy is linked with the four object types 
of legal form, namely individual law, action, actor, and legal order. In the lower level of 
the pyramid or the ladder of abstraction, Tier 3, legitimacy is most specified. This is the 
level of normative conceptions of legitimacy. As regards that final tier, in this 
discussion, only certain normative conceptions of legitimacy of international law will be 
discussed. 
 
Many points in this chapter rely on Applbaum’s work. This is barely a choice: 
Applbaum’s work is the only work in contemporary literature engaging with legitimacy 
in the same manner as in this discussion. First, Applbaum deals with normative, not 
descriptive legitimacy such as Thomas Franck. Second, Applbaum does not deal with 
specific normative conceptions of legitimacy, but with concept analysis of legitimacy, 
as is this discussion. To the extent of my knowledge, he does not conceptualise 
legitimacy in a trichotomy, which is a novelty of this discussion, nor does he reach the 
claim that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept. He does, however, in line with 
what this discussion is about, reach, in a logical, consistent and generally valid route of 






2.2. Tier 1: Legitimacy in Abstracto 
In this tier, the concept of legitimacy is most abstract. This is the concept of legitimacy 
per se: detached from any context. Imagine a ladder of abstraction where the higher a 
concept lies in the ladder, the more abstract it becomes; respectively, the more we lower 
the concept in the ladder of abstraction, the more specific and concrete it becomes, thus 
procuring more meaning and content. The first is the highest tier of the ladder, the 
concept of legitimacy in its most abstract form.  
 
How do we reach the concept of legitimacy at the top tier of the pyramid, Tier 1, i.e. 
legitimacy at its most abstract form? We trace different uses of the term ‘legitimacy’ 
which are as unrelated as possible and find the commonality between them which 
identifies the content of the concept. This methodology is dictated by the nature of the 
object of study: concept. In order to analyse the concept detached from its conceptions, 
it is only inevitable that we refer to instantiations of this concept. 
 
Since it is not the first time this methodology has been deployed in the field, it is worth 
mentioning a notable previous use: Hart. Finnis correctly points out that Hart, trying to 
define law, is using an array of instances where ‘law’ is used, and he looks for that 
common element among them, which is the minimum content of the concept.8 ‘This one 
thing common is the criterion of the ‘essence’ of law, and thus the one feature used to 
characterize and to explain descriptively the whole subject-matter.’9 This is how Hart, 
by comparing ‘moral law’, ‘international law’ etc., ends with a sine qua non for law, 
namely rules for guidance for officials and citizens. Since law regulates a society, rules 
are an essential component of law. Like Hart, we are trying to appeal to the 
‘components of the concept.’10 
 
There are two notable differences with Hart that the methodology here with the 
instances of legitimacy ought to be contrasted with. First, Hart is using instances of 
where the word ‘law’ is used, whereas I am referring to instances where the concept of 
legitimacy is deployed. As we shall see later, word, concept and conception (of a 
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concept) can be three quite distinct things. Although this difference will not come to 
play in the specific examples used, it is present in principle: Plato and Aristotle were 
Greeks, wrote in Greek, and did not use the English term ‘legitimacy’, even though they 
did refer to the concept, as we shall see. The other difference is the level of abstraction. 
‘Moral law’ and ‘international law’ are indeed different things and it is true that by 
detecting the common element between them, we reach the necessary component of 
law: regulation of behaviour, rules of conduct. Notably, both these examples are in the 
same level of abstraction. By contrast, although it is clear what is meant by ‘legitimate 
daughter’ (born in marriage), it is not so clear what is meant by ‘illegitimate law’ – is it 
illegitimate because of its content, e.g. it sends Jews to genocide or political dissidents 
to their deaths, or is this law illegitimate because even though of good content it was 
laid down by improper procedure, e.g. by a military coup instead of by the procedures 
described n the constitution? As we shall see, this difference is due to the nature of 
legitimacy being contextualised by conceptions/standards when attached to specific 
objects, whereas this is not the case with the concept of law.   
 
It could be argued that Austin gave his own ‘conception’ of law11; is there any relevance 
with the conceptual analysis in this discussion which is premised in the distinction 
between the word, concept and conceptions of the concept? The answer is negative. 
When Austin presents a ‘conception’ or ‘definition’ of law, what he is in fact doing, is 
answering a very specific question, irrelevant to the conception vs concept issue which 
is the crux of this thesis. In particular, Austin, being a consistent legal positivist, asks 
the following question: what makes law legally valid? Austin replies: it being a 
command of the sovereign backed by threat. One could label Austin’s answer as 
‘Austin’s conception of law.’ He would not be wrong, but he would not be relevant to 
our discussion either, because in our discussion, the task is one of conceptual analysis, 
not addressing a specific question of legal validity. This confusion would be best 
avoided is Austin was not referred to as having presented ‘a conception of law’, but 
rather having addressed the question, in consistency with legal positivism, of what 
makes law legally valid. Hart addressed this question as well; but the similarity with 
finding the commonality between many uses of legitimacy to reach its minimum 
																																																								





content is not in the rule of recognition but in detecting common elements between 
instances of law. 
 
What are then, such uses of ‘legitimacy’ and what is then the commonality between 
them? “In ordinary language, we say, ‘legitimate argument,’ ‘legitimate self-defence,’ 
‘legitimate theater’, legitimate daughter,’ legitimate monarch,’ and ‘legitimate state,’ 
but beyond sharing some vague notion of properness, these uses do not share much.”12  
Legitimacy in its most abstract form, Tier 1, is a vague notion of properness. I will 
elaborate on this in the next few paragraphs. 
 
In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a 
governing law or a regime. Whereas ‘authority’ denotes a specific position in an 
established government, the term ‘legitimacy’ denotes a system of government. An 
authority viewed as legitimate often has the right and justification to exercise power.  In 
Chinese political philosophy, since the historical period of the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 
BC), the political legitimacy of a ruler and government was derived from the Mandate 
of Heaven, and unjust rulers who lost said mandate therefore lost the right to rule the 
people. In moral philosophy, the term ‘legitimacy’ is often positively interpreted as the 
normative status conferred by a governed people upon their governors’ institutions, 
offices, and actions, based upon the belief that their government's actions are 
appropriate uses of power by a legally constituted government13. Hobbes held that in the 
state of nature, everyone’s self-preservation is under threat, the natural right to self-
preservation cannot be relinquished and political authority is created by the social 
contract with which people authorize a sovereign to guarantee their protection; political 
authority is legitimate as long as the sovereign ensures the protection of the citizens 
(Leviathan, Chapter 21).   
 
‘Legitimate daughter’ though seems to suggest something quite different. Legitimacy, 
in traditional western common law, is the status of a child born to parents who are 
legally married to each other, and of a child conceived before the parents obtain legal 
divorce. Conversely, illegitimacy (or bastardy) has been the status of a child born 
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outside marriage, such a child being known as a bastard, or love child, when such a 
distinction has been made from other children. Depending on local legislation, 
legitimacy could affect a child's rights of inheritance to the putative father's estate and 
the child's right to bear the father's surname or hereditary title. The Legitimacy Act 
192614 of England and Wales legitimized the birth of a child if the parents subsequently 
married each other, provided that they had not been married to someone else in the 
meantime. The Legitimacy Act 1959 extended the legitimization even if the parents had 
married others in the meantime and applied it to putative marriages which the parents 
incorrectly believed were valid. Clearly, legitimacy here pertains to legal rights of the 
child. Yet, it is hard not to notice a moral implication here. Centuries ago, legislation 
according to which children born within marriage had certain rights contrast to children 
born outside marriage was reflecting public morals. At those times, it was regarded as 
immoral to have children outside marriage and in many cases such an event was even a 
cause of shame to the child, especially to the daughter, and the probably to the mother. 
‘Legitimate daughter’ then seems to refer to both the legality and morality of birth, so to 
speak. 
 
How about ‘legitimate self-defence’? Does it also conflate legality with morality? In 
Leviathan (1651), Hobbes (using the English term ‘self-defence’ for the first time) 
proposed the foundation political theory that distinguishes between a state of nature 
where there is no authority and a modern state. Hobbes argues that although some may 
be stronger or more intelligent than others in their natural state, none are so strong as to 
be beyond a fear of violent death, which justifies self-defence as the highest necessity. 
In the state of nature, there is no authority, no organized society, no state and no laws. 
Therefore, the right to self-defence cannot be referring to a legal right, i.e. the right to 
self-defence granted by law. The right being a non-legal right seems to lead to the 
conclusion that the right is moral. This claim seems to rest on the premise that the 
binary ‘legal-moral’ covers all possibilities. However, it could be argued that although 
defending others against an aggressor is moral, defending myself against an aggressor is 
mere prudence or an act of rational self-interest, not moral per se. Therefore, it could be 
argued that the right to self-defence could be understood as being a right based on 
prudential reasons/reasons of self-interest and reasons of necessity. This understanding 
																																																								





is compatible with Hobbes’ understanding of self-defence as being ‘justified’. Many 
moral philosophers would draw a distinction between an action being ‘moral’ and an 
action being ‘justified’. An action being ‘moral’ means that it derives from valid moral 
principles, whereas an action being ‘justified’ means it is permitted all-things-
considered, which includes reasons of self-interest/prudential reasons which are not 
moral. However, such a distinction seems to be conflated by Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, according to which: 
 
‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’ 
 
Article 12 seems to make no distinction between defending oneself (prudence/self-
interest) and defending family members (morality). Article 12 is of course a legal 
clause, thus stating a legal right, but being a human right, it is also the legal 
manifestation of a moral right. The right to self-defence then, could be understood either 
as a justified action based on all-things-considered judgement when defending oneself 
and a moral right when defending others, or a moral right covering both such instances.  
 
How about the legitimate right to self-defence of states? In his 1625 magnum opus The 
Law of War and Peace, Hugo Grotius stated that “Most Men assign three Just Causes of 
War, Defence, the Recovery of what's our own, and Punishment.” Again, ‘legitimate’ 
here could be understood as meaning ‘moral’, or ‘justified’ (all-reasons-considered) 
which is broader than just moral. In either case, ‘legitimate’ here would be contrasted, 
like with individual self-defence, to ‘legal’, which is determined according to the 
relevant international legal rules, namely Article 51 of the UN Charter and the legal 
right of self-defence of states according to customary international law.  
 
Finally, the interesting choice of words ‘legitimate argument’ clarifies that legitimacy as 
a concept does not only pertain to morality (or prudence/self-interest) but also to notions 
of properness entirely irrelevant to legality and morality. Thus, ‘legitimate argument’ 
may simply mean a valid argument, i.e. an argument in which it is impossible for the 
premises to be true and the conclusion false at the same time. Alternatively, it may 





premises to be true and the conclusion false at the same time. It may mean a good 
argument, i.e. a valid or strong argument, or it may mean a valid argument where all the 
premises are true.  Although the terms ‘valid argument’, ‘true/false premises’, ‘strong 
argument’ and ‘good argument’ have a specified meaning when referring to arguments, 
the term ‘legitimacy’ in these instances does not; it is a matter of fact whether in the 
context of a specific conversation the specific meaning of ‘legitimate argument’ is 
demonstrated. However, although the specific meaning of these terms varies, we can 
elevate legitimacy higher in the ladder of abstraction, in order to examine if there is any 
commonality between them. What do these meanings of ‘legitimate argument’, i.e. valid 
argument, strong argument, good argument, have in common? Since the 
characterization as ‘legitimate’ is not ascribed to specific claims, premises or 
conclusion, but to the argument in its entirety, and since the difference between an 
argument and a series of premises is that the former includes the logical procedure from 
which we move from certain claims, the premises, to another claim, the conclusion, a 
commonality between the meanings of ‘legitimate argument’ could be properness of 
procedure.15 
 
Properness of procedure may as well be the commonality between legitimacy of a 
monarch, a state, a daughter and an argument. If only the son of the deceased king ought 
to be king, then only that son is the legitimate monarch. If Donald Trump was indeed 
loser of the national vote and won the elections with the help of Russian intelligence 
operatives, if George W. Bush was loser of the national popular vote and if Barack 
Obama was not born in the USA, then these presidents are illegitimate because, like the 
daughter born out of wedlock, their terms in office were conceived through improper 
procedure.16  
 
However, properness of procedure seems to still be not high enough in the ladder of 
abstraction in order to capture the entire spectrum of possible meanings. The criterion of 
properness extends to substantive, aside from procedural, matters. It is with this 
meaning that the US legal order of the 18th century is illegitimate, as it violated, or at 
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least failed to protect, basic human rights of a large part of its population, the slaves. 
The illegitimacy here does not rest on properness of procedure, but on properness of 
substance: the content of fundamental legal norms.   
 
Indeed, the only connection between several instances of legitimacy, such as legitimacy 
of a monarch, a state, a daughter and an argument that we examined above, is a notion 
of properness. ‘Legitimate daughter’ means a daughter born ‘properly’, i.e. within 
marriage, without necessarily separating legality from morality. ‘Legitimate self-
defence’ refers to a right, both legal and moral, with stress on the latter, that is proper 
for individuals and states to have. ‘Legitimate argument’ means a proper argument, here 
in the sense that it has been derived with a proper procedure. ‘Legitimate state’ and 
‘legitimate monarch’ mean proper state or monarch, typically in the sense that the state 
or the monarch is justified in exercising power. At its most abstract level, Tier 1, 
legitimacy is not more specific than a vague notion of properness. 
 
An objection could be raised here. If legitimacy does not only pertain to law and is 
much more abstract, a vague notion of properness, how is it then, that earlier uses of the 
word ‘legitimacy’ coincided with ‘lawful’? Does this not cause conceptual confusion? 
None of the uses of the term we examined is a metaphorical use. 
 
Indeed, it has been documented in the literature that earlier uses of ‘legitimacy’ referred 
to ‘lawful’. Thus, to say that something was ‘legitimate’ was to say that it was ‘in 
accordance with the law’, perhaps with the most fundamental laws of society.17 
Applbaum states that the earliest work he has found ‘that uses ‘legitimacy’ as the 
primary normative term of art by which to evaluate rulers is the Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos.’18 This piece of writing was probably written around 1575 and it was 
published in 1579. It constitutes a great contribution to the Huguenot resistance19 
literature. The justification of resistance to tyranny is attributed to Philippe de Plessis-
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18 Applbaum, (n 16), 26. 
19 Huguenot rebellions, also called Roman wars, after the Huguenot leader Henri de Rohan, were three 
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Mornay (1549-1623), a young Protestant aristocrat who served Henri of Navarre as 
military officer, diplomat and counsellor. It is possible that authorship has been shared 
with his older friend, Hubert Languet (1518-1581).20 The Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos 
was written only a few years after the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacres of 1572 and 
among the French Protestant works of political thought that address the question of 
justified resistance, it is the most developed and most influential. However, it is not the 
most original – that would be either François Hotman’s Francogallia or Théodore 
Beza’s Right of Magistrates. But unlike Hotman, Beza or Bodin, the major absolutist 
writer of the day, the Vindiciae reputedly deployed the term ‘legitimacy’ as a normative 
property of rulers that did not simply mean legality or procedural correctness.21 
 
Earlier uses of the term, however, cause no conclusion whatsoever, as long as one 
makes the distinction between the word/term, and the concept. Words may refer to 
entirely different concepts or things. For example, ‘pool’ may refer to a man-made area 
of water (swimming pool) or to a game where players try to put the coloured and 
numbered balls into the holes around the edges of the table (billiards). ‘Nails’ are the 
hard parts of fingers and toes, but also thin, sharp metal pieces used in construction. The 
word ‘bank’ may refer to the financial institution or to the side of a river. In these cases, 
the words have more than one meanings/concepts at the same point in time. It is also 
possible for words to change the concept they refer to through time. The word ‘gay’ 
used to mean a light-hearted, cheerful and happy man, whereas now it means a 
homosexual man. In the instances mentioned in the previous paragraph, the word 
‘legitimacy’ meant ‘lawfulness’. In other words, the term ‘legitimacy’ was not 
deploying the concept (that we now discuss as) legitimacy, but the concept (that we now 
discuss as) lawfulness. The concept we now discuss as ‘legitimacy’ is a vague notion of 
properness (Tier 1). In abstracto, it is void of concrete meaning. It thus more commonly 
discussed in more specific contexts, which specify the vagueness of properness. What 
happens to this vague concept when lowered in the ladder of abstraction? 
 
																																																								
20 Skinner attributes it to Mornay. See Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought 
Vol. II (CUP 1978), 305, whereas Garnett, who prepared the excellent and painstaking contemporary 
translation, concludes that the work most likely is the result of close collaboration with Languet, see 
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2.3. Tier 2: Legitimacy in Law 
In the Tier 2, the concept of legitimacy is lower on the ladder of abstraction, if looking 
from above (Tier 1); or higher, if looking from lower, from the point of view of a more 
specified concept (Tier 3). The crucial characteristic of the second tier is that legitimacy 
here relates to the four object types of legal form. We are not referring to legitimacy of 
an argument any longer. The concept here becomes legally relevant.  
 
Legitimacy is linked with four object types of legal form: actions (e.g. an invasion), 
norms (customary right to self-defence), actors (e.g. states, international organizations) 
or legal systems (domestic or international).22 Legitimacy of each of these object types 
can be treated separately, even in the same factual context.23 Hence, the US invasion of 
Iraq (an action) could be criticized as illegitimate, even by those who still recognized 
the legitimacy of the USA (an actor) as a state and major power, while the USA 
criticized the legitimacy of existing restrictions (norms) on self-defence, and others 
criticized the Security Council (an institution, thus actor) for being illegitimate because 
it failed to prevent the invasion, or the international legal order (a system) for proving 
so impotent.24  
 
It is rightly argued that influences between objects of legitimacy do not entail 
legitimacy assessments of the objects not functioning independently. Indeed: The legal, 
economic, social and cultural links between various objects of legitimacy ensure that 
what affects one will often affect another. In the short term, however, even intimately 
connected objects tend to operate, for legitimacy purposes, independently. Hence, the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system may be said to enjoy widespread legitimacy even 
though panels may occasionally issue reports that are considered seriously deficient, 
and the UN Security Council may retain legitimacy even when it struggles to confront 
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massive human rights violations in Syria. Depending on the object of legitimacy, 
different legitimating mechanisms may apply, and its legitimacy may be subjected to 
greater or lesser scrutiny. When engaging in legitimacy debates, it is thus important to 
be clear about exactly what one is arguing to be legitimate or illegitimate.25  
  
This does not prevent certain objects of legal form, let’s call them derivatives, deriving 
their legitimacy from other objects of legal form. Although the four objects of legal 
form can be evaluated separately legitimacy-wise, it is not impossible for some objects 
of legitimacy to be legitimate because they have been issued by another object of 
legitimacy, assuming the latter is legitimate. Assume that the UNSC is legitimate. 
Although some decisions of the UNSC may be illegitimate, many decisions of the 
UNSC may be legitimate because they are decisions of the UNSC, i.e. they derive their 
legitimacy from the UNSC; in other words, the UNSC, an actor, confers legitimacy on 
decisions, which are a different object of legal form, namely actions. We can see the 
decisions here as being the derivative. We do not always need to argue or prove the 
legitimacy of the derivative separately and it may be the case that once the initial object 
of legal form is legitimate, evaluating (legitimacy-wise) the derivative separately will 
come into play if the grounds of the criticism are such so as to render the derivative 
illegitimate, and these are probably independent grounds: the grounds based on which a 
UNSC decision may be illegitimate (e.g. political pressure or threats against a 
permanent member) are independent of the reasons why the USNC is legitimate (peace 
and stability).  
 
2.3.1. Normative vs. Descriptive Legitimacy 
Having clarified what could possibly be the object of legitimacy at this tier and that 
legitimacy here is legally relevant, what then, one would now ask, does legitimacy 
mean? The kind of properness implied here is surely not the same as in the ‘legitimate 
argument’. What is the discussion about? Philosophical and legal literature usually 
begin the legitimacy discussion, typically defining it roughly as a moral right to rule.26 
At this point, a crucial distinction is at place. Indeed, for conceptual analysis to be 
precise, one has to distinguish two different concepts which hide behind the same word. 
																																																								
25 Ibid. 
26  See, e.g. Applbaum, (n 12), 216: ‘In specifying the concept of legitimacy fruitfully, and in 
distinguishing the concept from its various conceptions, we might begin with the rough notion that the 





Therefore, the discussion begins with the crucial distinction between normative 
legitimacy and descriptive (or sociological or perceived) legitimacy. The distinction is 
crucial because, as the following analysis will illustrate, the concept of legitimacy is 
deployed merely by normative legitimacy, whereas sociological legitimacy is a rather 
deceiving term which deploys a concept pertaining to human attitudes.  
 
As is often stated, normative legitimacy is genuinely having the moral right to rule, 
whereas descriptive legitimacy is the social fact that people believe an object of 
legitimacy has the moral right to rule; it is also sometimes added that ‘descriptive’ or 
‘sociological legitimacy’, pertaining to nothing more than human perceptions towards 
legitimacy, is a misleading way of referring to ‘perceived legitimacy’.27 The right to 
rule is the moral right to create legally binding rules. The necessary and sufficient 
conditions for this moral right to obtain is a matter of normative conception of the 
concept of legitimacy (Tier 3), whereas what necessarily is the content of the concept of 
legitimacy is a matter of conceptual analysis (Tier 2).  
 
Descriptive or sociological legitimacy is best illustrated with examples. Suppose that in 
ancient kingdom, people believe that absolute kingship which has been traditionally laid 
down from one king to the other is legitimate legal order. This descriptive claim yields 
the standard of descriptive or sociological legitimacy, not normative legitimacy. It is a 
social fact about human attitudes, i.e. what people believe. The investigation of the 
behaviour of addressees of law yields the standard of descriptive or sociological 
legitimacy. The question asked here is essentially what people believe, or better say, 
whether people believe that a legal order, a state, an action or any object belonging to 
any of the four object types of legal form, is legitimate, regardless of whether it is true 
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or not. To push things a little further, if people believe that Nazi legal order is a 
legitimate, or North Korea is a legitimate state or that the US-UK attack on Kosovo was 
legitimate, or an international legal order which allows for piracy is legitimate, these 
beliefs would answer the question of descriptive or sociological legitimacy.  
 
A sociologist could then engage with a further descriptive inquiry, asking why it is that 
people hold these beliefs, why people feel this way, why people believe the object in 
question (law, legal order, state, action, etc.) is legitimate. The answer to the question 
why people believe an object of legitimacy is legitimate or illegitimate could be called 
the standard of descriptive/sociological/perceived legitimacy.  
 
According to Weber, all such standards fall under only three categories of legitimation 
strategies which he calls ‘pure types’. First, legal authority is based on a system of rules 
that is applied administratively and judicially in accordance with known principles. The 
persons who administer those rules, the superiors, are appointed or elected be legal 
procedures, and they are oriented toward the maintenance of the legal order. The people 
subject to their command obey the law instead of implementing it. Superiors are also 
subject to rules that limit their powers, separate their private lives from official duties 
and require written documentation for transactions to be valid.28 So people could even 
regard Nazi rulers as legitimate, regardless of whether they were in fact legitimate, 
merely because the Nazi rulers, some appointed some elected (like Hitler), had legal 
authority based on a system of rules that was applied administratively and judicially, 
they were oriented toward the maintenance of the legal order, people subject to their 
command obeyed the law instead of implementing it, etc. Second, legitimation based on 
traditional authority is the belief that an authority is legitimate because it ‘has always 
existed’. People in power usually enjoy it because they have inherited it. Officials 
consist either of personal retainers (in a patrimonial regime) or of personal loyal allies, 
such as vassals or tributary lords (in a feudal society). Their prerogatives are usually 
similar to those of the ruler above them, just reduced in scale, and they too are often 
selected based on inheritance.29 For example, people of an ancient kingdom could 
regard their king as legitimate, merely because kingship ‘has always existed’. Finally, 
charismatic authority is based on the charisma of the leader, who shows that he 
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possesses the right to lead by virtue of magical powers, prophecies, heroism, revelations 
or other extraordinary gifts. His followers regard him as legitimate because they believe 
in his unique extraordinary qualities (his charisma), not because of any tradition or legal 
rules.30 Some people in North Korea who have been brainwashed by the regime believe 
that their dictator is a legitimate ruler because they regard him as a charismatic ruler 
who is always right in virtue of magical powers. Weber maintains that in history, these 
‘pure types’ are always found in combination.31  
 
Despite Weber’s account, there is theoretically no limit to what could drive human 
minds to regard an object of legitimacy as legitimate or illegitimate. In this regard, 
Frank investigates what it is that makes subjects of law obey certain laws even in the 
absence of coercion, what he calls ‘pull to compliance.’32 Many such questions can be 
asked, and these questions are sociological, like the inquiry of what the effects of law 
are in a society. Such is the sociological inquiry of whether people believe an object of 
legitimacy is legitimate. This inquiry is purely descriptive as it merely describes the 
world as it is.   
 
To sum up then, descriptive or sociological legitimacy is what people, a matter of fact, 
believe to be legitimate and perhaps on what grounds, regardless of whether they are 
right or wrong. Applbaum is correct to state that Weber’s account of legitimacy is an 
exercise in descriptive social science, not normative political philosophy, and the object 
of description is the social fact that people have beliefs about the normative grounds of 
legitimacy.33 Indeed, sociological or descriptive legitimacy is preferably referred to as 
perceived legitimacy and in any case a discussion best categorized as belonging in 
sociology of law or more generally social science. 
 
By contrast, normative legitimacy invites a philosophical inquiry. Normative legitimacy 
means that the standard is what it is, regardless of what the standard is believed to be. It 
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is indifferent to people’s beliefs and it is interested in norms and moral concepts: what 
is the standard of legitimacy? The philosophical inquiry here is not what people happen 
to believe that the normative grounds are, but the normative grounds themselves. What 
is legitimacy as a concept? Is there a standard by which law, legal orders, legal entities, 
etc. can be morally evaluated? Ought law be in a certain way? It is those normative 
grounds that we are looking for. Clearly, this discussion pertains exclusively to 
normative legitimacy.  
 
Having distinguished descriptive from normative legitimacy, it is reasonable to expect 
an analysis of the connection, if any, between the two. I will explain how it is that as a 
matter of conceptual analysis, there is no necessary connection between descriptive and 
normative legitimacy; any connection between them would be a matter of normative 
conception of legitimacy – which would belong to Tier 3 – and in my opinion false, as 
will be explained below. 
 
There seem to be writers who assume a connection between normative and descriptive 
legitimacy. For some, “descriptive legitimacy seems conceptually parasitic on 
normative legitimacy since beliefs about legitimacy are usually beliefs about whether an 
institution, as a normative matter, has a right to rule.”34 Obviously the connection here 
is wrongly assumed: beliefs may be mistaken. If such a mistake was not a possibility, 
the one sense of legitimacy would be a manifestation of the other. The possibility of 
error, as a matter of logic, not fact, i.e. regardless of the how often it occurs as a matter 
of fact, entails that human attitudes may falsely deploy the concept of legitimacy, so 
there is only the impression of legitimacy being discussed, whereas the discussion is 
merely about human beliefs, not legitimacy.  
 
On the other hand, some argue the other way around, that normative 
legitimacy depends on descriptive legitimacy. It has an intrinsically social 
quality and depends on people’s beliefs. An institution could not be 
normatively legitimate if no one thought so. As Andrew Hurrell (2005: 29) 
argues, legitimacy is "quite literally meaningless outside of a particular 
historical context and outside of a particular set of linguistic conventions 
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and justificatory structures. To paraphrase Ronald Dworkin, legitimacy has 
no DNA.35  
 
Bodanksy goes on however to rightly disagree with those illusory connections and agree 
with the normative/sociological distinction as illustrated above:  
 
But the normative and descriptive/sociological perspectives on legitimacy 
clearly differ. If we ask what makes an institution normatively legitimate, 
the answer will depend on arguments about moral, political, and legal 
theory. In contrast, if we ask what makes an institution descriptively 
legitimate, the answer will depend on empirical and explanatory arguments 
about what people believe and why. Normative legitimacy depends on 
whether an institution objectively has a right to rule – whether its claim is in 
some sense true. It focuses on qualities of the ruler that morally justify its 
authority – for example, its democratic pedigree, transparency or expertise. 
In contrast, descriptive legitimacy concerns whether actors subjectively 
believe that an institution has a right to rule. It focuses on the attitudes of the 
ruled, rather than on the qualities of the ruler, and this reflects ‘not the truth 
of the philosopher but the belief of the people’ (Clark 2005: 18, quoting T. 
Schabert). An institution is descriptively legitimate when it is socially 
sanctioned (Reus-Smit 2007: 158) and when people tend to follow its 
decisions not because of self-interest or compulsion, but because they 
accept the institution’s right to rule (Hurd 1999).36  
 
Bodansky correctly makes the point that the distinction of descriptive and normative 
legitimacy itself makes it clear there is no necessary connection between the two. 
Finally, Applbaum illustrates and exemplifies the point with utmost clarity: 
 
But it is a conceptual confusion to hold that ‘legitimate’ simply means 
‘believed to be legitimate,’ for descriptive legitimacy is parasitic on the 
conceptually prior idea of normative legitimacy. What is supposed to be the 
content of these beliefs about legitimacy? Consider: when the objects of this 
social scientific description, the members of some political society, believe 
that a rule or a ruler is legitimate, they are not (or not simply) engaging in 
their own social scientific description of each other’s beliefs. If that were so, 
when the citizens polled by the Los Angeles Times were asked ‘Is Bush 
legitimate?’ each would have to answer ‘I don’t yet know— I haven’t seen 
the results of this poll.’ What descriptive legitimacy describes are views 
about normative legitimacy. (This is so, by the way, even if normative 
legitimacy does not exist, which would be the case if various forms of moral 
skepticism or anarchism were true. Unicorns do not exist either, but the idea 
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of a unicorn does, and therefore one’s beliefs about what a unicorn is can be 
mistaken.)37 
 
Descriptive and normative legitimacy are clearly distinct. Two points of Applbaum 
ought to be stressed. First, descriptive or sociological or perceived legitimacy is not 
description of each other’s beliefs, but views about normative legitimacy. Second, 
descriptive legitimacy is indeed parasitic on the conceptually prior idea of normative 
legitimacy but this does not establish a connection between descriptive and normative 
legitimacy, because it does not mean that the one is condition of the other. Descriptive 
legitimacy being parasitic on the conceptually prior idea of normative legitimacy is a 
claim entirely reducible to descriptive legitimacy being views about normative 
legitimacy; this claim merely tells us what descriptive legitimacy is. The complete 
independence of the one concept from the other is manifested by the last part: (not only 
normative legitimacy stands independent of descriptive legitimacy but also) descriptive 
legitimacy stands independent of normative legitimacy because people can have views 
about a concept (such as normative legitimacy), even if normative legitimacy does not 
exist, as is the case with unicorns and Santa Clause. Indeed, descriptive and normative 
legitimacy are entirely distinct. As will be soon discussed below, any connection 
between the two concepts – descriptive and normative legitimacy - is a matter of a 
specific normative conception of legitimacy, not a matter of conceptual analysis. To 
make it even clearer that there is no logical connection between descriptive and 
normative legitimacy, I will examine all possible logical connections descriptive and 
normative legitimacy may have.  
 
What is, if any, the relationship between descriptive (sociological/perceived) and 
normative legitimacy? I will examine all the logically possible connections: descriptive 
legitimacy being necessary and sufficient condition for normative legitimacy, perceived 
legitimacy being a sufficient condition for normative legitimacy and perceived 
legitimacy being a necessary but not sufficient condition for normative legitimacy.  
 
Is perceived legitimacy a necessary and sufficient condition for normative legitimacy? 
In other words, here we will examine whether the following claim could be sustained: 
an object is legitimate if and only if most people (for whatever the reason) believe that 
																																																								





the object is legitimate. Notably, this is a claim about the normative criteria of 
legitimacy, i.e. a particular conception, and not a claim about the meaning of 
legitimacy, which is conceptually more primitive than social facts about beliefs about it.  
 
Though not incoherent, such a claim is mistaken. In most cultures over most 
of history, women have believed that their husbands had legitimate 
authority over them, but that didn’t make it so. Similarly, the fact that 
people in a society believe that their rulers have legitimate authority, or the 
fact that the rulers of other societies believe that the rulers of the society in 
question have legitimate authority, doesn’t make it so.38 
 
Applbaum gives another reason why it is that perceived legitimacy is not a necessary 
and sufficient reason for normative legitimacy: 
 
Furthermore, it does seem that a conception of normative legitimacy that is 
wholly a function of beliefs about legitimacy fails the test of transparency, 
in that it depends on some people holding a different conception. Suppose a 
two-member polity is subjected to the rule of an outside ruler. Both 
members believe that the correct conception of legitimacy is that the ruler is 
genuinely legitimate just in case the other believes the ruler to be legitimate, 
and illegitimate just in case the other believes the ruler to be illegitimate. 
Neither has beliefs about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the ruler, nothing 
else counts for or against legitimacy, and it is common knowledge between 
the two that this is their conception. Then there are two stable normative 
equilibria, legitimacy and illegitimacy, and this is so because there are two 
stable epistemic equilibria: both members’ believing the ruler to be 
legitimate and both believing the ruler to be illegitimate. But there are no 
grounds whatsoever for choosing between the two equilibria. As specified, 
neither the members nor their conception can deliver an answer to the 
question “Is this ruler legitimate or illegitimate?  
 
This result generalizes to the N-person case in which the conception of 
legitimacy that everyone holds is that the ruler is legitimate if and only if n 
or greater out of N persons believe the ruler to be legitimate, for n greater 
than 0 and less than N. To tip one way or another, there need to be 
exogenous beliefs about legitimacy or exogenous presumptions in favor of 
inferring beliefs in legitimacy that are precluded by the theory. For even if 
we suppose that each member of this society subscribes to the general 
conception that genuine legitimacy is wholly a function of beliefs about 
legitimacy, but they hold varying specific values for the critical threshold n, 
ranging from the minimal threshold of n = 1 up to the demanding threshold 
of n = N-1, the cascade that will bring about unanimous justified belief in 
legitimacy (or, symmetrically, illegitimacy) cannot get started unless one 







happen if all form beliefs about legitimacy in accordance with their 
conception: the cascade depends on someone believing in the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of the ruler on different grounds, or on making a mistake in 
inference about the beliefs of others.  
 
In some games with multiple equilibria, aren’t some strategies dominant? 
Yes, but this is not a game of strategy, in which players choose actions to 
their rational advantage. What to believe here is given by one’s normative 
theory, and is not a matter of choice. Pascal’s wager notwithstanding, a 
rational person cannot choose to believe. One can choose to consent, and on 
a normative account of legitimacy in which only consent matters, with the 
added assumption that it is to the rational advantage of each (or, on Kant’s 
view, the duty of each) to live under legitimate rule, choosing to consent 
and thereby making the ruler legitimate is indeed a dominant strategy. But 
now consent, and not belief in legitimacy, is doing the work.39 
 
Having established that perceived legitimacy is not a necessary and sufficient condition 
for normative legitimacy, we can now proceed to examine whether perceived legitimacy 
is merely a sufficient condition for normative legitimacy. Applbaum continues: 
 
The appeal of taking perceived legitimacy as a sufficient condition for 
genuine legitimacy may arise from conflating perceived legitimacy with 
consent. An obvious way that belief in legitimacy and consent can come 
apart is when the belief has been fraudulently manufactured. If I agree to be 
governed by the winner of an election who actually stuffed the ballot boxes, 
or if I agree to be governed by God’s prophet who actually is a con artist, I 
have not genuinely consented. Perceived legitimacy and consent also can 
come apart in a deeper way. I can believe that a government has the right to 
govern us without our consent without that belief itself constituting consent. 
When the bastard Edmund’s nonfictional contemporary, James I of 
England, argued for the divine right of kings, he explicitly denied that the 
legitimacy of his power depended on any sort of consent. Now imagine you 
are an English subject taught to believe that the king is God’s lieutenant on 
earth, answerable to God alone. You chafe at James’s violations of his 
subjects’ liberties, and have the mischievous thought that if your consent 
mattered, you would not grant it, but, alas, you believe that consent doesn’t 
matter. I think it odd to say of a person whose belief in the legitimacy of a 
ruler depends on the belief that human volition is irrelevant to legitimacy 
has consented to be ruled.40 
 
The first point, belief having been fraudulently manufactured, is quite clear. It is indeed 
clear that legitimacy and consent come apart when subjects regard as legitimate the 
winner of an election, although they were unaware of the fact that the winner actually 
																																																								






stuffed the ballot boxes. Perceived legitimacy obtains because there is a belief (based on 
ignorance of crucial facts) that the object of legitimacy (actor; winner of the election) is 
legitimate. However, subjects of legitimacy have not consented in a genuine way, 
exactly because of ignorance of crucial facts. There are of course different theories 
about what consent involves and one possible theory, subjects consent merely by saying 
‘I consent’ even if they do not know all the relevant facts. However, this would not be a 
‘genuine’ consent; ‘genuine’ consent is a consent based on knowledge of all the relevant 
facts. Because of ignorance of crucial facts (winner stuffed the ballot boxes, actor is not 
God’s prophet but a con artist), genuine consent is not granted. Yet, because of this 
ignorance, there is a belief that legitimacy obtains.  
 
The second point is quite less clear. Indeed, by believing that the government has the 
right to govern us without our consent, we have not consented. Besides, holding that 
belief is perfectly consistent with strongly disagreeing to consent based on other 
grounds. In the example, the subject has been taught to believe that James I of England 
is legitimate because James is God’s lieutenant on earth answerable to God alone. Thus, 
perceived legitimacy obtains. In order for perceived legitimacy and consent to come 
apart in this example, it has to be the case that the subject does not consent. We thus 
assume that that our subject does not consent to James because James violates the 
liberties of his subjects. Thus, perceived legitimacy and consent come apart. However, 
it is unclear how the subject would not consent to James because of violation of 
liberties, since the subject has been taught to believe that the king is God’s lieutenant on 
earth and answerable to God alone. It seems to me that for the same reason why the 
subject would regard James as legitimate, i.e. for the same reason why perceived 
legitimacy would obtain, consent would also obtain. If I believe that king is legitimate 
because of his divine connection, I would consent for this same reason. If I believe that 
the king being God’s lieutenant on earth and answerable to God alone is not enough for 
me to consent to be ruled by him because he violates the liberties of his subjects, I see 
no reason for believing any differently when it comes to whether the king is legitimate. 
It is indeed strange to say that someone believes that legitimacy of a ruler does not 
depend on consent, and that person consented. It is not entirely clear though how this 






Regardless of the issue of consent, the same type of examples which proved that 
perceived legitimacy is not a necessary and sufficient condition for normative 
legitimacy, also prove that perceived legitimacy is not a (merely) sufficient condition 
for normative legitimacy. In most cultures over most of history, women have believed 
that their husbands had legitimate authority over them, but that didn’t make it so. 
Similarly, imagine a legal order where citizens are brainwashed to believe that the 
government is legitimate, while it is committing horrendous atrocities like ethnic 
cleansing. This regime is legitimate in a descriptive/sociological sense because citizens 
believe that the government is legitimate, but the government is illegitimate normatively 
speaking. Perceived (sociological) legitimacy is not a sufficient condition for genuine 
(normative) legitimacy.  
 
Could perceived legitimacy be a necessary but not sufficient condition of genuine 
legitimacy? The answer is that perceived legitimacy is not a necessary condition for 
genuine legitimacy, i.e. there is no necessary connection between the two as a matter of 
conceptual analysis, but perceived legitimacy could be a necessary condition of 
normative legitimacy in the context of a specific normative conception of legitimacy. 
Suppose that people in post war Germany had felt that the government of the Allies was 
illegitimate; it would still be legitimate. Descriptive legitimacy is not a necessary 
condition for normative legitimacy. Thus, the only way descriptive legitimacy could be 
relevant to normative legitimacy, is by descriptive legitimacy being a condition of a 
substantive normative conception of legitimacy. Applbaum is states that: “…descriptive 
legitimacy might be a necessary but not sufficient condition of normative legitimacy. 
This would be so if some measure of effectiveness were a condition for the justified 
exercise of coercive control, and the perception of justification were necessary for 
effectiveness.”41 I would not be too quick to identify descriptive legitimacy/perception 
of justification as necessary for effectiveness. It is possible for coercive control to be 
exercised effectively, without perceived to be legitimate or justified. Suppose that most 
North Koreans (not only the ones that attempt to flee) regard the North Korean legal 
order as illegitimate and its exercise of coercive control as unjustified. Even if so, the 
North Korean legal order is effective.  
 
																																																								





Regardless, in more general terms, although there is no connection between descriptive 
and normative legitimacy, one could construe a conception of normative legitimacy in 
such a way so as to include descriptive legitimacy among the necessary conditions of 
normative legitimacy. For example, one could argue that a legal order is legitimate if 
and only if it is minimally democratic, protects fundamental human rights of all and is 
regarded as legitimate by its own subjects. Although such a conception of normative 
legitimacy is possible, it would be, in my opinion, problematic, because it could be the 
case that a legal order which satisfies the other requirements apart from descriptive 
legitimacy, fails the latter exactly because it satisfies the other necessary requirements. 
In the same example, imagine a society which regards their legal order as illegitimate 
because it is minimally democratic – suppose the subjects are religious fanatics who 
believe only representatives of God should rule by divine mandate -, and because it 
protects fundamental human rights of all -  suppose the subjects believe that minorities 
of different religious groups should not enjoy all fundamental rights. In this case, the 
legal order in question would be illegitimate because the descriptive legitimacy 
requirement is not satisfied. Although it is entirely consistent to simply regard this legal 
order as illegitimate based on this conception of legitimacy, it is hard not to notice that 
if we assume the first two conditions as ‘true’, the third is ‘false’. If the first true 
conditions are based on objective grounds which are assumed as true, which is why they 
are required in every evaluation of an object of legitimacy, the beliefs seem to be simply 
a falsity. Making normative legitimacy dependent on descriptive legitimacy would 
render normative legitimacy dependent on morals of a specific society in a specific 
time. ‘Normative’ is thus diffused in relativism. I will elaborate on relativism below. At 
this point, we can conclude that descriptive legitimacy could be a necessary condition of 
normative legitimacy but that is exclusively a matter of normative conception of 
legitimacy, which is a matter of substantive argument; as a matter of conceptual 
analysis, descriptive legitimacy is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of 
normative legitimacy.  
 
On the other hand, is normative legitimacy a necessary and/or sufficient condition for 
descriptive legitimacy? Again, the answer turns to the negative. Imagine the same 
example. In a legal order with a legitimate government, citizens believe that the 
government is illegitimate because the government officials are not religious enough. 





obtain. Therefore, normative legitimacy is not a necessary condition for descriptive 
legitimacy. Also, the normative legitimacy condition is satisfied, yet it does not 
guarantee that descriptive legitimacy obtains. Therefore, normative legitimacy is neither 
necessary nor sufficient condition for descriptive legitimacy. Although it is undoubtedly 
desirable for citizens to regard legitimate bodies, governments, actions and rules as 
legitimate and, as a matter of fact, descriptive legitimacy may usually (though not 
always) overlap with normative legitimacy, it is not the case the there is any 
implicational relationship (necessary or sufficient) or logical connection whatsoever 
between descriptive and normative legitimacy. 
 
There is, however, a caveat here. In order for the distinction between perceived and 
normative legitimacy to be valid and there being no implicational relationship or logical 
connection whatsoever between these two concepts, it has to be the case that the 
normative legitimacy is indeed normative. It has to be the case that normatively 
speaking, a government, for example, is illegitimate when it exterminates members of 
its society in virtue of their religious beliefs, regardless of what people believe is 
legitimate or illegitimate. As we noticed above with a possible normative conception 
rendering normative legitimacy dependent on descriptive legitimacy, to the extent that 
normative legitimacy includes a moral standard, it has to be the case that the moral 
standard exists and is not relative. This claim excludes moral nihilism from the 
discussion of normative legitimacy.  
 
2.3.2. Refuting Nihilism 
Indeed, moral nihilism, the view that there are no objective moral facts, is not a view 
one can hold when discussing normative legitimacy. Moral nihilism is a meta-ethical 
view, so a few words on metaethics are in order. Although it may have been expected 
that the legitimacy discussion is about ethics – whether peace or human rights or 
democracy or this or that moral standard is the best standard-, conceptual analysis has 






Meta-ethics is second order ethics because they make claims about moral theories.42 
Ethics or morals are theories about what is right and wrong, such as consequentialism 
and Kantianism. By contrast, meta-ethics do not tell us what is right and wrong, what is 
morally permissible, impermissible or obligatory, but they are theories about what 
moral statements mean. A moral statement, such as ‘Killing for entertainment purposes 
is wrong.’ has different meaning when assuming different meta-ethical theories.  
 
More specifically, meta-ethics addresses two separate questions: 1. What state of mind 
are we in when we assert statements about right and wrong? 2. Are there mind-
independent moral truths? These two questions invite for two different classifications of 
meta-ethical theories. As regards the first question, people disagree about what moral 
statements intend to express, beliefs or desires. Are moral statements even capable of 
being true or false? Can they have a truth value, or do they merely express an attitude? 
The opposing schools here are cognitivism and non-cognitivism or emotivism or 
expressivism. Cognitivism holds that moral statements do express beliefs and that they 
are apt for truth and falsity. Non-cognitivism holds that moral statements have no 
substantial truth conditions, i.e. they are not apt for truth and falsity, and that moral 
statements do not express states of mind which are beliefs, or which are cognitive in the 
way that beliefs are; rather they are expressing non-cognitive attitudes more similar to 
desires, approval or disapproval.  
 
The classifications differ in terms of the second question, which is what interests us 
most in this discussion. The second question is whether there are objective moral truths 
out there in the world, in other words whether moral facts populate the universe of facts. 
The opposing schools here are objectivism and non-objectivism. According to moral 
objectivism, there are objective moral truths. The truth value of moral statements 
																																																								
42 In philosophy, ‘ethical theory’ and ‘moral theory’ are used interchangeably, but in English ‘ethics’ and 
‘morals’ are not used interchangeably.  One reason for this is that ‘ethics’ is commonly used to refer to 
adherence to a code of conduct, as in ‘business ethics’ or ‘medical ethics’, which might prohibit an action 
that is not morally impermissible.  For example, insider trading is a violation of business ethics, but it is 
hard to see how buying or selling stocks on information that one has and others do not is morally 
impermissible.  It is contrary to medical ethics for a psychiatrist to have an intimate relationship with a 
patient, but it is hard to see how it is morally impermissible for two competent adults to have a 
consensual intimate relationship, provided they are not already committed to someone else.  In English 
language, the term ‘morals’ also has a different connotation from ‘ethics’ in referring possibly to a list of 
traditional restrictions such as a prohibition against extramarital sex. The different uses of the terms 
‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ in English language are irrelevant to this discussion, as the terms ‘ethical theory’ 





(true/false) is unchanged through space and time and independent of people’s opinions 
or any other human attitudes.  
 
Cognitivism and objectivism usually go together, but not necessarily so. The famous 
‘error theory’ of Mackie for instance combines cognitivism with non-objectivism, 
arguing that whilst moral statements try to express truth (cognitivism), there is no truth 
out there to be expressed (non-objectivism). Moral statements are like statements about 
Santa Clause: they try to be true but since there is no truth out there, they are all false.  
 
Non-objectivism negates objectivism. Thus, non-objectivism or moral nihilism holds 
that there are no objective moral facts. I will examine three moral nihilist theories, 
which are negated by normative legitimacy. 
 
Error theory discussed above is a moral nihilist theory. Error theory holds that moral 
statements ascribe properties to states of affairs and these properties do not exist. It 
therefore implies that there are no objective moral facts. Remember that ‘objective’, as 
typically used, means ‘attitude-independent’. Notably, one nihilistic alternative to error 
theory would be a crude kind of expressivism: there are no moral facts and moral 
statements merely express attitudes (other than belief) and do not make assertions. This 
view also negates the existence of objective moral facts, so it is a nihilist theory.  
 
Another nihilist theory is individual relativism or subjectivism. According this theory, 
moral statements mean that the utterance is true according to the speaker, i.e. the 
speaker holds the opinion stated in the utterance. In other words, what is morally right 
or wrong for each one of us depends on what each person believes is morally right or 
wrong, i.e., right or wrong is relative to the individual. The moral facts are not 
objective; they may alter from person to person. For example, to claim ‘It is wrong to 
kill for fun’ means that the subject stating the claim believes that it is wrong to kill for 
fun. 
 
Respectively, according to cultural relativism (or relativism or conventionalism), moral 
statements mean that the utterance is regarded as true by the culture in which the 
speaker belongs. In other words, what is morally right or wrong depends on what the 





are concerned with. The moral facts are not objective; they may alter from society to 
society. For example, to claim ‘It is wrong to kill for fun’ means that according to the 
culture of the speaker, it is wrong to kill for fun. Notably, relativism as a meta-ethical 
theory does not refer to the descriptive fact, which we would all agree with, that 
people’s beliefs about morality differ from place to place and change through time; the 
point here is not the descriptive/sociological fact of what people believe, but whether 
there are objective moral facts or not, regardless of human attitudes.  
 
Indeed, subjectivism and relativism are generally useful, but irrelevant to this 
discussion. These two theories can help us understand psychological reasons motivating 
moral statements. They prompts us to ask whether a moral statement that was made 
about a moral rule actually does have a fixed value as moral objectivism would 
maintain or if in real it is simply an opinion of what is right and wrong according to a 
certain individual or culture, which is very often the case as different cultures have 
different moral values, ranging from exceptions to the prohibition of killing to standing 
in line when waiting for the train (compare England with India). This theory, however, 
is irrelevant to the discussion as it addresses, much like perceived legitimacy, 
descriptive sociological questions pertaining to whether and why an individual or a 
culture hold certain views. In the more general context of ethics, subjectivism and 
relativism seem to be missing the point because moral disagreements are disagreements 
about what is right and wrong, not about whether a specific subject has made a specific 
claim, which is a matter of fact (in the ordinary use of the term ‘fact’, i.e. not a moral 
fact). Ethical disagreements are about whether it is wrong to kill for fun, not about 
whether an individual or a culture believe that it is wrong to kill for fun. 
 
Having examined subjectivism and relativism, I will now discuss moral scepticism. 
This theory pertains to the epistemological question of accessing moral truths, not the 
ontological question of whether they exist. In other words, like expressivism, it pertains 
to the first question metaphysics tries to answer, - what state of mind we are in when we 
assert statements about right and wrong-, not the second – whether there are mind-
independent moral truths. Therefore, moral scepticism could be or could not be nihilist. 
If I were defining ‘moral scepticism’, I might say it is the view that we cannot possibly 
know that any moral proposition is true or false.  However, so stated, moral scepticism 





are true or false. The issue concerns the truth conditions of ‘know’. I can consistently 
hold that we do not know that we are not brains in a vat, yet claim that we are justified 
in not believing that we are. So, if moral scepticism is understood as a claim about 
knowledge and not justified belief, then perhaps we do not know moral propositions 
that we are justified in believing. So, moral scepticism as defined above is not a very 
threatening doctrine. For this reason, it might be better to characterize moral scepticism 
as the view that we cannot be justified in holding any moral beliefs. A downside of this 
characterization of course is that it seems absurd. 
 
Regardless, whichever version of scepticism we assume, the theory could be nihilist or 
not nihilist. According to the first version, scepticism is the view that we cannot 
possibly know that any moral proposition is true or false. One can hold this claim and 
consistently hold the claim that there are objective moral facts or the claim that there are 
no objective moral facts. The distinction between ontology and epistemology is present. 
By the same token, one can claim that we cannot be justified in holding and moral 
beliefs whatsoever, regardless of whether there are objective moral facts or not, as 
moral nihilism maintains.  
 
Difficulties of nihilist theories do not automatically prove moral objectivism. Not only 
the obvious problems we have seen pertain merely to subjectivism and relativism, not to 
error theory, but it is difficult to prove moral objectivism, given that it does not indicate 
the epistemological route for accessing any fixed truth values, assuming they exist. If 
there is no ‘proof’ of the existence of fixed truth values, how are we justified in 
understanding moral statements as anything more than mere opinions? 
 
Notably, the objectivism vs non-objectivism debate lies outside the scope of this 
discussion, because a substantive moral argument is hereby not made. In the context of 
a normative conception of legitimacy, if a substantive moral argument was made, moral 
objectivism would perhaps ought to be somehow proven or at least examined, at least as 
a better alternative to nihilism. However, since in this discussion such an argument is 
not made (as the discussion attempts a conceptual analysis of legitimacy without 







Although this discussion will not serve as a battleground between objectivism and non-
objectivism as it lies outside the scope of this discussion, a consistency argument is 
relevant. If moral nihilism is true, there is no room for discussing normative legitimacy, 
assuming that legitimacy includes some substantive, and more specifically moral 
criteria. The specific criteria of legitimacy to obtain, i.e. the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the moral right to rule, are a matter of normative conception of 
legitimacy, not conceptual analysis. The claim that is made here is that it is inconsistent 
to hold moral nihilism on the one hand and the claim that legitimacy includes moral 
criteria on the other. One could, theoretically, be a moral nihilist and hold a conception 
of legitimacy which contains only procedural criteria, or one could reject moral nihilism 
and hold any conception of legitimacy. This claim is relevant only if it is the case that it 
is not conceptually necessary that legitimacy only includes procedural criteria. Is this 
the case?  
 
2.3.3. Legitimacy: Substantive vs Procedural Dilemma? 
It could be argued that legitimacy is entirely procedural. If so, it would only make sense 
for a distinction to be made between procedural and substantive legitimacy. In the 
former case, the necessary and sufficient conditions for legitimacy to obtain would be 
procedural and in the latter substantive.  
 
Applbaum correctly argues that since the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
legitimacy to obtain is a matter of normative conception of legitimacy and not 
conceptual analysis, it is incorrect to maintain that as a matter of conceptual necessity, 
legitimacy is either only procedural or substantive.43 Indeed, as a matter of conceptual 
necessity, legitimacy can include both procedural and substantive criteria. Arguing to 
the contrary would be arguing for a specific normative conception of legitimacy, which 
in the scheme presented in this discussion would belong to Tier 3.  
 
Instead of dwelling on the mundane task of repeating Applbaum’s excellent scholarly 
work explaining in further detail why legitimacy, as a matter of conceptual necessity, 
can be both procedural and substantive and best reject entirely procedural conceptions 
																																																								





of legitimacy,44 I will limit myself to certain observations. These observations easily 
indicate that legitimacy is more commonly assumed to be both procedural and 
substantive. The fact that legitimacy is assumed to include both procedural and 
substantive criteria does not mean that the concept necessarily has such criteria. 
Besides, as stated above, the necessary and sufficient conditions for legitimacy to obtain 
are a matter of normative conception, not conceptual analysis. However, the observation 
that legitimacy is often assumed to be not only procedural but also substantive, brings 
out the importance of consistency in the discussion of legitimacy: if we rush to claim 
that legitimacy is only procedural, yet we catch ourselves maintaining that an object is 
illegitimate based on substantive grounds, then we are rendering ourselves inconsistent.  
 
Was the Nazi regime legitimate or illegitimate? Adolph Hitler was democratically 
elected, so procedure was followed. Indeed, Hitler did violate certain procedural rules 
after his election to power, but is this what the Nazi regime is regarded as having been 
illegitimate for or the immorality of genocide (substantive)? Had the Nazis followed 
strictly all procedure but had committed the same or even greater genocide, would the 
proponents of procedural legitimacy regard the Nazis as legitimate regime? If 
legitimacy is entirely procedural, a Nazi type regime which ticks all the boxes when it 
comes to procedure but establishes and regulates genocide would be legitimate. Would 
then the concept of legitimacy, thus construed, carry any significant weight?  
 
Next, if legitimacy is all about procedure, how does it differ from legality and legal 
validity? If the 18th century US legal order was legal/legally valid because it was 
effective and enforcing its constitution and satisfying procedural criteria, how would 
legitimacy, determined entirely by procedural criteria, differ from legality or legal 
validity? If a norm has been established according to the proper procedures provided by 
a given legal order, it is legally valid. If legitimacy is entirely procedural, then the law, 
regardless of substance, would be legitimate exclusively because it is legally valid. 
Legality/legal validity would then seem to fully overlap with legitimacy, rendering 
legitimacy a redundant concept. Interestingly enough, according to the Kosovo report, 
legality s exactly what legitimacy is typically contrasted to, referring to the “gap 
																																																								





between legality and legitimacy”45 and clarifying that “The Commission’s answer has 
been that the intervention was legitimate, but not legal, given existing international 
law.”46 
 
Finally, the US/UK attack on Kosovo reminds us that legitimacy is widely understood 
as including substantive criteria. This attack was an instance where the concept of 
legitimacy bore an extremely important role, i.e. the role of justification of an illegal 
attack on a sovereign state. This is an instance where legitimacy was used under careful 
consideration; an instance where the world relied on this very concept to determine 
whether an illegal attack which was to escalate force and increase the number of deaths 
was to take place. Legitimacy, in this important instance, obviously included 
substantive criteria: “It was legitimate because it was unavoidable: diplomatic options 
had been exhausted, and two sides were bent on a conflict which threatened to wreak 
humanitarian catastrophe and generate instability through the Balkan peninsula.”47 
Attacking illegally to prevent humanitarian catastrophe and maintain stability, as the 
attacked was thought to have intended, is not a procedural, but a substantive matter 
(preventing humanitarian catastrophe seems clearly moral).48 In this instance where 
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Response, Lessons Learned (OUP 2000), 291.  
46 Ibid, 289. 
47 Ibid. 
48 It has to be noted that, on the one hand, an intervention in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe 
and on the other hand, the actual intervention, i.e. the specific US/UK attack, after the Kosovo report, as 
it happened, are two different objects of legitimacy. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the one object does 
not entail legitimacy or illegitimacy of the other. The former is legitimate as it envisages an attack that 
will merely prevent, or rather say terminate, a humanitarian catastrophe. Determination of legitimacy of 
the actual attack would have to consider facts such as that the appropriate means to protect innocent 
civilians was land forces which can discriminate between combatants and civilians, whereas aerial 
bombings indiscriminately kill combatants and civilians and ‘Aerial strikes are not effective for 
protecting people on the ground who are likely to suffer additional discrimination and abuse because of 
the bombing’ (see Christopher Greenwood, ‘International Law and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo’ 
(2000) 49 ICLQ 926, 922); although the humanitarian catastrophe attributable to Yugoslav military forces 
resulted to a standard estimate of 2000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees (Noam Chomsky, 
‘The Current Bombings: Behind the Rhetoric’ (March 1999) < https://chomsky.info/199903__/> accessed 
23 April 2019 (under (2) How do these or other considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?), 
surprisingly, during the first 60 days of the 7 000 attacks (on more than 500 targets) NATO had killed as 
many as 1500 civilians, “this war, supposedly in defense of human rights, has led to war crimes being 
committed by NATO and a civilian casualty rate that is at least three times greater than the casualty rate 
of the ‘intolerable’ violations of human rights that NATO was supposedly acting to protect”, the result of 
the attacks provoking wider Serbian offensive against ethnic Albanians was foreseen by military and 
CIA, yet it was ignored, whereas diplomatic efforts for settlement had not been exhausted, “It is certainly 
hypocritical for those who propose a take-it-or-leave-it deal [which would have rendered Yugoslav and 
Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo largely fictive] to complain when the allegedly obstinate party actually 
offered a counterproposal”, “The Wall Street Journal reported, on April 27, that NATO had decided to 





legitimacy seems to have mattered the most, it is substantive criteria that did the heavy 
lifting.49 The Kosovo report is an excellent exemplification of the contrast between the 
concepts of legality and legitimacy. 
 
Indeed, if legitimacy is, as often stated, the moral right to rule, it includes substantive 
criteria as well, since morality is a substantive, or at a least partly substantive criterion. 
The ones who wish to argue for a normative conception of legitimacy which includes 
only procedural criteria would have a lot of work to do separating legitimacy from 
legality (making sure legitimacy does not collapse to legality), and also explaining, if 
possible, what other concept than legitimacy was actually deployed by the word 
‘legitimacy’ in the case of the US/UK attack to Kosovo where ‘legitimacy’ was used 
with substantive considerations. 
 
So far, certain claims have been made in terms of legitimacy in Tier 2: 
 
1. Descriptive or sociological or perceived legitimacy is distinct from normative 
legitimacy. These two concepts are not logically connected: as a matter of 
conceptual analysis, none of the two is a necessary or sufficient condition for the 
other to obtain; they are thus clearly distinct. Any logical connection between 
the two can only be argued in the context of a normative conception of 
legitimacy.   
2. If legitimacy is at least partly substantive and that includes morality, discussion 
of normative legitimacy is incompatible with nihilism or relativism. Thus, if one 
																																																																																																																																																																		
to hit civilian targets was made clear”, regardless of the fact that “Depriving a civilian population of water 
is a textbook example of a violation of international humanitarian law”, “the ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
in Kosovo has resulted in flagrant violations of international law and the UN Charter by NATO countries; 
it has turned what had been the brutal repression of a brutal armed uprising into a humanitarian 
catastrophe, and produced the first massive bombings of a European country since World War II, 
bombings that were aimed mainly at civilian targets” in Robert Hayden, ‘Humanitarian Hypocrisy’ 
(1999) 8 East European Constitutional  Review 91, 91-94 (see entire article for Figures on war activities, 
costs, losses and overall view of the attack); the NATO Treaty did not provide authority to act for 
humanitarian purposes and NATO did not attempt to use the Uniting for Peace Procedures of the General 
Assembly (Kosovo: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 4th Report, June 2000, (2000) 49 
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justification for the bombing of Yugoslavia was always the imposition of the NATO plans for the future 
of Kosovo (Ian Brownlie and CJ Apperley, ‘Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International 
Law Aspects’ (2000) 29 ICLQ 878, 879 and 896-904).  
49 Applbaum shares the understanding that the Kosovo Report grounds legitimacy on moral criteria: ‘To 
defeat the Kosovo Report, one has to provide a moral argument.’ in Arthur Isak Applbaum, (n 27), 80. At 






holds nihilism or relativism as true, there is no room for discussing normative 
legitimacy, assuming that legitimacy includes some substantive, and more 
specifically moral criteria.  
3. As a matter of conceptual analysis, it is not necessary that legitimacy is entirely 
procedural and there is room for legitimacy to be at least partly substantive. Any 
belief that legitimacy is entirely procedural is a matter of normative conception 
of the concept which does not derive from conceptual necessity.  
 
2.3.4. The Core of Legitimacy: The Three Views 
Having established these three claims, the discussion within Tier 2 can continue. In Tier 
1, legitimacy in its most abstract form is a vague standard of properness. How more 
specific than vague properness does legitimacy become in Tier 2, where the concept is 
linked with the four object types of legal form? Legitimacy, the moral right to rule, is 
what kind of moral right? Three Hohfeldian answers come into play. Legitimacy can be 
understood as a claim right, as a liberty right and as a moral power.  
 
I will now explain the distinction between claim and liberty right. In his highly 
influential work Fundamental Legal Conceptions, As Applied in Judicial Reasoning and 
Other Legal Essays, American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld made a seminal 
distinction between two senses of rights, namely claim rights or rights proper) and 
liberty rights (or privileges). Liberty rights and claim rights are the inverse of one 
another: X has a liberty right permitting him to do something only if there is no other 
person Y who has a claim right forbidding X to doing so, or, which is the same, if X 
does not have a duty to refrain from doing so. Conversely, if X has a claim right against 
Y, that other person's liberty is thus limited and Y has a correlative duty. This derives 
from the principle that a person is permitted to do all and only the things he is not under 
a duty to refrain from, and obligated to do all and only the things he is not permitted to 
refrain from. A person's liberty right to x consists in his freedom to do or have x, while a 
person's claim right to x consists in an obligation on others to allow or enable him to do 
or have x. For example, to assert a liberty right to free speech is to assert that I have 
permission to speak freely. This means that I am not doing anything wrong by speaking 
freely, that I do not have a duty not to speak freely. However, this liberty right does not 





or even that they would be wrong in preventing me from speaking freely. To say these 
things would be to assert a claim right to free speech; to assert that others are obligated 
to refrain (i.e. prohibited) from preventing me from speaking freely (that is, that it 
would be wrong for them to do so) or even perhaps obliged to aid my efforts at 
communication (that is, it would be wrong for them to refuse such aid). Conversely, 
such claim rights do not entail liberty rights. As we follow the Hohfeldian framework, it 
is important to recognize that it is analytically purificatory and definitional, not 
empirical or substantive. This analytic scheme is a framework of deontic logic, with 
positions connected by purely logical relations of entailment and negation. It does not 
attempt to prescribe or recount the substance and the distribution of actual entitlements. 
This framework is therefore not susceptible to moral objections or empirical 
refutation.50 
 
2.3.4.1. Legitimacy as a Claim Right 
Legitimacy was first understood as a moral claim right. In Crito, one of his earliest 
dialogues, Plato, the first to treat the question of legitimacy, understands legitimacy as 
what has later become the dominant, at least historically speaking, view of legitimacy, 
which is that legitimate political authority entails political obligations.51 Thus, Socrates 
finds himself having the moral obligation to abide by a decision of his fellow 
Athenians, not because he regards the decision correct, but because it is a decision taken 
in accordance with the laws of a legitimate state. The object of legitimacy, here the legal 
order of Athens, is presented as a bearer of the moral claim right demanding obedience 
towards the subjects of legitimacy, the ones legitimacy is directed towards, who are the 
subjects of the legal order, i.e. all the people under the governance of the city-state of 
Athens, Socrates included. 
 
Conception of legitimacy as a claim right seems to still be the standard view.  
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The standard view is that legitimacy entails two other normative relations: 
the moral obligation of those legitimately ruled by the ruler to obey, and the 
moral immunity of the ruler from coercive interference in the exercise and 
enforcement of legitimate rule. On this view, it is incoherent to hold that an 
authority is legitimate, but that those subject to the authority are not morally 
obligated to comply with its commands, or that others are not morally 
disabled from stopping the legitimate authority from exercising its 
legitimate powers. To think that legitimate commands do not necessarily 
obligate is like thinking that parenthood does not necessitate children.  
To take one important proponent of this view, John Simmons claims that 
‘state legitimacy is the logical correlate of various obligations, including 
subjects’ political obligations.’52 If, as Simmons holds, a subject’s consent 
or something like it is a necessary condition for a state to be legitimate with 
respect to that subject, then indeed a tight (but still, not airtight) connection 
between legitimacy and obligation would follow. For ordinarily, to what 
would the subject consent, if not to political obligation? But the consent of 
the governed is not itself a conceptual requirement of legitimacy: the view 
that a ruler is legitimate if and only if he has been anointed by the one true 
god is a mistake, but not a logical contradiction. So Simmons’s view should 
be understood as a normative conception of legitimacy. Simmons thinks that 
rival conceptions of what makes a particular state legitimate with respect to 
particular subjects suffer from not being sufficiently distinguishable from 
accounts of what justifies the state—that is, accounts of what must be the 
case for the exercise of coercion by the state to be morally permissible. As 
will be explained shortly, I agree that legitimate authority is not merely 
justified coercion, and Simmons surely is correct that a complete account of 
legitimacy must connect particular subjects to particular authorities. But it 
does not follow that consent to obligation is the only possible way to make 
this connection.53 
 
An explanation is in place. Indeed, legitimacy as claim right means not only that the 
object of legitimacy has the right to exist, e.g. a legitimate legal order/system being in 
place, a legitimate norm being in place, a legitimate actor acting in accordance with its 
rules, etc.,54 but also that that there is correlative moral duty to obey. Absence of that 
duty entails inconsistency, as Applbaum notes, because this moral duty is the necessary 
condition for a right to be a claim right; claim right necessitates the correlative moral 
duty to obey just like parenthood necessitates children. How is this moral duty 
accounted for? In other words, what makes one believe that there is such a moral duty? 
How does one account for the move from legitimacy entailing merely the right of the 
legitimate object to exist to adding the moral obligation to obey? Proponents of this 
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view would probably claim that this obligation just is the essence of the claim right. 
Although this is true, it merely pushes the question one step further: now we ought to 
ask, what is it that makes an object legitimate so that apart from the right of the object 
to exist, there is also a correlative duty of its subjects to obey? We can merely discuss 
the object of legitimacy and examine whether it has the right to exist. But when 
entailing that there is also a correlative obligation of the subject of legitimacy to obey, 
there has to be an additional justification pertaining to the subjects, which links the 
subjects of legitimacy to the object of legitimacy, and explains to us how it is that just 
by the object of legitimacy being legitimate, the subjects of legitimacy have a 
correlative duty to obey. Simmonds assumes consent. Consent, however, is not a 
necessary component of the concept of legitimacy. One could argue that it is not 
consent that renders a government or legal order legitimate, but the extent to which the 
government or legal order reflects the divine law of the one true god. As Applbaum 
correctly stated, ‘the view that a ruler is legitimate if and only if he has been anointed 
by the one true god is a mistake, but not a logical contradiction.’ Any link that would 
connect the object of legitimacy with the subject of legitimacy in a way that adds to the 
concept of legitimacy the correlative duty of obedience would consist of a component 
which is not a conceptual requirement of legitimacy, whether it is consent, a true god, 
democracy, or protection of human rights or anything else. These components are not 
requirements of the concept of legitimacy, but they are necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions for legitimacy to obtain, in other words requirements of conceptions of the 
concept of legitimacy. ‘So Simmons’s view should be understood as a normative 
conception of legitimacy.’ Of course, as Applbaum also notices, it is correct that an 
account of legitimacy ‘must connect particular subjects to particular authorities. But it 
does not follow that consent to obligation is the only possible way to make this 
connection.’ What other possible ways are there? This will be explored further on.  
 
More recently, John Tasioulas also assumes that legitimacy is a claim right. In 
particular, he claims that since legitimacy is the moral right to rule and ‘rights ground 





states: “…the claim to impose duties belongs to the core or focal sense of legitimacy; 
indeed, so much is implied by speaking of a ‘right’ to rule, since rights ground duties.”55 
 
Like Tasioulas, Christopher Thomas, seems to assume that legitimacy is a claim right, 
though perhaps less obviously. As stated above, in Tier 2 where legitimacy is relevant 
to law, the objects of legitimacy belong to four object types of legal form, namely actor, 
actions, individual laws and legal orders/systems. Objects of legitimacy answer the 
question: what could be legitimate? In maintaining that there are not only objects of 
legitimacy, but also subjects to legitimacy, which by definition have to obey/submit to 
legitimacy, he is construing legitimacy, the moral right to rule, as a claim right. In 
particular, Christopher Thomas maintains that legitimacy assumes “a subject who 
should submit to or support the legitimate object.”56 He holds that subjects of legitimacy 
could, for instance, “be citizens of a state, people in a state’s territory or adherents of a 
particular region.”57 To be clear, every object of legitimacy will refer to certain subjects. 
The additional claim that Christopher Thomas is assuming is that the subjects have the 
moral duty to obey. But how could this be? The idea here is that when discussing the 
legitimacy of an object (legal order, law, action or actor), legitimacy assumes that there 
are subjects who should submit to or support that legal order, law, action or actor. The 
verb ‘assumes’ here manifests an unproven logical claim, in other words a logical 
connection which is not entailed: to say that a legal order or legal norm or action or 
actor is legitimate necessarily entails that subjects ought to submit to it (or support it), 
means that not only there are moral reasons for that object to exist (for the legal order to 
rule, or the state to rule or the action to take place or the legal norm to regulate), but also 
that other entities (the so-called subjects) have moral obligation to obey (submit to it). 
This claim is assumed as a correlative to legitimacy; i.e. legitimacy, the moral right to 
rule, is understood as a claim right. 
 
How would the understanding of legitimacy as a claim right match with all the four 
objects of legitimacy? An action, such as an attack, being legitimate would entail that 
the target of the invasion has the moral obligation to not resist. (The other normative 
relation as stated above would be that invaders have moral immunity, so third parties 
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are morally disabled from intervening). A norm, such as the international customary 
norm to self-defence, being legitimate would entail that the entities subjected to the 
specific norm, such as states, have the moral obligation to obey the norm. (The other 
normative relation would be that states which defend themselves enjoy immunity and 
third states are morally disabled from preventing a state to defend itself). An actor, such 
as the UNSC, being legitimate would entail that, within its sphere of competence, the 
entities, such as states, subjected to its decisions and resolutions have moral obligation 
to obey them. (The other normative relation would be that the actors, such as the UNSC, 
enjoy moral immunity and third parties are morally disabled from preventing the actor 
when the latter is acting within its sphere of competence). Legal orders or legal systems, 
such as domestic legal orders or the international legal order, being legitimate would 
entail that the entities subjected to that legal order have a moral obligation to obey it. 
This moral obligation is general, i.e. it is a moral obligation to obey all the laws and 
orders of that legal order or legal system, decisions of courts and resolutions of the 
UNSC in the international legal order etc.58 (The other normative relation would be that 
the rulers enjoy immunity and third parties are morally disabled from stopping the 
legitimate authorities from exercising their legitimate powers).  
 
2.3.4.2. Legitimacy as a Liberty Right 
Legitimacy can also be understood as a liberty right (or ‘liberty’ or ‘privilege’ or 
‘justification-right’). As a liberty right, legitimacy does not entail any obligations 
towards its subjects. To understand freedom of speech as a liberty right is to assert that 
bearers of this right do nothing wrong by speaking freely. But this liberty right does not 
in itself entail that others are obligated to help communicate what the bearer of the right 
wishes to say, or even that they would be wrong from preventing the bearers of the right 
to speak freely; liberty rights entail no obligations. Understanding legitimacy as a 
liberty right then entails no obligation to obey.59   
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Christopher Wellman very well understands how it is that legitimacy is a liberty right 
and distinct from political obligation: “It is crucial to notice that political legitimacy is 
distinct from political obligation; the former is about what a state is permitted to do, and 
the latter concerns what a citizen is obligated to do. Although I believe these two are 
related, clearly they are not identical. In my view, political legitimacy is necessary but 
not sufficient for political obligation.”60  
 
Political theorists often presume that the question of what justifies the 
state’s coercion is merely the flip side of the issue of what grounds the 
citizen’s obligation to obey the state. This conclusion follows from 
mistaking the correlative of a state’s moral right to coerce as a citizen’s 
moral duty to obey, but the true correlative of the former is merely a 
citizen’s lack of right to not be coerced. To emphasize: Political legitimacy 
entails only a moral right to create legally binding rules, not a moral right to 
create morally binding rules. The latter entails corresponding moral duties, 
but the former need not; it implies at most only legal duties. The supposed 
existence of moral duties involves an additional (typically unrecognized) 
assumption that there is a moral duty to obey just law.61  
 
The question whether there is moral duty to obey just law is a separate question which 
is not addressed by legitimacy. Therefore, legitimacy does not get us all the way to 
moral duty to obey, so legitimacy is not a claim right. A separate argument is needed in 
order to establish the additional claim that there is moral duty to obey. The burden of 
proof of this claim lies on the supporters of legitimacy as a claim right who seem to be 
assuming what they ought to be proving. This claim can, off course, be established by a 
normative account of legitimacy, for which a substantive moral argument would be 
required. Such a claim is not, however, substantiated by conceptual analysis. Applbaum 
is correct to point out that:  
 
It is a virtue in conceptual analysis to seek the least restrictive specification 
of a concept that is still useful and fruitful, because if we do not we risk 
making two mistakes. The first is to misdescribe a genuine disagreement as 
a semantic misunderstanding. The second is to dismiss rival moral 
arguments too quickly as logical mistakes. In this case, the dismissal indeed 
is too quick. If the exercise of legitimate authority creates moral obligation, 
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this is so for moral reasons. If legitimate authorities have immunity, it is not 
an analytic truth.62 
 
The least restrictive specification of the concept of legitimacy is clearly that legitimacy 
does not include a moral obligation to obey. If we do not follow the least restrictive 
specification of the concept, we risk misdescribing a genuine disagreement as a 
semantic misunderstanding. Semantic misunderstandings arise when people give 
different meanings to the same words. Thus, two people may disagree about whether an 
object of legitimacy creates moral obligation to obey. If we construe legitimacy as a 
claim right and include moral obligation to obey in the concept of legitimacy, then the 
disagreement regarding whether there is an obligation to obey may seem like a semantic 
misunderstanding: the speaker who uses the concept of legitimacy without entailing 
moral obligation to obey is just using the word/concept ‘legitimacy’ with the wrong 
meaning. However, this misunderstanding is misdescribed because whether there is a 
moral obligation to obey is a matter of substantive moral argument. Therefore, the 
disagreement about whether the object of legitimacy entails obligation to obey is not a 
semantic misunderstanding but a genuine disagreement. The second is to dismiss rival 
moral arguments too quickly as logical mistakes. Assume that we construe legitimacy is 
a claim right and includes moral obligation to obey. This entails that legitimate 
authorities have immunity. A rival moral argument according to which legitimate 
authorities do not have immunity would be then dismissed as a logical error. This 
dismissal is false, it is too quick, because if legitimate authorities have immunity, it is 
not an analytic truth, but a claim that has to be supported by substantive moral 
argument. 
 
How would the understanding of legitimacy as a liberty right match with all the four 
objects of legitimacy? An action, such as an invasion, being legitimate would entail that 
the invaders have the freedom to invade, but the target of the invasion, e.g. targeted 
state, has no moral obligations in relation to the invasion, so self-defence would in that 
regard be morally permissible. A norm, such as the international customary norm of 
prohibition of piracy, being legitimate would entail that the entities subjected to the 
specific norm, pirates and states, have no moral obligation to obey this legal norm just 
because it is a legal norm. (There may be a moral obligation to not perform piracy if it is 
																																																								





inherently immoral, but that is independent of the international legal norm being a 
liberty right). An actor, such as the UNSC, being legitimate would entail that entities 
the decisions and actions the UNSC refer to have no moral obligation to obey. A 
domestic or the international legal order being legitimate would entail that the entities 
subjected to that legal order do not have a moral obligation to obey. There is thus no 
general moral presumption to obey the laws, orders, decisions and commands of the 
legal order in question. If legitimacy is a liberty right, substantive moral argument is 
needed for the subjects of legitimacy to have moral duty to obey.  
 
2.3.4.3. Legitimacy as a Moral Power 
Finally,	 legitimacy	 can	be	understood	as	 a	moral	 power.	Apart	 from	claim	 rights	
and	liberty	rights,	Hohfeld’s	analysis	included	two	other	types	of	right:	powers	and	
immunities,	 which	 refer	 to	 second-order	 liberty	 rights	 and	 claim	 rights	
respectively.	 Powers	 are	 second-order	 liberty	 rights,	 i.e.	 liberty	 rights	 regarding	
the	 modification	 of	 first	 order	 rights.	 A	 power holder	 can modify,	 e.g.	 expand or 
reduce,	 his own entitlements or the entitlements	 held	 by	 some	 other	 person(s).	 By	
contrast,	a liability	bearer	is exposed to the exercise of a power; the entitlements of the 
liability-bearer are open to being amplified or diminished or shifted	 in	 certain	ways.	
Thus, a power consists in one’s ability to effect changes in legal or moral relations, 
while a liability consists in one’s being unshielded from the bringing about of changes 
by the exertion of a power.63	For	 example,	 the	US	Congress	 has	 certain	powers	 to	
modify	some	of	US	citizens’	legal	rights,	inasmuch	as	it	can	impose	or	remove	legal	
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Applbaum correctly understands that legitimacy is not a first order right, claim 
right or liberty, but a kind of moral power. In particular, it is the moral power to 
create and enforce non-moral, or at least not yet moral, prescriptions and facts. 
Thus, a legitimate authority for instance has the moral power to author legal, 
institutional, or conventional rights and duties, powers and liabilities (thus an kind 
of rights), which change the legal institutional, and conventional situation or 
status of subjects. But in what way does the exercise of this moral power change 
the moral situation or status of the subject? In accordance with Hohfeld’s 
framework, when A exercises a moral power toward B, and thereby imposes upon 
B an institutional duty, B has a correlative moral liability. Liability is B being 
subject to morally justified enforcement. However, neither a moral liability nor an 
institutional duty is a moral duty. The fact that B is now subject to moral liability, 
justified enforcement, is a change of the normative situation of the subject, which 
is exactly what legitimate authority does, exactly because legitimacy is a moral 
power, and moral power changes normative relationships. Although it could be 
the case in the context of a substantive conception), it is not conceptually 
necessary that, if A exercises legitimate authority in imposing upon B an 
institutional duty, B has a moral duty to obey.  
 
A few clarifications are in place. It is obviously tautologically the case that if A 
succeeds in imposing upon B an institutional duty, B has an institutional duty to 
comply. Applbaum does not claim that valid law simply is a declaration of the 
ruler’s will backed by threat, morally justified or not. Clearly, valid law generates 
valid legal obligations among other legal advantages and disadvantages, such as 
claim rights. The point at issue is whether valid legal obligations are of necessity 
moral obligations. Applbaum’s power-liability account, which the conceptual 
analysis of this discussion follows, says no: whether hypothetical imperatives are 
also moral imperatives is a conceptually open question to be settled by substantive 
moral argument in light of morally relevant empirical circumstances.  
 
Finally, Applbaum illustrates how we are to understand a moral liability that is 
not yet a moral duty. As per Hohfeld, the opposite of a liability is an immunity: 
thus, the subject of legitimate authority has no moral immunity against the loss of 
legal rights and the subsequent detrimental exercise of privileges by others, or the 
imposition of legal duties and their enforcement, and this limits the sort of 
justified complaints the subject can make. When such legal privileges are granted 
and exercised by others, or when legal duties are imposed and enforced, the 





justifiably complain that the law is an unauthorized abuse of power. He can 
complain that he has been wronged in one way, but not in another: if legitimate, 
this is the sort of mistake about right and wrong that is the authority’s to make. 
Indeed, a legitimate law need not be a just law, as a conceptual matter.64 
 
 
One could wonder whether the distinction between legitimate object and just object 
(such as law) is in tension with legitimacy correctly understood by Applbaum as not 
only procedural but also substantive, since ‘just’ is substantive. “Normative argument, 
not conceptual analysis, is required to determine whether the content of the concept, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for having legitimacy, make reference solely to 
pedigree and procedure, or also include substantive criteria.” 65  As a matter of 
conceptual analysis, legitimacy is not content-independent. Indeed, as a matter of 
conceptual analysis, substantive criteria are not excluded from legitimacy. So, although 
legitimate law need not be just law (as a conceptual matter), it could be so (as a matter 
of normative conception).  
 
Therefore, since as a matter of conceptual analysis, legitimacy being a moral power 
entails absence of complain about injustice, the content-independent trait is qualified. 
As a matter of conceptual analysis, legitimacy is not content-independent on the one 
hand, but on the other hand an important part of the content lies outside the scope of 
legitimacy. Whether a law is just or unjust pertains to the content of the law. As stated 
above, the ‘legitimacy as a moral power’ account ‘limits the sort of justified complaints 
the subject can make. When such legal privileges are granted and exercised by others, 
or when legal duties are imposed and enforced, the subject can complain that the law is 
mistaken, stupid, or unfair, but he cannot justifiably complain that the law is an 
unauthorized abuse of power.’ The law being authorized or unauthorized is a procedural 
matter, not substantive (like ‘mistaken, stupid, or unfair’). It thus seems that the 
limitation of the complaints of the subject is in tension with the legitimacy as moral 
power view being not entirely substantive. The only response seems to be that other 
substantive complaints can be presented as complaints grounded on legitimacy, though 
they are not complaints of justice. It makes one wonder though, what these could be. It 
seems to me that such substantive grounds are avoided by Applbaum because they 
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derive from the normative account of legitimacy which is not our issue here, not from 
the conceptual analysis of legitimacy and the understanding of it as a moral power.   
 
How would the understanding of legitimacy as a moral power match with all the four 
objects of legitimacy? An action, such as an invasion, being legitimate, entails that the 
invaded state has moral liability, i.e. the invaded state is subject to morally justified 
enforcement. Liability does not entail moral duty to comply. If the invasion is legally 
valid, the invaded state has a legal obligation (institutional duty) to comply but not 
necessarily moral duty. Such a moral duty is to be settled by substantive moral 
argument in the light of morally relevant empirical circumstances. The invaded state, 
the subject of legitimacy, has no moral immunity against the loss of legal rights and the 
detrimental exercise of privilege by others, or the imposition of legal duties and their 
enforcement, and this limits the sort of justified complaints the subject can make. In the 
absence of that, there is no difference between legitimacy of an action, such as an 
invasion, being a (first order) liberty right, or a second order liberty right, i.e. moral 
power. 
 
A norm, such as the international customary norm of prohibition of piracy, being 
legitimate would entail that the entities subjected to the specific norm, pirates and states, 
are subject to morally justified enforcement, i.e. they have moral liability, without that 
entailing moral obligation to obey this legal norm just because it is a legal norm. Such a 
moral obligation to not perform piracy can be established by substantive moral 
argument. The subjects of the legal norm have no moral immunity against the loss of 
legal rights and the detrimental exercise of privilege by others, or the imposition of legal 
duties and their enforcement, and this limits the sort of justified complaints the subject 
can make. In the absence of that, there would be no difference between legitimacy of a 
legal norm being a (first order) liberty right, or a second order liberty right, i.e. moral 
power. 
 
An actor, such as the UNSC, being legitimate would entail that entities subjected to its 
actions and decisions, mainly states, are subject to morally justified enforcement, i.e. 
they have moral liability, without that that entailing moral obligation to obey the actions 
and decisions of the UNSC. Moral duty of subjects to comply with the object of 





subjects of legitimacy, mainly states, have no moral immunity against the loss of legal 
rights and the detrimental exercise of privilege by others, or the imposition of legal 
duties and their enforcement, and this limits the sort of justified complaints the subjects 
can make. Thus, if the UNSC orders the use of force against a state in accordance with 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the attacked state may not have moral obligation to 
obey but it has moral liability, i.e. no moral immunity against the loss of the legal right 
to not be attacked and subsequent exercise of actions on behalf of other states which 
support the attack. The kind of justifications the attacked state can make are limited: the 
attacked state can complain that the decision was mistaken or unfair, but not 
unauthorized abuse of power. In the absence of that, there is no difference between 
legitimacy of the UNSC being a (first order) liberty right, or a second order liberty right, 
i.e. moral power. 
 
Finally, a domestic or the international legal order being legitimate would entail that the 
entities subjected to the legal order in question have moral liability. This means they are 
subject to morally justified enforcement, including enforcement of all the laws, acts 
(such as acts of executive function in domestic legal orders), orders (such as court 
orders) and commands (such as commands from law enforcement mechanisms) of that 
legal order. Yet, the entities subjected to the legal order in question do not have a 
(general) moral duty to obey. Such a moral duty can only be settled with a substantive 
moral argument. The subjects of legitimacy, whether they are states, international 
organizations, legal or physical persons, have moral immunity against the loss of legal 
rights and the detrimental exercise of privilege by others, or the imposition of legal 
duties and their enforcement, and this limits the sort of justified complaints the subjects 
can make. Subjects can complain that the laws, decisions etc. are mistaken or unfair but 
not unauthorized abuse of power. In the absence of that, there is no difference between 
legitimacy of a legal order being a (first order) liberty right, or a second order liberty 
right, i.e. moral power. 
  
It has become obvious that for the view of legitimacy as moral power, the power-
liability view as Applbaum calls it, to be distinguished from both the view of legitimacy 
as liberty right, the appropriate examples must be analysed. In many cases these two 





in examples where the entailments of the two views differ can one see the difference 
between the two views. 
 
Separating his view from the legitimacy as liberty right view, Applbaum writes: 
 
the creation of a legal right or duty by a legal power can change the 
normative situation of a subject of the legal right or duty by changing his 
moral rights and privileges, powers, and immunities even when no moral 
duty to obey the legal power has been generated. Having the power to 
change these moral statuses is moral power. Although all such moral powers 
can also be said to be moral privileges to exercise legal powers—hence the 
temptation toward reduction—not all moral privileges to exercise legal 
powers are moral powers, because the exercise of legal power does not 
always affect moral rights and privileges. The difference matters, because 
we should expect that the criteria for having a morally justified privilege to 
exercise an institutional power that does not affect moral rights and 
privileges (altering the rules of Quidditch) are less demanding than the 
criteria for having a moral power that operates via institutional powers 
(altering the rules of private property). Powers and privileges are not 
redundant ideas, and the subsequent streamlining of Hohfeld’s scheme by 
the deontic logicians provided no illumination in legal and political 
philosophy. Although one can attempt to circumvent using the idea of a 
moral power by reducing all such situations to moral privileges to exercise 
institutional power, an important distinction would be lost.66 
 
One must be careful then to notice when, assuming legitimacy as moral power, exercise 
of moral power affects moral rights and privileges. If the exercise of moral power 
(legitimacy) does not affect moral rights and privileges, then in that instance moral 
power will essentially overlap with liberty right. In other words, in that instance, there 
will be no difference between understanding legitimacy as first order liberty right and 
legitimacy as second order right. However, absence of a difference in some cases does 
not mean there is no difference between these two understandings of legitimacy. This is 
manifested only in the cases where legitimacy as moral power does yield different 
results than legitimacy as liberty right, i.e. in the instances where exercise of moral 
power affects moral rights and privileges, an effect which the ‘legitimacy as liberty 
right’ view cannot account for. 
 
																																																								






Applbaum illustrates the distinction of the power-liability view with the liberty right 
view, with the following example67 of a legitimate authority’s moral power to change 
the normative relations between two other parties, with legitimate authority being a 
court decision. We are asked to imagine a coastal legal order, where a specific 
beachfront property extends to the mean high tide line. Thus, everyone is permitted to 
walk, boat or fish below that line. There is distance between each house at the beach 
and locals have used pathways between the houses to access the sea since anyone can 
remember. We are to imagine a man, Clamdigger, who owns a clam flat, which is 
accessible by land only via such a path. Clamdigger’s family has used such paths for 
generations and although this particular path has never been subject to adjudication, in 
this jurisdiction courts have ruled in similar cases that paths are public rights-of-way by 
custom and adverse possession. The next person of interest in this example is Mr 
Beachowner who purchases a property across Clamdigger’s path. Beachowner prevents 
access to the path, which he regards as part of his property, which is shown by him 
stringing a chain across the entrance to the path with a ‘No Trespassing’ sign hanging 
from it.  
 
Although the town, siding with Clamdigger, litigated, Beachowner won the lawsuit, 
successfully defended on appeal, and the sign thus remained. Applbaum asks us to 
suppose that on the legal merits, and on whatever account of interpretation one chooses 
to commit to, the case was wrongly decided: on a positivist account, the substantive 
																																																								





result is not supported by the legal materials; on a Dworkinian account, the substantive 
result is not supported by the appropriate moral reading of the law. In any case, since 
the courts have authoritatively determined the parties’ legal claims, the ruling is valid 
law. Notably, Clamdigger does not deny the legal validity of the legal ruling. By 
contrast, he concedes that Beachowner now has the legal right to block access to the 
path, and that using the path without permission would constitute a violation of a legal 
duty. It is also the case that, no matter what conception of legitimacy Clamdigger 
commits to, he does not deny the legitimacy of the authority of the legal ruling. He 
accepts that the court had the moral power to rule as it did, and, though mistaken in one 
sense, the court is not mistaken in another: it has not abused its power. This is exactly 
the kind of mistake the court has the moral privilege to make. Clamdigger concedes that 
he is an addressee of the ruling, he is subject to it, and that therefore the ruling changes 
his normative situation. What Clamdigger does deny - not necessarily because of a 
general denial that law obligates, but because of the specific attributes of this case – is 
that he has a moral obligation to obey the ruling. So Clamdigger feels morally permitted 
to violate the law (the legally valid ruling) and thus skips over the chain and walks 
down the path to dig clams as he always has done. Applbaum accepts that Clamdigger 
may (or may not) be making a moral mistake. The question he addresses is not whether 
Clamdigger is making a moral mistake, but whether Clamdigger is making a conceptual 
mistake. Clamdigger’s view is that the court ruling is legitimate, but does not morally 
obligate him. Does this necessarily imply that Clamdigger has incoherent views about 
legitimacy? Applbaum rightly states that the answer depends on whether the moral 
power of the court to change Clamdigger’s normative situation, and correlatively, his 
moral liability to such change, can be explicated in a way that does not cash out, either 
directly or circuitously, in a moral duty to obey the court order.  
 
So we should compare the normative relationships between Beachowner and 
Clamdigger before and after the court ruling. Before the decision, under the legal 
interpretation at that time, Clamdigger had a moral claim-right against Beachowner not 
to have his right-of-way blocked, and Beachowner had a correlative moral duty not to 
block Clamdigger. It could be argued that the court ruling reverses this entirely, so that 
Clamdigger now has the moral duty and Beachowner the claim-right. But there is 
another possibility that still counts as a change in their normative situation: the ruling 





only a moral privilege to jump the chain. Clamdigger’s privilege is not unbounded: 
before, he might have had a privilege to rip down the chain blocking the path, and 
perhaps now he has a new moral duty not to damage the chain while climbing over; 
both before and after, he has a moral duty not to use violence against Beachowner’s 
person. Besides, as N E Simmonds rightly states, the Hohfeldian scheme of analysis 
allows Hart’s point that frequently liberties find a perimeter of protection in claim rights 
protecting one from such interference as assault and trespass.68 Beachowner is entitled 
to use stronger measures: he may build a high fence, or post a guard (but not set a 
mantrap or plant landmines). What other duties and their correlative claim rights are is a 
matter of exercising ones imagination. However, these are not the kinds of duties that 
are needed for the legitimacy-entails-duty view to succeed: the court has ordered 
Clamdigger off of the path, and that precise duty, is the one Clamdigger, without 
contradiction, denies. The court has attempted to grant Beachowner a moral claim-right, 
the right not to have his land crossed without his permission. However, Clamdigger 
claims, again without contradiction, that the court has achieved only something weaker: 
it has succeeded in granting Beachowner only a moral privilege to attempt to prevent 
the crossing of his land. If the supposed injustice to Clamdigger were greater, 
Clamdigger might have viewed the law as without any normative effect whatsoever, and 
held that Beachowner still is under a moral duty not to block access. But Clamdigger 
has taken a more nuanced view of what substantively mistaken but legitimate law 
accomplishes here. 
 
Aplbaum is not arguing for the moral attractiveness of this construal; he does not 
maintain that as a matter of substantive morality Claimdigger does indeed have the 
moral privilege to use the path and the Beachowner has the moral privilege to prevent 
him from doing so. Applbaum is well-aware of the instability and uncertainty that 
positing such misfirings of authority creates, of the difficulties that arise from letting us 
be judges in our own cases, of the need for procedural finality to settle substantive 
disagreement, and so on and so forth. Applbaum is posing a different question: is 
Clamdigger making a conceptual error in holding that the court is a legitimate authority, 
in that it has the moral power to change his normative situation so that what was his 
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moral claim-right now is merely a moral privilege, but does not, under the 
circumstances, have the moral power to impose a moral duty? The answer is that he 
makes no such conceptual mistake. Notably, this conclusion does not depend on the 
particular reason because of which authority misfires here: that a determination of law is 
substantively mistaken. In other words, the fact that the court ruling is substantively 
false (not provided for by the legal materials, assuming a legal positivist view) is 
irrelevant to Clamdigger maintaining that legitimacy being moral power and the court 
being a legitimate authority mean that the court ruling changed his normative situation 
and it did so by substituting his moral obligation with a moral privilege, not moral duty. 
Moral and conceptual questions are different kinds of questions and must be kept 
separate. The answers of the one are not reducible to the answers of the other. 
Applbaum grasps this crucial distinction. Whether Clamdigger, after the court ruling 
and because of it, has a moral duty or moral privilege is a moral/substantive question. 
Whether he is right or wrong is a question of substantive morality, which invites for 
exactly that kind of discussion. Assuming moral objectivism, one would have to 
presumably determine the relevant objective moral principles and derive from them any 
relevant moral duties, and by contrast determine what is morally permissible/moral 
privilege. Regardless of whether he does, as a matter of objective morality, have a moral 
privilege instead of a moral claim right after the court ruling, Clamdigger is correct on 
the conceptual question. It is conceptually correct and consistent to hold that the court, 
being a legitimate authority and thus having the moral power to change normative 
relations, has changed Clamdigger’s moral claim right to moral privilege, even if it is 
the case that this is not morally correct. By the same token, if Beachowner’s property 
right over the path had been established by legislation, or even constitutional 
amendment, so that the legal validity of the law’s substance were uncontested, 
Clamdigger would still not be making a conceptual mistake if he held that he is not 
obligated because of the substantive unfairness of law whose substantive validity is not 
in question. 
 
As a final note, Applbaum rightly points out that this account does not depend on the 
command-backed-by-justified-force or rather say legitimacy-as-claim-right account.  
No appeal has been made to any permission the court has to enforce or punish. 
Legitimacy of the court and its decision does not imply a moral duty to obey the 





two parties. This would the case even if the legal rulings in this jurisdiction were merely 
unenforceable pronouncements of what the law requires. ‘So the normative relation of 
the court to the parties is poorly captured by reducing it to a permission with respect to 
the parties. What the court has is the normative power to change the normative 
permissions that hold between the parties.’ 
 
On first glance, the court decision could have three results vis a vis the parties. First, it 
could be the case that there is a complete reversal: Before, Clamdigger had a moral 
claim-right against Beachowner not to have his right-of-way blocked, and Beachowner 
had a correlative moral duty not to block Clamdigger. One might hold that the court 
ruling completely reverses this, so that Clamdigger now has the moral duty and 
Beachowner the claim-right. This would be the legitimacy as claim right view. The 
argument would be as follows: 
1. Legitimacy is a claim right. 
2. The court decision is legitimate. 
3. Therefore, the court decision establishes a moral claim right.  
Since the court decision ordered Clamdigger off the path, the moral claim right 
established by legitimacy of the decision would be Beachowner’s claim right to block 
access to the path and respectively Clamdigger’s moral duty to not access the path. 
Regardless of our view of legitimacy, a legally valid court decision establishes legal 
rights and legal duties. Legitimacy, only according to the view of legitimacy as claim 
right, establishes a moral claim and thus a respective moral duty to obey. In this case 
then, Beachowner’s claim right that Clamdigger does not access the path and 
Clamdigger’s duty to not access the path are both not only legal, but also moral. The 
problem here is that understanding legitimacy as a claim right seems to assume that 
legal validity entails not only legal consequences but also moral consequences; it 
assumes that there is moral duty to obey the law. Indeed, just like establishing moral 
duty to obey the law requires a substantive moral argument, by the same token, 
legitimacy as a claim right with the correlative moral duty can only be presented in a 
substantive moral argument as a normative conception of legitimacy, not as a matter of 







Abandoning the legitimacy as claim right view, there are two other options remaining. 
The middle view would be Applbaum’s legitimacy as moral power view, with milder 
change at the normative status, and at the other side of the spectrum there could be no 
change at all to the normative status, i.e. the court decision affects the legal but not 
moral relations of the parties. This would be the liberty right view, from which 
Applbaum tries to distance his power-liability view.  
 
Is there something to be said from the ‘legitimacy as a liberty right’ view against the 
‘legitimacy as a moral power’ view? Applbaum himself states that if the supposed 
injustice to Clamdigger were greater, Clamdigger might have viewed the law as without 
any normative effect whatsoever, and held that Beachowner still is under a moral duty 
not to block access. If the court decision has no normative effect whatsoever, the moral 
relations between the two parties remain the same before and after the decision. The 
decision being legally valid entails the change in legal relations between the two parties, 
which manifests the fact that the court decision has legal power. Does it have moral 
power to change moral relations? The decision being legitimate means that the court 
had the first order liberty right, or the second order liberty right (moral power) to decide 
as it did, (regardless of the correctness of the decision).  
 
If we view the court decision as having no normative effect whatsoever, then the 
legitimacy as liberty right view and the legitimacy as moral power view fully overlap as 
they make the same entailments, in other words they are entirely the same. If, on the 
other hand, we view this court decision as having the normative effect of turning 
Clamdigger’s moral claim right (to access the path) into a moral liberty right (moral 
privilege) and Beachowner’s moral duty (to not block access to the path) to moral 
privilege, then the legitimacy of the court decision has changed the normative relations 
of the subjects of legitimacy, which are the parties of the case, a change which cannot 
be accounted for by the legitimacy as first order liberty right view. This is exactly why 
and how the legitimacy as moral power view is distinguished from and wins over the 
legitimacy as first order liberty view. 
 
Applbaum is ‘not arguing for the moral attractiveness of this construal.’ In other words, 
he takes no stand as to whether the legitimacy of the court decision performs this 





which is besides the point. ‘But the question before us is a different one: is Clamdigger 
making a conceptual error in holding that the court is a legitimate authority, in that it 
has the moral power to change his normative situation so that what was his moral claim-
right now is merely a moral privilege, but does not, under the circumstances, have the 
moral power to impose a moral duty? The answer is that he makes no such conceptual 
mistake.’ Only legitimacy as a moral power view accounts for the change of the 
normative status of the subjects of law, in the cases that we view the law as having 
normative effect. Legitimacy as a moral power allows for a possibility that legitimacy 
as a (first order) liberty right view cannot account for and this is what establishes 
legitimacy as a moral power the correct view of legitimacy.  
 
To end the presentation of legitimacy as a moral power view, I will present Applbaum’s 
motorist example which not only blocks reduction of the view to the legitimacy as a 
moral claim view which may by now seem redundant, but, and that is more important 
for our discussion at this point, it illustrates an important distinction: that moral 
permission (liberty right) is static, whereas moral power is dynamic. I will first present 
the example and then Applbaum’s distinction of power from permission based on this 
example. 
 
In the ‘motorist and the long red light example’, Applbaum makes the point that the 
power-liability view, in other words legitimacy being a moral power, blocks the 
reduction to claim-right view. Suppose that for a long time, there has been a stop sign 
regulated traffic at a sparsely travelled intersection at the outskirts of a town, with flat 
desert all around. After a highly publicized fatal accident at a stop sign at a very busy 
intersection in the center of town, and taking advantage of a temporary price reduction 
offered by the local distributor of traffic control equipment, the town council decides to 
replace every stop sign under its jurisdiction with a traffic light and to post “No Turn on 
Red” signs at every one. However, this model of traffic light is a bargain because the 
lights are preset to change at long intervals and their timing mechanisms are 
cumbersome to reprogram. Now suppose a motorist wishes to turn right at the sparsely 
traveled intersection, approaches just as the light turns red, and she knows from prior 
experience that she will have to wait for a long time. It is a clear day and there are no 
pedestrians, bicyclists, or other cars are in sight. She thus turns on red, with great care. 





stops the Motorist and writes her a ticket, which she accepts and pays ruefully, but 
without resentment. She pays the ticket, not because she fears the consequences of not 
paying, but because she believes that she ought to. Next time, she takes a long hard look 
at the cactus before turning on red. The point here to sketch the violation of legitimate 
but bad law—bad in the sense of poor, not immoral. The faulty considerations upon 
which traffic regulation in this town is based are not intended to amount to illegitimate 
corruption. The faultiness is intended to be, at least ex post, common knowledge and 
uncontroversial. If this hypothetical specification suggests something else to the us, we 
can just rearrange the facts to fit an example of a law that is uncontroversially legitimate 
and uncontroversially bad. Applbaum does not intend to give an example that tests our 
convictions about the moral obligation to obey silly but legitimate laws. Appbaum 
believes that there ordinarily is such an obligation, and until convinced that a red light 
actually is broken, he maintains one should sit at it, with thinning patience fortified by 
thoughts of respect for fellow citizens. Rather, the purpose of the example is to make 
plausible two claims: that such an obligation is no conceptual entailment of the law’s 
legitimacy, but that legitimacy is not merely command backed by justified force. She 
denies the first view. Motorist denies that, under the circumstances, she has a moral 
duty not to turn on red, accepts that the police officer is justified in ticketing her, and 
accepts that she ought to pay the fine. The question Applbaum is asking is again 
conceptual: is this a coherent set of positions? Does her view entail that the town 
council and police officer do not have the moral power to enforce traffic law, but, like 
Rubbish-burner, have merely a moral permission, and so do not have legitimate 
authority over her? Alternatively, does her recognition that she ought to pay the fine 
reduce to a moral duty to obey the law? Applbaum rightly detects that neither construal 
is necessary. This is because the Motorist can consistently hold that the town has the 
moral power to impose upon her traffic fines— correlatively, that she is morally liable 
to have traffic fines imposed upon her—but not the moral power to impose upon her a 
moral duty to obey this traffic regulation. Like in the previous example, the distinction 
between substantive moral argument and conceptual argument must be maintained. Her 
recognition that she ought to pay the fine would follow from a substantive moral 
argument, rather than a conceptual analysis, of what minimal respect for legitimate law 
requires. Applbaum rightly informs that such an argument could make use of the ideas 
employed in defining and justifying civil disobedience: the outer limits of fidelity to the 





as a demonstration of good faith, even though this is not a case of civil disobedience, 
Still, she can deny reduction to the legitimacy-entails-duty view, because the exercise of 
legitimate authority has misfired, because it fails to impose the moral duty that it sets 
out to impose: the Motorist retains the moral privilege to turn on red. Such an argument 
may not succeed, but if it is defeated, it will be on substantive moral grounds, not by 
demonstrating a contradiction. In other words, it would be defeated as a substantive 
moral argument, not conceptually; she can be held blameworthy for being immoral, not 
inconsistent. Notably, Applbaum distinguishes the Motorist from Bad Woman Motorist. 
The latter recognizes no moral reason to pay fines, and does so only when it is in her 
interests to do so. Bad Woman Motorist’s conception of legitimate authority does 
appear to be no more demanding than the command backed by justified 
force/legitimacy as claim right view. But Motorist pays her fines even if she could 
successfully evade them, and in doing so, recognizes her moral liability. If you one is 
yet not persuaded, Applbaum asks us to substitute Honor System Motorist. This one 
doesn’t simply recognize that she ought to pay traffic fines when caught. To make thing 
some dramatic, she voluntarily mails in the applicable fine every time she turns on red. 
Her normative view is as follows: respect for legitimate law requires that one should 
pay the penalty for every violation, whether enforced or not, but there are circumstances 
under which there is no moral duty to obey the law in the first instance. The views of 
neither Motorist, Bad Woman Motorist, nor Honor System Motorist could reasonably 
be held about all legitimate law, whether malum in se (evil behaviour in and of itself) or 
malum prohibitum (unlawful behaviour in virtue of the law). Indeed, the ends of fair 
social cooperation are not served if all laws are treated merely as price schedules, 
whether paid voluntarily or under threat. But some laws (parking meter ordinances 
perhaps) are or have become mere price schedules, and recognizing that this is so does 
not endanger their standing as authoritative; if you deny a moral obligation to vacate a 
parking space before the meter expires there is no conceptual entailment between 
legitimacy and duty that you fail to recognize. Motorist, like Clamdigger, judges that 
under certain circumstances, particular legitimate legal duties that she is subject to are 
not for her moral duties, but merely moral liabilities imposed by a moral power to 
which she is subject. Her mistake, if she is making one, is not conceptual. 69 
 
																																																								





Finally, Applbaum distinguishes between moral power and moral permission.70 Indeed, 
someone who has only moral permission, liberty, to use force, does not have a mora 
power to change the normative situation. This is exactly the difference between first 
order rights, claim rights and liberties/permissions, on the one hand, and second order 
rights, namely powers and immunities. Permissions are static, whereas powers are 
dynamic. Thus, a permission being a static normative advantage, means that one either 
has it or he does not have it; one may or may not be able to delegate or assign it; and we 
need not have any control over when and how a permission is first granted or acquired 
or when and how it can be lost or taken away. I either have or I do not have the moral 
permission to pick a pebble from the beach. I have that moral permission/liberty if no 
one has a claim right to the pebble, and I do not have moral permission/liberty if 
someone else does have a claim right to the pebble, e.g. deriving from ownership of the 
pebble (e.g. if the pebble is in a private beach). It is not necessary that I have control 
over whether I have that permission or not – in this example, the existence of the liberty 
depends on whether someone else has claim right to the pebble or has given that claim 
right away. By contrast, a normative power is the ability to bring into existence or 
change other normative statuses, including permissions. A power is a normative status 
which generates other normative statuses: it enables.  
 
Applbaum is correct to notice that this distinction is obscured when the authority and 
the enforcer are the same entity. This is why in the example with the town council and 
the police officer, , where the authority (town council) and the enforcer (police officer) 
are different, it is clearer that the authority changes the normative status of both the 
enforcer and the subject. The authority, exercising its moral power with respect to the 
subject (Motorist), grants the enforcer (police officer), a moral permission (and perhaps 
a moral duty) to enforce; the subject was morally liable to having her normative status 
changed by such enactment, and now is morally liable for specific enforcement. Power 
here is the ability to enact. Applbaum notes that this is why legitimate authority is 
typically exercised through speech-acts and why e.g. Hobbes sees authorities as the 
authors of the actions of their agents. Before enforcement against the subject is 
permitted, the status change must be enacted - the power must be exercised. To put it 
clearly, ‘In authority as mere permission, the authority says to the agent of enforcement: 
																																																								





“I am permitted to force that subject to comply, and you are my agent. On my behalf, 
force that subject to comply.” In legitimacy as normative power, the authority says to 
the agent of enforcement: “I have the power to make it the case that you are permitted to 
force that subject to comply. I hereby invoke that power. Force that subject to comply.” 
This can be so even if the authority itself never has permission to enforce.’ How can the 
last sentence be true? Because the members of the city council may not have the power 
to grant themselves permission to write traffic tickets. If they have the power, they still 
have to grant it to themselves. An accurate example Applbaum mentions is with 
President Richard Nixon, who had the power to order Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson to dismiss Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, but did not have permission to 
do so himself, hence the drama of what became known as the Saturday Night Massacre. 
 
Understanding legitimacy as moral power (the power-liability view), Applbaum 
continues, explains what is especially wrong with the abuse of force by officials and 
with extra-legal vigilantism, even when the actions taken track what a properly 
authorized outcome would have been; this explains why the victims of the improper use 
of force by officials have a serious complaint even when they get what should have 
been coming to them through proper channels. Fear of arbitrary and mistaken 
application of force does not entirely explain our strong negative emotional reaction, 
our horror to these abuses. We would be correct to be indignant, even if the same exact 
enforcement from some other official were properly authorized, if the enforcing official 
were not properly authorized, because we have moral immunity from the exercise of 
unauthorized powers. It is also not the case that public official simply did something 
wrong: we do not have the same horrified reaction to an official who misuses his office 
for personal gain without exercising force or coercion over subjects. ‘The morally liable 
subject still is morally inviolable until the power to which she is liable is invoked.’ This 
is not the case under the account that reduces all moral powers to moral permissions 
(legitimacy as moral liberty) to exercise legal powers. Under the legitimacy-as-moral-
liberty account, the subject is never inviolable with respect to the authority. This is 
because the authority already has permission to use force, and the subject already has 
the correlative no-right against force.  
 
The Motorist does not need to view legitimate authorities merely as entities that have 





herself morally fee to turn on red and police officer to ticket her. That would leave her 
normative status unchanged once the city council had an initial moral permission to 
regulate traffic. In that case, enactment and enforcement would be rearrangements of 
legal advantages and disadvantages, not moral ones. The Motorist could still be morally 
wronged by the council and by the police; but such a wrong would trace back to some 
overstepping of the initial conditions of and on the moral permission. In contrast, on the 
power liability view, the city council has an initial moral power to regulate traffic, and 
Motorist is liable to that power. Her normative situation changes depending on how that 
power is exercised. 
 
As with the court in Clamdigger, Applbaum observes that apart from the power of 
enforcement and punishment, the city council’s power to regulate traffic also gives it 
the power to change normative relations between other parties. Indeed, motorists may 
have acquired specific moral duties of care to one another that they did not have before, 
because others will act in reasonable reliance on the new traffic signs. Motorists who 
ignore the sign are legally liable under tort law, because turning on red may reasonably 
be taken to be conclusory with respect to legal judgments of negligence. The moral case 
may be different: someone who turns on red may have exerted all due moral care, but 
because of freakish circumstances causes damage (say a balloonist at that moment falls 
out of the sky). The Motorist has still no moral complaint about legal liability. 
 
Indeed, Applbaum rightly observes that it would be quite odd for a lawmaker to defend 
creating and enforcing an unjust or bad law on the grounds that it is legitimate. From 
the first-personal perspective, I am most certainly morally prohibited from issuing an 
unjust law and have good reason not to issue a bad law, even if I have the legitimate 
authority to do so. However, this shows that legitimacy is primarily a practical 
judgment made from the second- and third person perspective. This means that 
legitimacy governs how you, the moral patient, should react to my unjust or unwise 
moral agency, whether lesser officials should enforce, and whether third parties should 
intervene. Or, to put it differently, the question of legitimacy arises when there is 
disagreement about the justice or goodness of an authority’s command. The claim right 
view holds that to judge an authority legitimate simply is to judge that the subjects of 
that authority have a moral duty to obey it. According to Applbaum, to judge an 





liable—that is, not morally immune—from the exercise of a moral power to impose and 
enforce conventional duties and change relevant social facts in ways that change the 




In this chapter, I presented the framework of conceptualizing legitimacy and prepared 
the ground for the thesis statement that will follow in the next chapter. In particular, I 
presented the trichotomy of legitimacy, which helps us understand legitimacy as a 
concept independently of its conceptions. By drawing on different uses of the concept 
of legitimacy that are as unrelated between them as possible, we concluded that the 
content of legitimacy at its most abstract form (Tier 1) is, as Applbaum rightly calls it, a 
vague notion of properness. This is extremely important for understanding legitimacy 
and for the thesis of this discussion, which will follow in the chapter, because any 
conception of legitimacy specifies this abstract content. In order for a standard to be a 
conception of legitimacy, it must specify how the object of legitimacy is proper. In Tier 
2, legitimacy becomes more concrete, lower on the level of abstraction, by being 
matched with an object of legitimacy. Thus, there can be several ‘Tier 2’, depending on 
the object types in question. ‘Legitimate argument’ and ‘legitimate daughter’ belong in 
different tiers of the second level. What interests us in this discussion is legitimacy of 
the four objects of legal form, namely actions, norms, actors and legal systems.  
 
In order to further understand the concept of legitimacy we are referring to in this 
discussion, I made certain important distinctions. I clarified that the discussion pertains 
to normative, not sociological legitimacy, and that as a matter of conceptual analysis, 
these two kinds of legitimacy are not logically connected. None is a necessary and/or 
sufficient condition for the other. Any connection between them would have to be 
established by a particular conception of legitimacy (Tier 3), specifying the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for legitimacy to obtain. For descriptive legitimacy to be 
distinct from normative legitimacy, it has to be the case that normative legitimacy is not 
reduced to human attitudes, and it is thus not relative, but objective, in the sense of 
attitude-independent. This led us to refuting nihilism, the view that there are no 





theory and two relativist theories, individual relativism and cultural relativism, must be 
rejected in order for discussion on normative legitimacy to take place. I clarified that I 
did not attempt to disprove nihilism, which is a negative position, but I merely 
illustrated that nihilism is inconsistent with normative legitimacy; one can hold the one 
or the other, but not both at the same time, because either there are, or there are not, 
objective moral facts. If legitimacy is at least partly moral, then it is at least partly 
substantive. This excludes an entirely procedural conception of legitimacy. This led us 
to the next question, namely whether legitimacy is substantive or procedural. We 
concluded that as a matter of conceptual analysis, legitimacy is not entirely procedural 
but at least partly substantive, and that any understanding of legitimacy as entirely 
procedural would have to be argued as an individual conception (Tier 3). Both 
Applbaum and I advise against such a conception, since such a conception will have to 
deal with issues such as committing to substantively inappropriate and undesirable 
outcomes and lapsing into legal validity. 
 
In the final part of this chapter, I established the minimum content of legitimacy in 
terms of the four object types of legal form (apart from it being a vague notion of 
properness). I presented the two established views of legitimacy as a clam right on the 
one hand and a liberty right on the other, and finally explained, as per Appblaum, how it 
is that legitimacy is a moral power.  
 
Having established the core of the concept of legitimacy as moral power, the discussion 
pertaining to the content of the concept of legitimacy detached from its individual 
conceptions has been completed. Having assumed a distinction between conceptual 
analysis and normative conceptions, it would seem that the next logical step is to 
proceed to normative conceptions, moving the discussion from Tier 2, to Tier 3. The 
legitimacy discussion would be incomplete, however, if we do not clearly understand 
how it is that the concept of legitimacy is different from neighbouring concepts, 
especially authority. After that, I will discuss the relation of legitimacy with individual 
conceptions and end the next chapter with the main argument of this discussion, the 
thesis statement, which is also the main original contribution to knowledge: that 








Concept and Conceptions 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Conceptual analysis implies determining the relationship of the concept in question with 
neighboring concepts. Defining a concept implies delineating the concept from 
neighboring concepts. In Greek, the word for definition is ορισµός (orismos), which 
comes from the verb ‘ορίζω’ (orizo) which means to define in the sense of delineate and 
separate from neighboring conceps, thus the derivative noun ‘όριον’ which means limit 
and border (σύν-ορον – synoron, border). To fully undersand a concept, we must be 
able to understand how it is distinct from neighboring concepts. When dealing with 
abstract concepts as with legitimacy, in order to understand the relationship 
betweensuch concepts, it is necesary to define both.  
 
Conceptual analysis implies figuring out the minimum content of a concept and 
determining the nature of a concept, such as whether is moral power and/or a contested 
or an essentially contested concept. If common understanding of neighboring concepts 
seems, at least on first glance, to present an overlap between two concepts, then one can 
cast doubts as to whether the two concepts have been clearly determined and defined. 
None of the two concepts can be fully understood, unless the neighboring concept is 
defined and so is the relationship between the two neighboring concepts. Suppose that 
‘legitimate authority’ refers to a state that has good reasons for using legal rules, 
enforcing them and generally maintaining order. How are we expected to understand 
how much of the content of the concept of ‘legitimate authority’, whatever that is, falls 
under ‘legitimate’ and how much under ‘authority’? If ‘legitimate authority’ implies 
changing the normative situation of the subject of law, then how can we be anything but 
confused if we are not sure whether the change of normative status is implied in both 
‘legitimate’ and ‘authority’? Does ‘legitimate authority’ include a repetition/overlap? If 
so, have we made a mistake somewhere in conceptual analysis? If not, what exactly 
does authority mean and what is its relationship with legitimacy? Similarly, how can 
‘legal legitimacy’ make sense, given the analysis so far? If normative legitimacy implies 





with legality as in the aforementioned Kosovo report (illegal but legitimate), how can 
‘legal legitimacy make sense?  
 
In this chapter, I will discuss conceptual relationships pertaining to the concept 
legitimacy. In particular, I will refer to the relationship of legitimacy with neighbouring 
concepts on the one hand, and with individual conceptions on the other, to conclude that 
legitimacy is an essentially contested concept.  
 
As regards the relationship of the concept of legitimacy with other concepts, I will focus 
on two major points, one negative and one positive. I will begin by discussing the so-
called ‘legal legitimacy’. The term certainly seems to express a concept neighbouring 
the concept of legitimacy. However, I will explain that the so-called ‘legal legitimacy’ 
is actually a non-concept. Then, I will proceed to the positive and more significant point 
of this part, which is discussing the most important neighbouring concept to legitimacy, 
namely authority. I will analyse the concept of authority, explain when/how it obtains 
and identify the relationship between the concepts of authority and legitimacy.  
 
Having discussed the issue of conceptual relationships between legitimacy and 
neighbouring concepts, in the second part of this chapter, I will discuss the distinction 
between concepts and conceptions, to reach the main claim that legitimacy is an 
essentially contested concept. I will start by showing, as per Gallie, when the 
conceptions of a concept stand in such a relationship between them and the concept, so 
that they render the concept essentially contested. I will then discuss how Hart, Rawls 
and Dworkin engage with the issue of concept vs conception distinction and whether 
they refer to contested concepts or essentially contested concepts. Finally, I will 
conclude to what is the greatest contribution of this thesis to knowledge, i.e. that 
legitimacy is an essentially contested concept. In doing so, I will refer to several 
instances which illustrate how it is that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, 
mainly cases where circumstances/facts give rise to competing conceptions of 
legitimacy and cases where the single conception of legitimacy itself is essentially 
contested. 
 






3.2.1. The Non-Concept of ‘Legal Legitimacy’  
The straightforward distinction between legality and legitimacy has been referred to in a 
previous part of the discussion. Legality, i.e. being in accordance with the law, is easily 
contrasted with legitimacy. As concluded in section 2.3.3. of the discussion, as a matter 
of conceptual analysis, there is room for legitimacy to be at least partly substantive, and 
it is best understood as such, since focal uses of legitimacy are contrasted with legality. 
Such was the case of the Kosovo report, which recognized an attack against a sovereign 
state as being illegal due to lack of UNSC resolution, yet the report regarded the attack 
as legitimate on the moral ground of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. A 
conception of legitimacy comprising only of procedural criteria would hardly be in line 
with legitimacy as a moral right to rule and would collapse the concept of legitimacy to 
legality, given that procedures are established by law. Like a procedural conception of 
legitimacy would collapse legitimacy to legality, the so-called ‘legal legitimacy’ 
collapses legitimacy to legal validity, at least as long as one remains committed to legal 
positivism.   
 
I will now explain how it is that assuming legal positivism, there is no such thing as 
‘legal legitimacy’. “Legal legitimacy” is defined as “a property of an action, rule, actor 
or system which signifies a legal obligation to submit to or support that action, rule, 
actor or system.’71 There seems to be lack of clarity here: what does ‘signify’ mean? 
Does it mean ‘create’ a legal obligation or indicate an already existing legal obligation? 
If it means create a legal obligation, then the definition is incorrect because legal 
obligation is created by legally valid rules, not by any other concepts such as the so 
called ‘legal legitimacy’. The legal validity of rules is what creates legal consequences, 
whether these are creating legal rights or legal obligations. The question then becomes 
what makes rules legally valid. This is exactly what legal positivism answers. 
According to legal positivism, which is nothing more and nothing less than a 
proposition of legal validity of norms, “In any given legal system, whether a given norm 
is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of the system, depends on its 
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sources, not its merits.”72 ‘Sources’ is read broadly, i.e. any argument for the validity of 
norms which is not merits-based.73 Thus, in the legal positivist tradition, represented 
most famously by Hans Kelsen and HLA Hart, to claim that a law is legally valid is to 
claim that it was created in accordance with the correct legal process. In Kelsen’s view, 
the test for legal validity is conducted recursively from the lowest to the highest norm 
(hierarchy of legal norms), until a non-legal, meta-legal fundamental norm for a legal 
system, the Grundnorm, could be reached, for which authority is ‘presupposed’.74 
According to Hart, legal validity is traceable to a ‘rule of recognition’, which is, contrast 
to Kelsen’s Grundnorm, not a norm, but a social fact.75 For legal positivists then, a 
norm is legally valid if it has been established in accordance with the correct process, 
which is the source of validity, regardless of the merits of the law which are substantive, 
e.g. moral, immoral or morally irrelevant. If a rule is legally valid, it exists in the legal 
world, so it bears legal consequences, it may grant legal rights or set legal obligations. 
Therefore, assuming legal positivism, legal obligations are consequence of the legal 
validity of certain norms. The property which creates legal obligations is nothing more 
and nothing less than the legal validity of rules. Therefore, ‘legal legitimacy’ is nothing 
more than legal validity, and thus a term better not used as it merely adds confusion. If 
‘signify’ means to indicate an already existing obligation, then legal legitimacy is again 
void of meaning: legal validity itself is not only the necessary but also the sufficient 
condition of a norm to bear legal consequences, including establishing legal obligations. 
No other properties can be used to indicate (already existing) legal obligations. 
Therefore, no matter what meaning we ascribe to the term ‘signify’, the fact remains 
that its meaning is already consumed by legal validity, as per legal positivism. 
 
Since ‘legal legitimacy’ adds nothing to legal validity, it is unsurprising that when 
discussing ‘legal legitimacy,’76 writers discuss requirements of legal validity, and thus, 
inevitably, legal positivism and natural law, with no mentioning of any requirements of 
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legal legitimacy per se. This is not an omission, but an inevitability. There cannot be 
any requirements of a concept which does not exist and which, assuming legal 
positivism, collapses to legal validity. What is said about ‘legal legitimacy’ actually 
applies to legal validity. Like legitimacy, ‘legal legitimacy’ is indeed normative and it 
too assesses any given object against a particular normative framework.77 It is again 
unsurprising that there is no mentioning of what/which this ‘framework’ is. 
Interestingly enough, legitimacy is labelled ‘moral legitimacy,’78 so since legitimacy is 
unsurprisingly understood as assessing objects to moral framework,79 ‘legal legitimacy’ 
can only be understood to assess given objects to legal framework, i.e. law, legal 
validity. No other sense of ‘normative’ apart from moral and legal framework is 
presented. 
 
Although, assuming legal positivism, ‘legal legitimacy’ is a non-concept, it may be a 
concept assuming natural law. It seems to me that assuming natural law, ‘legal 
legitimacy’ would collapse to legitimacy, since its ideal conceptions are substantive and 
include moral criteria. ‘Legal legitimacy’ then is a non-concept and attempts to ascribe 
meaning to it oscillate between legal validity on the one hand and legitimacy on the 
other.  
 
The issue of whether there is, finally, a concept of ‘legal legitimacy’, in the end rests on 
the disagreement between legal positivism and natural law, which I shall now discuss. 
Although legal positivism, i.e. the proposition of legal validity of norms, has already 
been discussed, I will clarify certain misconceptions about legal positivism which often 
blur the distinction between legal positivism and natural law. After these necessary 
clarifications, I will present natural law and conclude whether there is such a concept as 
‘legal legitimacy.’  
 
The first misconception about legal positivism which may blur the distinction between 
legal positivism and natural law is that legal positivism has the ‘disadvantage’ of 
maintaining the view that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. 
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This claim requires clarity. Both law and morality are normative frameworks. As such, 
there are bound to be necessary connections between them. Legal positivism, the 
proposition of legal validity of norms, does not make a claim about law and morality in 
general, i.e. it does not make a claim about the whole nature of law (it is thus a mistake 
to regard legal positivism’s distinctive thesis about law as a comprehensive theory of 
law), but a claim about the condition of legal validity of norms in particular. The only 
claim that can be inferred from the proposition of legal validity of norms, also known as 
the source thesis, is a more specific claim: legal validity and the moral justifiability of 
the law’s substance are entirely separate.80 
 
Since legal validity and the moral justifiability of the law are separate, the formal fact of 
legal validity creates a legal obligation to obey, but not necessarily a moral obligation to 
obey. Of course, a given law can be moral (e.g. criminal laws prohibiting murder and 
theft), immoral (e.g. older laws regarding slavery) or morally irrelevant (such as rules of 
coordination), but the question of moral justifiability lies outside the question of 
legality/legal validity. In this sense, legal validity is a purely formal fact – an ‘amoral 
datum’.81 Legal obligations and moral obligations do not necessarily coincide. Any 
connection between them may be contingent, but not necessary.  
 
Not only legally valid norms tell us nothing about what our moral obligations are, but, 
more generally, legal positivism itself is not action guiding. The proposition of legal 
validity tells us which norms are legally valid, which can be used as a premise in 
practical syllogism. If one needs to know what the law in any state says on some subject 
on some occasion, then the truth of the proposition of legal validity of norms as per 
legal positivism tells us how to proceed. According to this proposition, one should look 
for sources of the law of that state, not what is meritorious for people in that state to do. 
However, the proposition of legal validity is never a premise in practical syllogisms. 
This means that by itself it does not direct human behaviour; it does not point the 
addressee of law in favour or against doing anything at all. Not only it provides no 
moral guidance, but also it provides no legal guidance either.82 A morally conscientious 
and rationally self-interested traveller in a foreign country acting on prudential reasons 
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and being interested on what, as a matter of fact, the consequences on him/her will be 
depending on which course of action he/she follows, is not interested in the proposition 
of legal validity. His/her behaviour is based on reasons for action. This is where Raz’s 
theory of authority (not legal validity) becomes relevant, as it pertains to reasons for 
action. Raz’s theory of authority lies beyond, and is most certainly not an entailment of, 
the proposition of legal validity. 
 
Natural law, however, pertains to reasons for action as it treats moral justifiability as a 
condition of legal validity. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, is often quoted as stating that 
“if in any point [human law] deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a 
perversion of law.”83 William Blackstone wrote that “no human laws are of any validity, 
if contrary to [the law of nature].”84 Many legal philosophers, such as Austin,85 
Kelsen,86 Hart87 and Raz,88 have read these statements as indicating that, for natural 
lawyers, moral justifiability constitutes an essential condition of legal validity. The 
quintessential distillation of natural law then seems to be that ‘unjust law is not law.’ 
Therefore, natural law has been interpreted as arguing that positive law is invalidated if 
it is morally disagreeable.89 Hence, natural law has been typically understood as the 
opposite of legal positivism and these two propositions of legal validity as mutually 
exclusive: legal positivism maintains that whether a norm is legally valid depends on its 
sources, whereas natural law maintains that whether a norm is legally valid depends on 
its merits.  
 
However, contemporary natural law theorists such as John Finnis reject this reading as a 
misunderstanding of legal positivists. 90  Finnis argues that in the aforementioned 
statement ‘an unjust law is not law’, there are two different meanings of ‘law’ at play.91 
The first meaning of ‘law’ refers to human-made, positive law, and will continue to 
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exist as such in accordance with the principles of positive legal validity. The second use 
of the term ‘law’ means law that is morally obligatory, as all law should be. Although 
even immoral laws remain legally valid, they fail to achieve the quality of moral 
obligation that should be experienced in relation to law. Finnis thus separates the 
question of law’s validity from the question of its moral justifiability. More importantly, 
since Finnis acknowledges that what makes a given norm legally valid depends on 
positive legal validity, sources, not its merits, he is in fact a legal positivist. If, then, 
legal positivists and Finnis actually do disagree, it is a second order disagreement, i.e. 
they disagree about what they disagree about. Legal positivists seem to believe they 
disagree with Finnis about the condition of legal validity of norms, whereas Finnis may 
be assuming that the object of disagreement pertains to law’s morally obligatory force. 
Regardless of what exactly the disagreement between legal positivists and Finnis really 
is, since all these theorists assume that the condition of legal validity of norms is 
whether it has been established according to the proper legal procedure (source thesis), 
they are all positivists. Legal positivism, again, the proposition of legal validity of legal 
norms, has no competitor. Disagreements pertain to everything else, especially when 
law is authoritative/morally obligatory, which leaves legal positivism unaffected. If it is 
the case that Aquinas really did mean that unjust law is legally invalid, then he would be 
disagreeing/negating legal positivism. He would also, however, be wrong, as he would 
be unable to account for the condition of legal validity of norms all legal systems 
assume, and he would also be lacking supporters, considering the claims of 
contemporary natural law theorists. 
 
Notably, it can be argued that since antiquity, it has been crystal clear that whether a 
norm is legally valid is separate from its moral force. Without needing to overstress this 
point, I will mention only one example: Antigone. In this Greek tragedy, Antigone 
attempts to secure a respectable burial for her brother Polynices. The law – Creon’s law 
that was legally valid at that point in time – forbids mourning for Polynices. When 
Antigone is brought before Creon, she admits that she knew of Creon’s law, yet she 
chose to break it, claiming the superiority of divine law over human law, in other words, 
natural law over positive law. Three points are clear. First, there is no doubt that the 
legally valid norm is Creon’s law prohibiting the burial. Second, the legal validity of the 
norm depends entirely on its sources, in this case the fact that it has been laid down by 





validity (nor its enforcement for that matter). Third, Antigone is guided by real reasons 
for action, not by legal validity. The question she is asking is not about conditions of 
legal validity, but a very different one: what must she do? Should she bury her brother, 
thus obeying the legally valid norm and breach her moral obligation to bury her 
brother? Or must she fulfil her moral duty and violate an immoral law, at the cost of her 
life? To balance these reasons, she must consider philosophical questions the answer of 
which define her character and moral status: is satisfying this moral duty worth dying 
for? Is life worth it if she cannot satisfy certain moral obligations? Antigone, choosing 
to satisfy her moral obligation is buried alive in a tomb. The choice she made was not 
determined by legal validity, but on reasoning on the balancing of real reasons for 
action – moral reason (she ought to bury her brother) vs prudential reasons of self-
interest (burying her brother would lead to death penalty). It seems quite clear that even 
in ancient legal systems, legal validity and moral justifiability have been distinct. 
Whether a norm is legally valid does not depend on its merits. This distinction is 
inherent in the nature of law. 
 
Where does the discussion between legal positivism and natural law theory lead us in 
terms of ‘legal legitimacy’? If natural law is what Finnis claims it is, it assumes legal 
positivism, because it accepts the proposition of validity of legal norms (sources), so 
legal legitimacy collapses to legal validity. If, on the other hand, natural law is what the 
positivists understand it to be, i.e. the condition of legal validity of norms is their merits, 
then legal legitimacy would be again, legal validity, but that would consist on merits, so 
it would collapse to legitimacy, or at least certain normative conceptions of legitimacy. 
The ‘bad law is not law’ understanding of natural law would conflate legal validity with 
merits of the law, opening the Pandora’s box of all kinds of conceptual confusions. 
Without needing to elaborate on this point, it is worth noting that the unattainability of 
this understanding of natural law becomes evident from its inability to explain the legal 
validity of immoral legal norms and legal orders (bad law), such as the 18th century US 
legal order which provided for slavery (and all, or almost all ancient legal orders for that 
matter). Legal legitimacy, assuming natural law, collapses either to legal validity or to 
legitimacy.  
 
One element attributed to ‘legal legitimacy’ that does not actually refer to legal validity 





moral considerations.92 When discussing legal positivism, we already discussed that the 
proposition of legal validity establishes the condition for legal validity of norms 
(sources), but the proposition is not action guiding in any sense. Legal positivism does 
not tell us what to do nor does it give us reason in favour or against a certain action or 
omission. If a norm is legally valid, there is a legal obligation to obey it. This legal 
reason lies in the tautological redundancy of legal positivism: not abiding merely means 
that I breached a legal obligation and there is a legal ought for the legal consequences, 
as prescribed by the law, to apply. Whether the consequences will in fact apply or not is 
a matter of fact, not law. I may have a legal obligation to vote because it is stipulated in 
a legal clause, but as a matter of consistent practice, the state may do nothing to citizens 
who do not vote. Legally speaking, I have a legal obligation to vote. This legal reason 
may or may not enter my deliberation as to whether I will vote or not. When 
deliberating whether to vote or not, I am considering actual reasons, such as prudential 
reasons/reasons of self-interest, moral reasons, etc. These are action guiding reasons, 
reasons for action, not legal reasons. The exclusionary reasons mentioned are not legal 
reasons, but action guiding reasons, reasons that actually direct the subject to act, to 
comply with the law. These action guiding reasons for compliance referred to are Raz’s 
exclusionary reasons, to which I shall now turn. As we shall see, Raz does not present a 
concept of ‘legal legitimacy’ as distinct from legitimacy. Exclusionary reasons for 
compliance are reasons deriving not from a so-called concept of ‘legal legitimacy’ but 
from Raz’s (legitimate) ‘authority’, which is, together with legality/legal validity, an 
important neighbouring concept of legitimacy.   
 
3.2.2. Legitimacy and Authority 
The concepts of legitimacy and authority often go hand in hand93 and not without a 
reason. As explained at the introduction, in order to understand, in a process of 
conceptual analysis, the concept of legitimacy, neighbouring concepts ought to be 
defined and so their relationship with legitimacy. As already discussed, a prevalent view 
understands legitimacy to be not moral power, but moral claim right that entails a 
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correlative moral obligation. If authority means morally obligatory directives, then there 
is a significant overlap with the concept of legitimacy to the extent that it is hard to see 
any difference, making one wonder why one of them is not redundant. Having clarified 
that legitimacy is moral power, I will now proceed to discuss the concept of authority 
and thus crystallize the relationship between legitimacy and authority. First, I will 
discuss exclusionary reasons for action and illustrate how Raz connects them with 
legitimate authority. Then, I will discuss authority and crystallize the distinction 
between authority and legitimacy, two concepts which, when correctly understood, are 
neighbouring and connected, yet distinct.  
 
3.2.2.1. Exclusionary Reasons 
I will begin by explaining exclusionary reasons which, as mentioned, do not pertain to a 
so-called concept of ‘legal legitimacy’, but to legitimate authority. Exclusionary reasons 
are second-order reasons to refrain from acting for some reason. Second-order reasons 
are any reasons to act for a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason.94 In other 
words, exclusionary reasons exclude certain reasons from deliberation. In order to 
elaborate on this important point, an explanation on conflict of reasons is necessary.   
 
Raz correctly understands that reasons for action have a dimension of strength, or 
weight. Indeed, some reasons are stronger or weightier than others. Thus, in cases of 
conflict of reasons, stronger reasons override the weaker.95 For example, a driver is 
deliberating whether to speed up on the highway. If he speeds up, he will enjoy driving 
more, but he will put in danger his and other drivers’ life. His pleasure of driving faster 
is a reason for him to speed up, whereas endangering his and other people’s life is a 
reason for him to maintain the same speed. Both these reasons are first-order reasons, 
i.e. reasons for action, reasons that push toward a specific behaviour, course of action. 
These reasons do not relate to other reasons, but to the behaviour they are reasons for. 
When reasons of the same type, such as these first-order reasons, conflict, the conflict is 
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resolved by the relative strength of the conflicting reasons.96 The relative strength of 
reasons is weighed in the balancing of reasons. The heavier, stronger, weightier reason 
trumps the weaker one. In this example, the driver is deliberating which reason is 
‘heavier’, his satisfaction or safety. If the former, he speeds up, if the latter, he 
maintains the same speed. In such cases, we act based on the balance of first order 
reasons.97 This is an example of first-order conflicts.98 
 
Apart from first-order conflicts, there are two more kinds of conflicts. The one is 
conflicts between certain second-order reasons (exclusionary reasons) and first-order 
reasons. This is the kind of conflict that interests us the most here and will be 
exemplified in the next paragraph. The third and last kind of conflict is between second-
order reasons. Second-order reasons do not pertain directly to behaviour, action, like 
first-order reasons, but to other reasons. Such conflicts are between a reason to act for a 
certain reason and an exclusionary reason to refrain from acting from it. Like first-order 
conflicts, second-order conflicts turn on the strength of the conflicting reasons 
involved.99 Here is an example: John, a young boy, realizes that there is a reason to 
wear his jacket, i.e. it is cold outside. This is a first-order reason because it is reason for 
action. However, there is also a (first-order) reason to not wear his jacket, i.e. he feels it 
does not look good on him and other children may laugh at him at school. His mother 
(legitimate authority), tells him to wear the jacket. That is a second-order reason, i.e. 
reason to act on a reason: wear the jacket because mom said so, and mom saying so is a 
reason to not decide on the balance of reasons for action. Suppose his father tells him to 
listen to his mother. This is positive second-order reason, i.e. reason to act on a reason, 
because acting on mother’s instruction is a reason. Now suppose that father tells John 
not to act on his mother’s orders. Now John has a reason for not acting on a reason. 
Father’s order is a negative second-order reason, i.e. exclusionary reason.100 The 
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second-order conflict here consists on mother’s order (‘John, wear the jacket, don’t 
listen to your father.’) with father’s order (‘John, don’t listen to your mother.’). Both are 
second-order reasons, i.e. reasons of the same kind, so here, just like in first-order 
conflicts, the strength of conflicting reasons becomes relevant.101 
 
To more deeply understand exclusionary reasons (negative second-order reasons) and 
their importance in the discussion, however, we must carefully examine and exemplify 
the second kind of conflict, i.e. conflict between exclusionary reasons and first-order 
reasons. The first example is Ann who is looking for a good way to invest her money. 
The proposed investment is complicated, and she has to decide that same evening, as 
the offer to make a deal will be withdrawn a midnight. Ann is aware that it may well be 
a very good investment right now, but there may be facts due to which the investment 
will not be good bargain for her later at all. She is not certain whether this proposition is 
better or worse compared to another one what was put to her a few days before and 
which she is still considering. All she requires is a few hours to examine the two 
propositions thoroughly. She has all the relevant information in documents in front of 
her. However, Ann had a long tiring day, because of which she cannot trust her 
judgment. She understands that she cannot make a rational decision on the merits of the 
case. Refusing to consider the offer is tantamount to rejecting it. An rejected the offer, 
not because she thinks the reasons against it override the reasons in favour of it, but 
because she is avoided deliberation on the balance of reasons altogether, since she 
cannot trust her judgement at the moment. Her emotional and mental state is not a 
reason for rejecting the offer because it does not establish that it would be wrong or 
undesirable to accept the offer. Reasons for and against the offer are first-order reasons. 
Ann’s internal state because of which she does not trust her judgement at the moment is 
a second-order reason, and in particular an exclusionary reason, i.e. a reason which 
excludes deliberation on the balance of reasons for and against the offer. Her internal 
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state is a reason to go to bed and rest, and a reason to not act on the balance of reasons. 
But do exclusionary reasons exclude all first-order reasons? 
 
The answer is most certainly negative. Exclusionary reasons may exclude all or only 
some first-order reasons.102 When exclusionary reasons do not exclude all conflicting 
reasons, ‘one must decide what to do on the balance of the non-excluded first-order 
reasons, including the order itself as one prima facie reason for the performance of the 
ordered action.’103 What conflicting first-order reasons could be not excluded by 
exclusionary reasons?  
 
Jeremy’s example can be a great illustration of reasons that are not excluded by 
exclusionary reasons. Jeremy is serving in the army. He is ordered by his commanding 
officer to appropriate and use a van that belongs to a tradesman. Thus, Jeremy has a 
reason to appropriate the van.  However, his friend urges him to disobey the order 
because there are weightier reasons to do so. Indeed, on the balance of first-order 
reasons, Jeremy ought to not appropriate the van. Jeremy understands this. However, he 
claims, it does not matter whether his friend is right or not, because orders are orders 
and they have to obeyed even if wrong, even if no harm will come from disobeying 
them. Jeremy understands that being subordinate consists in not deciding what is best. 
He sees what is best in the balance of reasons but he understands he is not justified in 
following it and he appropriates the van as ordered.104 So far, the example illustrates the 
point we already covered, i.e. exclusionary reasons excluding deliberation on the 
balance on first order reasons. There is one important caveat in the example, however, 
which Raz mentions briefly and which needs to be stressed: “He admits that if he were 
ordered to commit an atrocity he should refuse.”105 Not performing an action because it 
is horrendous, morally impermissible, is a negative firs-order reason, i.e. reason for not 
performing an action. This first-order reason conflicts with the second-order reason of 
the commander’s order. However, one is not justified, all reasons considered to perform 
a horrendous crime because he was ordered to do so. This is exactly what makes 
ordinary people who were engaged in performing atrocities as ordered by Nazi 
																																																								
102 Raz, (n 88), 46 ‘An exclusionary reason may exclude all or only a certain class of first-order reasons.’ 
and Raz, (n 101), 22: ‘Exclusionary reasons may exclude action for all or only for some kinds of the 
conflicting reasons.’ 
103 Raz, (n 101), 22. 






authorities bear some responsibility for their actions. Although they do not bear the 
same responsibility as the high-ranking officials giving orders for genocide to take 
place, they still have moral obligation to not perform certain immoral actions, even if 
ordered, especially if they could have done without harm to their life and security. 
Therefore, it is not the case that exclusionary reasons exclude all conflicting first-order 
reasons. If Jeremy’s order consisted in an him performing an atrocity, Jeremy would not 
be justified in not deliberating on the balance of reasons and not performing the ordered 
atrocity.  
 
In cases of orders, which reasons are then excluded and which not? Raz contributes to 
the answer with common sense. “There is a minimum that an order must exclude to be 
an order. It must at least exclude consideration of the recipient’s present desires. Often 
orders exclude much more besides, but never do they exclude less.”106 Obviously, this 
does not entirely answer the question. There is no complete a priori answer. The answer 
to this question depends on the case. This is a practically extremely important question. 
It seems unreasonable to ask addressees of authority to not deliberate on the balance of 
first-order reasons as excluding such deliberation is what authoritative orders do, when 
there is no way of figuring out when addressees of law are expected to disobey orders, 
because of non-excluded first-order reasons. To decide whether a reason is excluded by 
exclusionary reasons or not, one must do what exclusionary reasons exclude him from 
doing: deliberate on the balance of first-order reasons.107 However, this question is not a 
weakness of Raz’s theory, because the theory does not aim at telling the addressees of 
authority what to do, but to explain when authority obtains. We will see soon further on 
how exclusionary reasons relate to authority. 
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Therefore, the claim that legal validity provides exclusionary reason for compliance, 
even in the face of opposing moral considerations108 needs to be corrected in two ways. 
Not only, as explained above, it is not legal validity that grants reasons for 
action/compliance (as we shall see soon below, authority grants these reasons), but also 
exclusionary reasons do not exclude all moral considerations. Exclusionary reasons may 
exclude all or only some considerations, with moral obligations being an example of 
non-excluded reasons. 
 
Where does this point in the discussion leave us in terms of the so-called ‘legal 
legitimacy’? It has become clear that exclusionary reasons are called this way because 
they exclude deliberation on the balance of at least some first-order reasons. Which 
concept, however, are exclusionary reasons provided by and how exactly do they relate 
to it? I will now illustrate, continuing on Raz, that exclusionary reasons are not provided 
by a so-called concept of ‘legal legitimacy’ but by the concept of authority.  
 
3.2.2.2. Authority 
According to Raz, legitimate authority arises when an authority’s addressees are better 
off from acting on the basis of the exclusionary or pre-emptive reasons than by 
identifying their own reasons for acting:  
 
[T]he normal and primary way to establish that a person should be 
acknowledged to have authority over another person involves showing that 
the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to 
him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the 
directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to 
follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him 
directly.109  
 
According to Raz’s ‘service’ theory of authority, people experience authority when they 
treat the directions or instructions given by those in authority as reasons that remove the 
need to decide for themselves how they ought to act (exclusionary or pre-emptive 
reasons). Bodies claim authority when they require their addressees to treat their 
directions as reasons for action in place of any reasons those persons might otherwise 
have had for their actions. The contrast here is between being told what we ought to do 
																																																								
108 Thomas, (n 71), 735. See note 83. 





and deciding for ourselves what we ought to do.  
 
Raz’s authority is clearly illustrated with a doctor example. The examples here will 
obviously resemble the examples mentioned above on exclusionary reasons, but the 
difference is that here authority will become clear. A patient visits the doctor, and the 
doctor exercises authority. What makes a doctor a legitimate authority on medical 
matters is his education and skill. However, the reason why the doctor exercises 
authority in a specific instance with the patient is not because of his background per se, 
but specifically because the patient treats the doctor’s instructions as reasons for the 
patient’s actions. The doctor’s instructions serve the purpose of providing reasons for 
action for the patient, thus ‘service’ theory of authority. If the patient insists in deciding 
by himself/herself what to do, e.g. by taking the doctor’s instructions as mere 
suggestions and searching for answers elsewhere either from other doctors or reliable 
lay people such as family and friends, this would be a failure of authority because the 
patient is not taking the doctors’ suggestions as reasons for action. In other words, 
doctor’s instructions have not pre-empted other considerations (thus, ‘pre-emptive 
reasons’). Experiencing authority consists on not deciding for ourselves. Other people’s 
directions, the ones in authority, become our reasons for actions, replacing our own 
reasons for action.   
 
Therefore, Raz’s theory of authority involves identifying two kinds of reasons for 
action. First, deliberative reasons are considered into making a decision and giving a 
direction. In the doctor example, the deliberative reasons would be all the factors that 
contribute to the doctor’s deliberation when trying to identify the disease from its 
symptoms, such as considering all the possible diseases which could be harming the 
patient, calculating the likelihood of each, etc. After the deliberation stage, the doctor, 
having concluded what the disease is, replaces deliberative reasons with executory 
reasons that tell the patient what to do e.g. take an aspirin, take some rest, etc. One type 
of reasoning replaces another. The person who exercises authority always takes the 
addressee (the person to whom authority is exercised on) from deliberative reasoning to 
executory reasoning. When the doctor is telling the patient what to do, the doctor does 
not repeat all the factors he took into account, such as all the medical knowledge he is 
drawing on and all the calculations he has made, but he is merely telling the patient 





people who experience authority experience executory reasons. They do not receive the 
deliberation of the person who is exercising authority and they do not continue 
deliberating themselves, so there is a double displacement here. 
 
A more legally relevant example is in place: the parliament. Statutes passed by the 
parliament are like the doctor’s instructions. Members of the parliament deliberate, 
considering their place in the polls, their power and success, the common good, they 
discuss issues with experts and try to work out what is best for the national interest and 
then they pass a statute. The statute with its rules replaces the deliberations that led to 
those rules and thus we treat statutes as authorities. Raz is identifying that if we really 
treat statutes as legal authorities, we take them as reasons for action which replace the 
deliberations that led to them. We cannot treat a statute as an authority if we insist on 
reworking all the reasons that led to that statute in that form. If we were treating statutes 
in that manner, they would not operate as authorities because they would not tell us 
what to do; in such a case, they would ‘try’ but they would fail to tell us what to do. We 
would not be treating the parliament as an authority if we did not treat the statute as 
something that displaces all the deliberation that lead to it. Interestingly enough, this 
point tells us something about separation of powers. Judges who apply the law have to 
treat the statutes as displacing the politics and all the deliberations that led to the law. 
Reopening the whole policy debate would consist on not treating statutes as authority 
and not treating the parliament as having authority. If law is authoritative, it excludes 
certain considerations and grants reasons for compliance.    
 
A comparison and contrast between these two examples sheds light in the concept of 
authority and reasons for action. The doctor example is an example of epistemic 
authority. The doctor does not make it so that the aspirin cures patient’s disease. The 
doctor does not manufacture the aspirin on the spot. The doctor happens to know what 
the disease is and how it ought to be cured and the addressee of authority, i.e. the 
patient, uses the doctor as a reliable way of reaching knowledge (what the disease is and 
how it ought to be cured). What is authoritative here is the way of reaching knowledge, 
the doctor, so doctor’s authority is epistemic authority. By contrast, the parliament 
makes a written document statute, and courts, by following it regardless of deliberative 
reasons, treat it as authority. The normativity of authority of the doctor is content 





normativity of authority of the parliament is content independent: courts treat it as 
authoritative because the legal rule in question was established by the parliament, 
regardless of it’s content. In both cases, because of authority, deliberative reasons are 
excluded. As we concluded, if law is authoritative, it excludes certain considerations 
and grants reasons for compliance. 
 
An instance where authority does not obtain is when the deliberation process was not 
performed properly. Suppose, in the previous example, that a lay person pretended to be 
a doctor. Since he/she has no medical knowledge, he/she has no authority as doctor and 
the directives are not authoritative. This is just one instance of directives being not 
authoritative because the deliberation process was not performed properly. An error in 
the deliberation process may still occur even if the appropriate people perform the 
process. Suppose that the addressee is exceeding the speed limit because he believes 
that the legislator has been overly concerned about the possibility of an accident. In this 
case, the addressee is engaging with considerations that the legislator was meant to 
consider in establishing this directive. If it is the case that the legislator indeed 
considered all the relevant reasons and did so properly and thus decided the specific 
speed limit, then the addressee is better to comply with reasons considered by the 
authority by complying with authority, rather than by following reasons which apply to 
him directly – the law is authoritative and the addressee ought to comply with the law. 
If it is the case that the legislator performed an error in the process, then the addressee is 
not likely better following the directives of the legislator and the law is not 
authoritative. The Nazis may have had able law makers, but given holocaust-related 
laws, it is safe to say that the deliberative process was not performed properly, so the 
law, albeit legally valid, was not authoritative; it did not grant moral reasons for action. 
If Jeremy, in our previous example, is ordered by his commanding officer to commit an 
atrocity, the order, even if legally valid, is not authoritative because of the error in the 
deliberation process; no exclusionary reason excludes the moral obligation to refrain 
from performing atrocities.  
 
Deliberative reasons then, lead to executory reasons which lead to Raz’s pre-emption 
thesis: ‘the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its 





to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.’110 Two observations have 
to be noted here. First, authority then requires performance of an action. Authority is the 
reason for its performance. Hence, law being authoritative does not mean obeying the 
law, but obeying the law because it is law. In the previous examples, treating the doctor 
as an authority is not complying with his instructions because someone else told the 
addressee so, but because he/she is a doctor. Treating the parliamentary statues as 
authoritative means complying with them because they are parliamentary statues. 
Treating the speed limit traffic rule as authoritative directive means complying with it 
because it is a traffic rule. Second, some reasons are preempted. (As we said above, 
exclusionary reasons may exclude all or some conflicting first-order reasons). The 
reasons that are preempted are the deliberative reasons mentioned above, also called 
‘background reasons’, i.e. the reasons that the authority was meant to consider in 
issuing the directives.111 “The function of authorities is to improve our conformity with 
those background reasons by making us try to follow their instructions rather than the 
background reasons.”112  
 
That said, if, although the background reasons were preempted, the addressee does not 
comply with the law because of other overriding conflicting reasons, then the direct of 
the law in this instance is not authoritative, because ‘authority’s directives must be 
capable of changing what we ought to do, all things considered’.113 Suppose, in our 
driving example, that the addressee exceeds the speed limit to take his heavily injured 
friend who is bleeding and may die any moment to the hospital, while visibility in the 
road and the overall driving conditions are excellent, there is no one else in the road and 
in general the addressee is not endangering his/her security or others. The reason of the 
addressee to violate the law is not a background reason. His reason, take the heavily 
injured friend at the hospital as quickly as possible, is not preempted and the addressee 
has an overriding moral reason to exceed the speed limit. In this case, the law is not 
authoritative because the directive does not change what the addressee ought to do all 
reasons considered. The directive preempted the background reasons, but not the crucial 
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reason that tipped the balance of reasons. For a directive to be authoritative, it must be 
capable of changing what we ought to do, all things considered. Raz makes it clear that 
that I have no reason to stop at the red light when driving in a flat country with perfect 
visibility, no other human being, animal or car for miles around me – even though my 
omission to stop is not urged by a moral obligation – simply because authoritative 
directions are not reasons for action in every instance. Traffic regulations may be 
authoritative, but there are instances where it is obvious on the merits of the case that 
authority of the directive does not obtain.114 
 
When authority does obtain, what then really happens; what is authority and where does 
this leave us with ‘legal legitimacy’? When the directive is authoritative, exclusionary 
or pre-emptive reasons exclude conflicting first-order reasons for action. Authority, via 
exclusionary reasons, is reason for compliance with the law. Exclusionary reasons are 
granted by legitimate authority, not be a so-called ‘legal legitimacy’. Since authority 
connects with compliance via reasons, i.e. by changing the reasons for action of the 
addressees, ‘Authority is ability to change reasons.’115 
 
3.2.2.3. Relationship Between Authority and Legitimacy 
How then does authority differ, if it does, from legitimacy? As per Applbaum (previous 
chapter), legitimacy is moral power, in the sense of second-order liberty rights, i.e. 
liberty rights regarding the modification of first order rights (claim rights and liberty 
rights). Legitimacy changes the normative relationships of the addressee. Authority is 
the ability to change reasons. By doing so, it may impact normative relationships. 
Authority is the ability to change reasons and can thus change normative relationships. 
How do they differ? 
 
First of all, as concepts they have different content outside the legal realm. One of the 
reasons why the trichotomy of legitimacy is important s because it ensures we do not 
lose sight of the broader meaning of the concept when connected with legally relevant 
objects. The meaning of legitimacy in Tier 1, the most abstract level, is a vague 
standard of properness. This is not the case with the concept of authority. To say that a 
doctor is an authority in cancer research refers to his expertise and reasons to follow his 
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suggestions, but not to a sense of properness per se. As mentioned in the first chapter, 
one could state that an argument is legitimate, whereas describing it as authoritative 
would have an entirely different meaning.  
 
Second, in relation to law, authority may mean power in an entirely different sense than 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is moral power, i.e. the ability to change first order rights. 
Authority can consist in power in the sense of actual influence on people’s lives. Apart 
from legitimate authority, Raz correctly states that there is effective, de facto authority 
that consists in power, together with the claim to legitimate authority. At this point, it 
must be stressed that Raz makes the point that all legal systems claim legitimate 
authority.116 All legal systems claim to decide things better than what their subjects 
would decide by themselves. This is the basis of their exclusionary reasons. The doctor 
claims authority because it is better we do what he/she says than us deciding ourselves. 
Law similarly claims legitimate authority because it presents itself as the appropriate 
way for people to behave. Laws that are not authoritative are presented to the addressees 
in the same manner as authoritative laws, thus making the same claim: to be obeyed. 
Legal systems present themselves as telling their subjects what to do and claiming that 
the subjects should do what they are told and that is better for the society. Although 
legal systems present themselves this way, this is not always necessarily true. Whether 
the addressees of law are indeed better to conform with the law or deliberate by 
themselves is, in any given situation, a matter of fact, not a matter of law. For example, 
a legal system may be largely the result of funding of one political party. The Nazi legal 
order claimed that it is best for the society if people behave the way that legal order 
demanded, e.g. the Nazi legal order claimed that it is better for the society if all citizens 
refrain from hiding Jews. The North Korean regime claims that it is best for the society 
if they do not escape from the country, remain loyal to their political ruler and refrain 
from any allegiance with the US. All these illegitimate legal orders claim legitimate 
authority as much as legitimate legal orders do. According to Raz, law, via its 
directives, does not just tell us what to do, but it also claims it is for our own good, 
regardless of whether its directives are authoritative or not. Apart from illegitimate yet 
legally valid legal orders, example of effective or de fact authority is a regime that is 
both illegal and illegitimate. The so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, a 
																																																								





regime recognized as illegal by legally binding UNSC resolutions as it occupies land of 
the Republic of Cyprus, a sovereign state, after an illegal invasion by Turkey, is an 
effective or de facto authority, yet neither legal nor legitimate. It is an effective 
authority because it exercises actual power and influences people’s fate. In addition to 
this, the regime presents itself as an independent state, even though it is not. It claims to 
be a sovereign state (legal validity) and also a legitimate one, unlike North Korea. It 
claims that it is best if its addressees behave according to the commands of that regime. 
By contrast, there is no such claim in cases where there is only brute power, “brute use 
of force to get one’s way”.117 An individual robbing a store is using brute power and 
exercising, by force or threat of force, his will on people who are subjects to his 
commands. However, the criminal in question does not act with a claim of a right. He 
thus has no claim to legitimacy. This is an instance not of authority, legitimate or 
effective, but brute power. The concepts come close, then, in cases of legitimate 
authority. If both concepts change reasons, what does the one concept add to the other?  
 
Legitimacy is obviously necessary in order to separate legitimate authority from 
effective or de facto authority mentioned above; but how does it do that? Note that one 
could not talk about effective legitimacy, as legitimacy does not pertain to power in the 
sense of actual force. This is another point where the trichotomy of legitimacy presented 
in this discussion becomes important. In ‘legitimate authority,’ authority brings in the 
issue of power (as force), whereas legitimacy brings in the issue of the appropriateness 
of the force to be exercised, the issue of the right. This is not a legal right, as legitimacy 
is distinct from legality/legal validity. This is the right as moral power, as per 
Applbaum. The ability to change normative relations. When saying ‘authority’ meaning 
‘legitimate authority,’ the concept of legitimacy may not be stated, but it is assumed.  
 
Further on, there seems to be one element in the concept of authority that is absent from 
the concept of legitimacy. When Raz discusses law as ‘authority,’ he makes the 
distinction between being an authority and having an authority.118 ‘A person is an 
authority if he has relatively permanent and pervasive authority over persons, that is, 
either authority over a large group of people or with respect to various spheres of 
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activity or both.’119 To have authority is the ability to change reasons for action with 
exclusionary reasons. Aside of the issue of power then, law being ‘authoritative’ and its 
directives giving reasons for action, links to the more general use of the word 
‘authoritative’. Like legitimacy in Tier 2 is a specification of the more abstract 
legitimacy in Tier 1, the vague standard of properness, law being authoritative (in the 
instances when it actually is authoritative) is a specification of the more general use of 
the term ‘authority’ in English language. We think through language and in this point of 
the discussion, words are important. The aforementioned example of a doctor is 
successful also because it indicates that connection of ‘law being authoritative’ with the 
more general use of ‘authoritative’ in English language. Doctor’s directives are 
authoritative, on the grounds of his medical expertise and experience. Suppose a doctor 
and medical researcher being an ‘authority in cancer research.’ What experts and lay 
people alike infer from this is that given the expertise of this researcher, his suggestions, 
even if they are not commands, grant reasons for action, in other words they give lay 
people good reasons to follow his suggestions about combating cancer. The addressees 
of the suggestions of this researcher, medical practitioners and lay people alike, are 
better off following the suggestions of this researcher because he/she is an authority on 
the subject, rather than acting on their own reasons. Addressees conform better with 
reasons following the doctor’s instructions than their own. Admittedly, this issue of 
expertise relates to the appropriateness in legitimacy. The expertise of the doctor and 
the legislator make their commands appropriate to be followed by the addressees. 
However, authority specifies this: the reason of complying is conforming with reason. 
This service conception is absent from the concept of legitimacy, though theoretically it 
could be part of the conception of it. 
 
Finally, it is legitimate (!!!) to use the word ‘authority’ to refer to a different concept: 
legal competence. Authority in this sense has nothing to do with law being 
authoritative, not with power, but with legal competence. This is a legal term we would 
hear in law schools on doctrinal legal subjects, not when doing philosophy of law or 
discussing reasons for action of compliance. The term here has legal meaning and does 
not relate to actual reasons for action, whether these are prudential, moral, etc. Instances 
of authority as legal competence are the following: ‘The police officers in the UK have 
																																																								





the authority to arrest suspects.’ Assuming the previous meaning in the word ‘authority’ 
would not be wrong: the police officer, exercising legitimate authority, issues 
authoritative commands and the suspect ought to comply with the commands of the 
police officer. Assuming the deliberation stage has been performed properly, the 
command gives reason for action and the suspect ought to comply. However, this is not 
what is meant here. What is meant in this statement is that the police officers have the 
legal competence to arrest suspects. We could understand ‘authority’ also as legitimate 
authority and thus understand the meaning of the sentence as being that the addressees 
have reasons for compliance. However, note how this would not stand if it was Nazi 
officers arresting whomever the Nazi laws would state as suspects. This statement is 
true without qualifications only in the sense of legal competences. It is in the sense of 
legal competences that both the legitimate UK police officer and the illegitimate Nazi 
police officer have the authority to arrest suspects. Authority as legal competence 
pertains to legality/legal validity. A final example would be the following: ‘The 
Westminster Parliament cannot legislate on agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural 
development of Wales because deciding on those matters is under the authority of the 
National Assembly for Wales.’ A complete paraphrase would be: ‘The National 
Assembly of Wales, not the Westminster Parliament, has the (legal) competence to pass 
bills on agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development of Wales.’ Notably, in 
other languages, the respective term for ‘authority’, such as ‘armodiotita’ in Greek 
(αρµοδιότητα) has only this legal meaning, which thus avoids confusion. 
 
We have now concluded the part of the discussion pertaining to legitimacy and 
surrounding concepts. We have concluded that there is no such concept as ‘legal 
legitimacy’ attempts to establish such a concept collapse either to legality/legal validity, 
at least by assuming legal positivism. Reasons for compliance are established by the 
distinct concept of authority. In the concept of legitimate authority, the concepts are 
intertwined, as authority contributes the issue of power, but needs legitimacy to bring in 
the right, necessary for legitimate authority to be distinguished from effective or de 
facto legitimacy. It is now time to proceed to the relationship between the concept and 
its individual conceptions. 
 






3.3.1. Essentially Contested Concepts 
The distinction between a concept and its conceptions is not unique to legitimacy. The 
concept/conception distinction originated with the paper ‘Essentially Contested 
Concepts’ by the philosopher Walter Bryce Gallie in 1956. 120  Gallie makes an 
extremely useful distinction of two different kinds of disagreements, namely 
disagreements consisting on ambiguity (pseudo-disagreements) and genuine 
disagreements.  
 
Ambiguity is a phenomenon in all human languages. Sometimes, disagreements 
regarding the application of certain concepts are not genuine disagreements, but they 
merely reflect ambiguity, because such words have different meanings. For example, 
the sense in which keeping promises is ‘right’ or ‘good’ is clearly different than the 
sense in which a person’s informal appearance at a formal occasion is ‘right’ or ‘good.’ 
The first sense is a rather moral sense whereas the latter sense is rather a standard of 
appropriateness based on fashion, taste or something like it. This is not a conceptual 
matter but a matter of ambiguity of language, just like the word ‘bank’ in English 
language has two distinct meanings, namely the financial institution and the side of the 
river (regardless of the historical connection between the two senses). It is thus wrong to 
regard disagreements based on ambiguity as conceptual disagreements and we could 
thus call them pseudo-disagreements. 
 
Gallie correctly observed that  
 
We find groups of people disagreeing about the proper use of the concepts, 
e.g., of art, of democracy, of the Christian tradition. When we examine the 
different uses of these terms and the characteristic arguments in which they 
figure we soon see that there is no one clearly definable general use of any 
of them which can be set up as the correct or standard use.121  
 
Indeed, people disagree about the proper use of such concepts. A roll of toilet paper on 
a wooden chair would not count as ‘work of art’ for some people, whereas it clearly 
does for people responsible of selecting artefacts of certain art museums. What is the 
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cornerstone of the Christian tradition? Some would say it is following the Bible to the 
letter; others would say it is love thy neighbour. These two do not always overlap and 
sometimes oppose each other. Gallie explains our intuition that when people disagree 
about the nature of certain concepts, their disagreement is not merely a linguistic 
confusion, but a real and genuine disagreement.  
 
Gallie makes two relevant, yet distinct claims, with the first one building up to the 
latter. In his own words: 
 
I want to show that there are apparently endless disputes for which neither 
of these explanations need be the correct one. Further, I shall try to show 
that there are disputes, centred on the concepts which I have just mentioned, 
which are perfectly genuine: which, although not resolvable by argument of 
any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and 
evidence. This is what I mean by saying that there are concepts which are 
essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves 
endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.122 
 
Gallie’s first point is that there are concepts regarding which it is not the case that from 
different explanations, senses, meanings of those concepts, one is necessarily the correct 
one. It does need to be the case that one of different conceptions of art be correct and 
the other false. It is not necessarily true that only one conception of a concept is correct, 
i.e. that each concept can have only one possible conception. A concept may have 
several conceptions.  
 
The second point is that such concepts are essentially contested. It is not the case that 
although no conception of the concept is wrong, one conception is better argued than 
the others. The disputes regarding the competing conceptions are sustained by 
respectable arguments and evidence, yet the disputes are not resolvable by argument. It 
cannot be argued which conception is sustained over the others and thus which single 
conception is best attached to the concept. The impossibility of resolving the dispute 









There is a prima facie contradiction here, which is actually nothing more than lack of 
clarity. On first glance, one could observe the following contradiction. Literally 
speaking, to say that ‘neither of these explanations need be the correct one’, referring to 
several conceptions of a concept, it is to say that it is not necessary that one conception 
is correct, but it could be the case that one conception is correct. This claim then, when 
taken literally, allows for the possibility of there being one correct conception and the 
others wrong. Gallie’s second point negates the possibility of there being one correct 
conception and the others wrong because it states that the conceptions are sustained by 
perfectly respectable arguments and evidence, and therefore the dispute regarding which 
is the correct conception is endless. If there was a correct conception, the dispute would 
not be endless, as it would be at least theoretically possible that the discussion 
concludes which conception is correct. If there is a correct conception, the concept 
would be contested because there would still be different argued conceptions about it, 
but it would not be an essentially contested concept. What makes a concept essential 
contested as per Gallie is that the dispute between competing conceptions of a concept 
is ‘endless’ and that is ‘inevitable’: ‘This is what I mean by saying that there are 
concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably123 
involves endless124 disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.’ If one 
conception is correct and the others are wrong, the dispute between them is not endless 
and most certainly not inevitable. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Gallie, by 
‘essentially contested concepts’ assumes a concept which invites for several well argued 
conceptions, of which none of them is correct and the others wrong. Indeed, what Gallie 
means by ‘need’ is ‘entailed by the concept itself.’125 To say that a conception of a 
concept is not necessarily correct is to say that it is not entailed by the concept of itself 
and a person who accepts a different conception of the concept is not necessarily failing 
to grasp the concept (although he could be because some conceptions could be wrong or 
absurd). It is important to note that ‘essentially contested concepts’ implies that there is 
no one correct conception of the concept.  
 
A simple example is in place: equality. Suppose that there two competing conceptions 
of equality (there could of course be more). Some believe that equality means treating 
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everyone the same, whereas others believe that equality means treating people in such a 
way so that the outcome for each person is the same. This means putting things in place 
to support people to achieve similar outcomes. For a person who is blind it may involve 
having screen readers on computers and removing obstacles in the building. If it is the 
case that both conceptions are sustained with perfectly respectable arguments and the 
dispute between the two conceptions cannot be resolved by argument of any kind and it 
is thus inevitably endless, then equality is an essentially contested concept.  
 
Justice could be another example. Before Rawl’s famous book A Theory of Justice, 
‘justice’ had a clear meaning: respecting people’s rights. When one person violated 
another person’s rights, he treated him unjustly. A person treated another person 
unjustly only by violating his rights. The government treated a person unjustly only by 
violating his rights or failing to protect them, e.g., the slaves’ liberty rights.  Rawls 
recognizes this traditional meaning of justice in passing in A Theory of Justice, but then 
goes on to use the term differently, arguing that it is sufficiently similar to the 
traditional meaning. But it is not. Rawls argues in A Theory of Justice that certain 
patterns of distribution are unjust. According to him, for example, it is unjust that 
people of equal talent and motivation should have very unequal chances of success 
based on differences in their parents’ wealth. But this is not unjust according to the 
traditional conception because one person does not violate another person’s rights 
simply in having advantages or giving their children advantages.126 Hayek accepts the 
traditional understanding of justice and rejects the notions of ‘social justice’ and ‘global 
justice’ as fundamentally confused. If it is the case that both conceptions of justice, i.e. 
justice as protecting or at least not violating rights and justice as patterns of distribution, 
are sustained by respectable arguments and the dispute between the two conceptions 
cannot be resolved by argument of any kind and it is this inevitably endless, justice is an 
essentially contested concept.  
 
What is the difference the between contested concepts and essentially contested 
concepts? In the above examples, if it is the case that one conception of equality or 
justice is correct because there are better arguments in its favour, and/or it is sustained 
by more compelling evidence, and/or there is argument which resolves the dispute 
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between the contesting conceptions, then that concept of equality or justice is contested, 
but not essentially contested. It is contested because there are different conceptions of 
the concept, but there is a correct conception. If, however, there is no single correct 
conception, there are more than one concepts which are sustained by perfectly 
respectable arguments and evidence, there is no argument to resolve the dispute 
between the contesting conceptions, and thus the dispute is inevitably endless, the 
concept is essentially contested. Therefore, the descriptive fact that people disagree 
about which conception is correct renders a concept contested; in order for the concept 
to be essentially contested, it also has to be the case that there is no one correct 
conception as was just stated, which is a matter of argumentation, not a matter of 
descriptive fact. ‘Contested concepts’ refers to a sociological fact of disagreement 
whereas ‘essentially contested concepts’ refers to the contestability of the claim when 
there is no one single correct conception.  
 
3.3.2. Hart  
Hart does not discuss the specific issue of essentially contested concepts, but he does 
draw on the concept vs conception distinction and identifies the concept with 
commonalities between its several conceptions. In specific pages of his famous work 
The Concept of Law which were later to be cited by Rawls, Hart maintains that there is 
a core abstract meaning of justice and there can be several conceptions which constitute 
specifications and applications of that core meaning. In particular, Hart first gives 
distinctive features of the application of justice. For example, he states: “That just and 
unjust are more specific forms of moral criticism than good and bad or right and wrong, 
is plain from the fact that we might intelligibly claim that a law was good because it was 
just, or that it was bad because it was unjust, but not that it was just because good, or 
unjust because bad.”127 For several instances of application, Hart settles then that justice 
is a subcategory of morality. “The general principle latent in these diverse applications 
of the idea of justice is that individuals are entitled in respect of each other to a certain 
relative position of equality or inequality.”128 Through distinctive features and diverse 
applications, Hart identifies the core of the concept of justice, which is “Treat like case 
alike” and “treat different cases differently.”129 He correctly goes on to state that the 
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vague core of the concept must be specified in order for justice to be meaningfully 
applied and it is in such specifications where conceptions are constituted.  
 
…though ‘Treat cases alike and different cases differently’ is a central 
element in the idea of justice, it is by itself incomplete and, until 
supplemented, cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct. This is so 
because any set of human beings will resemble each other in some respects 
and differ from each other in others and, until it is established what 
resemblance and differences are relevant, ‘Treat like cases alike’ must 
remain an empty form. To fill it we must know when, for the purposes in 
hand, cases are to be regarded as alike and what differences are relevant.130  
 
This is exactly what can be provided only by conceptions of justice which will specify 
the core of the concept of justice – ‘Treat cases alike and different cases differently’. 
The final formulation makes the concept vs conception distinction clear:  
 
There is therefore a certain complexity in the structure of the idea of justice. 
We may say that it consists of two parts: a uniform or constant feature, 
summarized in the precept ‘Treat like cases alike’ and a shifting or varying 
criterion used in determining when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or 
different.131  
 
For Hart, conceptions of the concept of justice are exactly the ‘shifting or varying’ 
criteria; why does this seem rather strange in comparison to our examples above? Let’s 
recall the conceptions of justice we stated in our example above: one conception of 
justice is protecting or at least not violating rights (let’s call it the ‘traditional’ 
conception for short) and the other is patterns of distribution (let’s call this one the 
‘progressive’ conception for short). Comparing the traditional and progressive 
conceptions of justice, one can see that they are not comparable - their difference is not 
a matter of shifting or varying criteria. Does that mean Hart is wrong? 
 
Not necessarily. In the previous example, we defined the conceptions, not the concept, 
so we did not discuss what the traditional and progressive conceptions of justice are 
criteria of. If we were to find the concept of justice that the traditional and progressive 
conceptions are conceptions of, then it could be as well the case that these conceptions 
identify varying criteria of that concept. If the concept which the traditional and 
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progressive conceptions are conceptions of is not the one identified by Hart, ‘Treat 
cases alike and different cases differently’, then two possibilities may be happening. 
The first possibility is that one of the identified concepts or both, may in fact be 
conceptions of a different, more abstract concept and we need to find out how it is that 
this concept is specified into these conceptions. Thus, it could be the case that Hart’s 
definition of the concept of justice is in fact a conception of a more abstract concept of 
justice than the one Hart is stating, e.g. a vague sense of ‘appropriate treatment’. One 
conception of appropriate treatment is protecting or at least not violating people’s rights, 
another conception is patterns of distribution (as we mentioned above, these two have 
different entailments), and in a legal context, appropriate treatment is about treating 
cases alike and different cases differently. The second possibility is that one of the 
conceptions is wrong, e.g. it may be a different conception altogether, and it is wrongly 
expressed by the word ‘justice’. If that is so, the conception most likely to be wrong 
from the three conceptions mentioned is obviously the progressive conception. Hayek, 
who regards the notions of ‘social justice’ and global justice’ as fundamentally 
confused, would probably agree with this. Here, one could argue that protecting or at 
least not violating rights is the concept and treating cases alike and different cases 
differently is a more specific conception of the concept. Alternatively, both possibilities 
could be happening. It could be the case that the progressive conception is wrong, the 
concept is indeed a more abstract one, say the vague sense of ‘appropriate treatment,’ 
and the conceptions are the traditional conception one the one hand, and ‘Treat cases 
alike and different cases differently’ on the other. As we shall also see below, the 
boundaries between concept and conceptions may shift. 
 
How did we move from the conceptions to identifying the concept? This is where the 
ladder of abstraction Hart is assuming becomes useful. If we are aware of conceptions 
but cannot identify the concept, we trace commonalities between the conceptions and 
climb the ladder of abstraction higher: what do several conceptions have in common? 
This is the line of reasoning that gives us the concept.  
 
Notably, this is exactly what we did at the beginning with legitimacy. Having traced 
several instances of legitimacy, ranging from ‘legitimate argument’ to ‘legitimate 
monarch’, we asked what the commonality between all these instances is and climbed 





legitimacy to a vague standard of properness. Having identified that, we started 
specifying this standard of properness. We ignored the instance of legitimacy in the 
examples of ‘legitimate argument’ and we focused on the instances which relate to the 
four objects of legal form (legal order/system, individual law, actor and action). In a 
sense, we identified some criteria: what does this vague properness, i.e. legitimacy, 
mean when it is applied in relation to the four object types of legal form?  
 
If this scheme makes sense, legitimacy in Tier 2 is a conception, not a concept; so 
how/why do we call it concept? The answer is simple: like we noticed above, the 
distinction between a concept and conception is fluid. In terms of legitimacy in its most 
abstract form (Tier 1), legitimacy in relation to the four object types of legal form (Tier 
2) may as well be a conception. From the point of view of legitimacy in Tier 2, 
normative conceptions of legitimacy which identify the necessary/sufficient conditions 
for legitimacy to obtain (speaking of Hart’s ‘varying criteria’) are conceptions. The 
reason why in this discussion we identify legitimacy as a concept in Tier 2 is because 
this discussion pertains to legitimacy in relation to law (the four object types of legal 
form). Nothing precludes one from regarding legitimacy of Tier 2 as a conception of 
legitimacy, with the concept of legitimacy being the vague standard of properness in 
Tier 1. With legitimacy in Tier 1 being the concept, there could be more conceptions 
apart from the conception of legitimacy of the four object types of legal form; for 
example, another conception could be the one that pertains to ‘legitimate argument,’ a 
different standard of properness. That would be another Tier 2.  
 
To conclude, Hart seems to have not discussed the issue of essentially contested 
concepts, but he did draw on the concept vs conception distinction. In particular, he 
identified the concept with commonalities between several conceptions of the concept 
which form the uniform or constant feature of the concept, and the conceptions which 
identify the criteria of when the concept applies. Soon later, Rawls was to draw on this 
same concept/conception distinction, referring to Hart. 
 
3.3.3. Rawls 
Perhaps the most famous use of the concept/conception distinction so far is found in 





between the concept of justice and particular conceptions of justice and defends his 
theory, justice as fairness, as the best conception of justice.  
 
Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered in this sense, for what 
is just and unjust is usually in dispute. Men disagree about which principles 
should define the basic terms of their association. Yet we may still say, 
despite this disagreement, that they each have a conception of justice. That 
is, they understand the need for, and they are prepared to affirm, a 
characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for 
determining what they take to be the proper distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation. Thus it seems natural to think of the concept 
of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice and as being 
specified by the role which these different sets of principles, these different 
conceptions, have in common [1].132 Those who hold different conceptions 
of justice can, then, still agree that institutions are just when no arbitrary 
distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and 
duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing 
claims to the advantages of social life. Men can agree to this description of 
just institutions since the notions of an arbitrary distinction and of a proper 
balance, which are included in the concept of justice, are left open for each 
to interpret according to the principles of justice that he accepts. These 
principles single out which similarities and differences among persons are 
relevant in determining rights and duties and they specify which division of 
advantages is appropriate. Clearly this distinction between the concept and 
the various conceptions of justice settles no important questions. It simply 
helps to identify the role of the principles of social justice.133 
 
The first observation in relation to Hart is the difference in the context of the concept. 
Hart defines justice as ‘Treat cases alike and different cases differently’. It is hard not to 
notice how differently Rawls defines the concept of justice: “a characteristic set of 
principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining what they take to be 
the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.” He refers to 
rights as the traditional definition we saw before, and then he adds the progressive 
definition pertaining to patterns of distribution. This difference in the definition of the 
concept of justice is contextual, thus not directly relevant to our purposes since our 
discussion pertains to legitimacy and not justice. What is, however, more important for 
our conversation, the number of points where Rawls follows Hart. 
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Rawls follows Hart at a couple of points. First and foremost, Rawls understands the 
concept as distinct from the conceptions and identifies the concept with what the 
conceptions have in common. Also, like Hart, making the concept vs conception 
distinction, Rawls discusses contested concepts, i.e. concepts in the case of which 
people argue for different conceptions, but not ‘essentially contested concepts.’ 
Notably, his concept/conception distinction does not imply that he believes that justice 
is essentially contested.  
 
Rawls believes that justice is a contested concept, but not essentially contested. What is 
the difference? As we discussed above, ‘contested concept’ refers to the sociological 
fact of whether people agree on one understanding of a concept, or if they disagree thus 
arguing for different conceptions of a concept, while there is a correct conception, 
whereas ‘essentially contested concept’ refers to the contestability of the claim when 
there is no single correct conception. Rawls believes that justice is a contested concept 
because he believes there are several conceptions of the concept of justice, and he also 
believes that his conception of justice is the correct one; the latter entails that he 
understands justice as being a contested, yet not an essentially contested concept. He 
believes that it is possible in the future for the people to understand that his conception 
of justice is the correct one. 
 
Before leaving Rawls, let’s focus on some common ground between Gallie and Rawls. 
Suppose that justice is an essentially contested concept, a claim with which Rawls 
disagrees. Gallie says: ‘I want to show that there are apparently endless disputes for 
which neither of these explanations need be the correct one.’ Before, we explained how 
it is, in the light of his second claim, that he means there is no single correct conception. 
Rawls presumably agrees with this, i.e. that ‘essentially contested concepts’ means that 
there is no one correct conception, which is presumably why Rawls (and Dworkin as we 
shall soon see) regards justice as contested but not an essentially contested concept. 
They also agree on another point. It seems that what Gallie means by ‘need’ is 
‘logically entailed by the concept itself.’134 To say that a conception of justice is not 
necessarily correct is to say that it is not entailed by the concept of justice itself and a 
person who accepts a different conception of justice is not necessarily failing to grasp 
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the concept. Rawls - and also Dworkin as we shall see next - would agree with this, 
even though they believe there is a correct conception of justice.  
 
3.3.4. Dworkin 
What has been mentioned in the last two paragraphs regarding Rawls, also applies to 
Dworkin.135 Another well-known use of the concept/conception distinction is found in 
Ronald Dworkin's theory, law as integrity.  
 
Suppose that Hercules, the hypothetical judge with whom Dworkin illustrates his 
theory, is interpreting the term ‘cruel’ in the Eighth Amendment of United States 
Constitution which prohibits cruel punishments. In order to do so, Hercules has to 
determine what conception of cruel punishment best fits and justifies the legal practices 
of the Eighth Amendment cases and more broadly of the whole of US constitutional 
law.  There are several conceptions of the term ‘cruel.’ According to one conception, a 
punishment is cruel if it only involves torture. According to another conception, a 
punishment is cruel only if it involves the needless infliction of suffering. Assuming the 
former, the death penalty is not cruel. Assuming the latter, it might be, if the death 
penalty has no deterrent benefits. How will the Hercules judge choose which conception 
to employ? For Dworkin, interpretation must fit settled law (dimension of fit), including 
all the relevant precedents that are generally accepted by the legal community, and, if 
more than one interpretation does this, the judge must choose the interpretation which 
best results in a system of law that better protects people's (natural) rights than any 
alternative interpretations that fits the settled law equally well (dimension of 
justification).  
 
In relation to Gallie’s essentially contested concepts, Dworkin lies in the same place as 
Rawls. Dworkin believes that there is one single correct conception of ‘cruel’ 
punishment and he lays down the path for the judge to find it. This way, Dworkin 
believes the dispute between different conceptions can be resolved, it is not ‘inevitably 
endless’, in Gallie’s words. It may be difficult for an actual judge, but the hypothetical 
Hercules judge can find the one correct conception of the concept ‘cruel’ punishment, 
via the dimensions of fit and justification. Dworkin does not regard justice as an 
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essentially contested concept, but he would regard it as contested, as people have 
different conceptions of it, presumably because the conception is not logically entailed 
by the concept itself – thus the need for the two dimensions the judge must follow. 
Therefore, it seems that for Dworkin ‘cruel’ is a contested concept because he does 
assume the sociological/descriptive fact that people have different conceptions about it, 
and it is also an interpretive concept - a concept that is subject to interpretation, but not 
an ‘essentially contested concept.’ 
 
3.4. Legitimacy: An Essentially Contested Concept 
The question which logically follows is this: is legitimacy a contested concept or an 
essentially contested concept? Having Gallie in mind, we would be inclined to 
understand legitimacy as an essentially contested concept, as long as there are several 
conceptions of legitimacy sustained by respectable arguments and evidence and no 
single conception is correct and the others wrong, so the dispute between different 
conceptions is not resolvable by argument and inevitably endless. On the other hand, 
having Rawls and Dworkin in mind, we would be inclined to understand legitimacy as a 
contested but not an essentially contested concept. It could be the case that there is one 
correct conception of legitimacy, despite any current disagreements. It is important to 
keep in mind that whether eventually, one conception of legitimacy is agreed upon is 
important for a concept being contested, not essentially contested. If a concept is 
contested, then future agreement on one conception of the concept renders the concept 
as no longer contested. By contrast, what renders a concept essentially contested is not 
the descriptive/sociological fact of disagreement but the contestability of the 
claim/nature of the concept, regardless of factual agreement/disagreement. Therefore, 
no matter how odd it may sound, in the case of an essentially contested concept, actual 
disagreement may cease to exist by everyone agreeing on one conception, but such an 
agreement will not render the concept as not essentially contested. Whether there are 
equally well argued conceptions or not depends on the contestability of the claim, not 
on the descriptive fact of whether there are people advancing such conceptions. Besides, 
the fact that there is a strong agreement on a claim does not render it correct; people 
may agree on what is wrong. For the most part of the history of mankind, humans 
believed that the earth is flat, and that men ought to have authority over women. Despite 






The difference between contested concepts and essentially contested concepts is that in 
the case of the former, there is one conception which is correct, whereas in the latter 
there is not. In the case of contested concepts, there can be more than one conception 
and it may also be the case that at different points in time, most or all people come to 
support one. Regardless of this sociological fact, the determining characteristic of a 
contested concept is that one conception can be singled out as the correct one, in terms 
of the contestability of the claim. By contrast, in the case of essentially contested 
concepts, more than one conception is equally reasonable and well argued, and there is 
no argument which solves the dispute between such equally reasonable and well agued 
competing conceptions, so there is no single correct conception. The absence of 
argument solving the dispute between competing conceptions is not a matter of no one 
having thought of it yet, but a matter of logic; in other words, the lack of agreement 
between competing conceptions is not a contingent sociological fact, but a necessary 
conceptual one.136 
 
How then should we answer the question of whether legitimacy is a contested or an 
essentially contested concept? What we must attempt to show then is whether there is 
one single conception which is correct, in which case legitimacy is a contested concept, 
or that there is no single conception which is correct, in which case legitimacy is an 
essentially contested concept. The former is much more difficult: one would have to 
consider all the conceptions of legitimacy, decide which one seems prima facie as the 
correct one and then try to argue why it is so. The latter seems like a much more 
sensible route, yet impossible: how do we prove something which does not exist (no 
single correct conception)? The most sensible path to follow then is to try to prove the 
latter, but with a different way. We can try to prove that there are at least two reasonable 
conceptions, and it is not the case that the one is correct and the other wrong.  
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3.4.1. Essential Contestability Dependent on Facts 
Although concepts like art make good examples of essentially contested concepts, in 
legally relevant objects, some convincing illustrations of legitimacy being an essentially 
contested concept pertain to instances where the standard of legitimacy depends not on 
fixed a priori criteria, at least not entirely, but at least partly on the context, on the 
facts.137 Facts can give grounds for equally well argued conceptions of legitimacy 
which, in the absence of an independent argument solving the dispute between them, 
render legitimacy an essentially contested concept. This is obviously more likely to 
happen when the object of legitimacy is an action or an entity instead of a legal order or 
an individual legal norm. A category of actions where the essential contestability of the 
concept of legitimacy is brought to obvious light is certain hard choices. Suppose that a 
state has been invaded and it thus has the right to defend itself. Because of corruption, 
many politicians are unwilling to do so and also convince a large portion of the people 
that standing down is the best choice. Therefore, the democratic mandate clearly 
requests no defensive war to be taken. It also happens to be the case that the head of the 
government can lead the country to a defensive war with reasonable chances of success, 
but only by violating both the democratic mandate and also specific constitutional 
procedural rules regarding leading the country to war. Therefore, leading the country to 
war is obviously illegal. The question is, would it be legitimate? The head of the state, 
who has sworn to protect his country and obey its laws is confronted with the following 
dilemma: either he leads the country to a liberation war but violates the law of the 
country and its democratic mandate, or he does not go to war, thus complying with the 
laws of the state and the democratic mandate but fails to protect the country even 
though he could.  
 
Presumably, both protecting the country on the one hand, and on the other hand 
respecting the democratic mandate and the laws of the country should be part of the 
standard of legitimacy here. When these two come apart, different prioritisation of the 
two will yield two different standards: if the conception of legitimacy prioritizes 
protecting the country over obeying the democratic mandate and the laws of the 
country, then going to war is legitimate and not going to war is illegitimate. If, on the 
other hand, the conception of legitimacy prioritizes obeying the democratic mandate 
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and the laws of the country instead of actually protecting the country, then not going to 
war is legitimate and going to war is illegitimate. A first reaction would be that the duty 
to protect the country is to be understood within the context of the legal system and thus 
cannot include the idea of protecting the country in violation of its laws. However, since 
the point at issue is not legality but legitimacy, it is hard not to see a valid moral reason 
to violate legal norms to protect a country when being the person who has sworn to 
protect it. Both arguments obeying the democratic mandate and the law on the one hand 
and protecting the country on the other are equally well argued and render legitimacy an 
essentially contested concept.  
 
The reason why the legitimacy of this action is an essentially contested concept is 
actually quite simple. On first glance, the choice seems to resemble the typical choice of 
‘do I obey morality or the law.’ The answer to this question is obvious, given that 
whether a rule is legally valid depends on its sources, not its merits, so legal validity 
does not entail moral validity (legal positivism). However, on a more careful 
consideration, the dilemma in this example is quite different. The head of the state has 
sworn to both protect the state one the one hand, and obey its laws on the other. He has 
sworn two things which, in this specific circumstance, happen to be mutually exclusive. 
Given the facts of this instance, protecting the country entails violating the law and 
obeying the law entails not protecting the country. The choice is between acting as a 
patriot vs acting as a citizen/man of authority. The former refers to our status as human 
beings with specific identity (such as ethnic identity), whereas the latter refers to our 
legal status as members of a legal order. These two are distinct because they are 
different aspects which do not communicate. The one refers to the actual world, the 
other to the legal realm. It makes sense to act as human agents rather than legal agents 
(it is better to quit your profession as a judge if, because of a sudden regime change, you 
have the legal obligation to apply morally horrendous laws), only that in this case, the 
head of state has sworn to both, so he has the same reason to act in accordance with 
either normative system. As a patriot, he ought to defend his country and violate the 
law. As a citizen/man of authority, he ought to uphold the law. However, since, 
regardless of our several roles, each human being is one entity, at any given point in 
time, it is possible to only apply one normative system in each choice. As Christoph 
Kletzer has correctly pointed out, there can only be one continuous normative system; 





simultaneously; we can switch back and forth between law and morality, but what we 
cannot do is take both at the same time.138 Of course our head of state in the example 
above can decide to save his country no matter what because that is what matters the 
most (saving the country has greater value – value theory), but that does not mean 
legitimacy here is not essentially contested. Of course, as an agent, the head of state will 
make a choice (given the facts, ‘not making a choice’, i.e. not doing anything, is making 
the choice of obeying the law and letting the country defenceless) but not dependent on 
legitimacy, because since here legitimacy is essentially contested, how it changes 
normative relations depends on the conception the agent chooses. The agent will choose 
between competing conceptions based on his individual beliefs, circumstances, values, 
such as protecting the country, etc., and choice of any of these well argued conceptions 
is equally valid exactly because there is no argument within legitimacy to solve the 
dispute between the two conceptions. This is exactly what renders legitimacy essentially 
contested. Freedom of country or upholding the law is a choice the human agent will 
make in accordance to what is more important for him, but there is no independent 
argument in solving the dispute between the two conceptions as they rise from the 
circumstances. Therefore, in this example, because of the facts/circumstances, 
legitimacy is rendered an essentially contested concept. 
 
A recent action which makes a great example of the normative conception of legitimacy 
best being identified in the light of specific facts/circumstances is the referendum in the 
UK regarding the exit of the UK from the EU in 2016. Regardless of the opinion one 
holds regarding whether the UK should remain in the EU or exit, the prevalent view is 
that the referendum was legitimate because democratic majority rules and the proper 
procedure were followed, people were not only in law but also in fact free to voice their 
opinions and cast their vote, etc. This is the prevalent conception of legitimacy of the 
referendum. However, it can also be well argued that the referendum was clearly 
illegitimate139 because of a conception which arises from the specifics of this particular 
circumstance: the voters were asked a binary question, yet they were informed of only 
the one answer. The voters know what ‘remain in the EU’ means. However, they could 
not have possibly known what ‘leaving the EU’ entails because the Brexit deal had not 
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been negotiated. A legitimate referendum with this question would entail negotiation of 
the Brexit first, so that people are aware of both options: they ought to know what 
happens if the UK remains in the EU, just as what happens if the UK leaves the EU. 
Asking a binary question when only one answer is known is not proper - it is not 
legitimate. According to this conception, if a referendum consists on a binary question, 
both answers have to be known. This conception of legitimacy is not an a priori 
criterion but it rose from the particularity of the specific facts. In the absence of an 
independent argument solving the dispute between the two conceptions, legitimacy of 
this referendum is an essentially contested concept. 
 
The other important point arising from this example is that legitimacy as a concept is 
too open ended to not be an essentially contested concept. This is because the content of 
legitimacy, as explained above, is determined by normative conceptions, not the 
concept of legitimacy per se. A normative conception of legitimacy of referendum 
would probably include certain established a priori conditions such as appropriate 
minimum turnout, guarantees for voters to express their opinions and vote free from 
fear or threats, etc. Such conditions would be necessary conditions of legitimacy. What 
the Brexit referendum example showed, is that although it is easy to identify certain 
necessary conditions of the standard/conception of legitimacy, it is extremely difficult, 
maybe even impossible considering the unpredictability of future circumstances, to 
provide an exhaustive list of a priori sufficient conditions of legitimacy. A conception of 
legitimacy has to do both: identify both the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
legitimacy. The condition of legitimacy which is relevant, as I demonstrated before, was 
whether voters have been informed about details of both potential answers of the 
referendum question, when it happens to be a binary question. This is not immediately 
obvious as the aforementioned necessary conditions imply. Each question that could be 
asked is different and different questions may pose different kinds of issues which call 
for different response(s) being appropriate, thus different conception(s) of legitimacy. 
The nature of the specific object of legitimacy and the broader context determines the 
appropriate conditions of the conception of legitimacy. Therefore in many cases, the 
sufficient conditions, and thus the appropriate conceptions, are identified in the light of 
the specific circumstances.  
 





What brings about change of circumstances is, in one word, time. Legitimacy can be 
essentially contested with competing conceptions pertaining to the element of time. For 
sure, time legitimizes in the descriptive sense.  For example, imagine the parents of a 
girl who has been brutally murdered. At the time recent to the event, there is a sentiment 
of eagerness for strong punishment of the perpetrator, even hatred. The perpetrator is 
presented as the manifestation of all evil and barely any punishment is enough. Trends 
not even particularly relevant, such as feminism, are brought in the agenda and people 
generally invoke any possible justification to present the perpetrator as the 
manifestation of all evil. The overall sentiment is in favour of very strict sentence in the 
context of despise and hatred towards the perpetrator. Suppose that the perpetrator is not 
found at any time recent to the crime. Several years later, people not only gradually 
cease to show sympathy for the strong negative feelings of the parents towards the 
perpetrator and the intense emotional responses towards him, not only people start 
telling the parents that it is ‘time to let go,’ ‘move on,’ etc., even though the perpetrator 
has not been punished, but people also change emotional stance towards the perpetrator. 
For sure, murder as such remains a horrible crime in the minds of the people, but the 
emotional stance towards the specific perpetrator and his act in particular has changed: 
‘It is an old story.’, ‘It belongs in the past.’ Suppose the perpetrator has been arrested 
when this emotional stance is now prevalent. The sentiment of the people could be in 
favour of a different sentence than before. The same sentence could be regarded now as 
illegitimate because it is perceived as manifestation of hatred of the parents who ‘did 
not move on’ and ‘cannot let go.’ The inconsistency in the beliefs of the people 
regarding the sentence lies on the fact that time is morally irrelevant. Leaving aside 
legal reasons which may influence the sentence because of time, it is morally irrelevant 
whether someone committed a murder yesterday or several years ago. The violation of a 
moral obligation and in that sense moral blameworthiness is not dependent on time. 
This is normative. Yet, descriptively, time legitimizes.  
 
The same is true in the international realm. States may be legal entities, but they are 
administered by human beings, just like the human beings in the previous example with 
inconsistent beliefs regarding criminal punishment. Suppose state A invades and 
occupies part of state B. The UN general Assembly issues resolutions regarding the 
illegality of the invasion and asks from the invading state to withdraw its military 





whatsoever, so there is peace, even though the status quo is unjust. Even after some 
time, the overall sentiment in the international system is probably against the invading 
power and in favour of breaking peace for liberation. Suppose that, because of political 
interests, the international community does not take military measures to expel state A 
from the territory of state B. Suppose that state A not only keeps its military forces in 
that territory, but also brings migrants from state A to the illegally occupied areas of 
state B, sells land of citizens of state A in the occupied areas, changes not only the 
demographics but also the cultural property of the occupied area, such as religious 
monuments, and declares the occupied area as an independent state which only state A, 
the invading state, recognizes. Leaving aside the illegality of both the invasion and the 
declaration of independence (suppose that the UN Security Council declares, with 
legally binding resolutions, the occupied area as a non-state but an illegal regime, as it 
occupies territory of a state), consider again how time legitimizes. The international 
community is no longer trying to restore justice but asks state B, the invaded state, the 
same thing people would ask the parents of the victim in our previous example: ‘to let 
go’, ‘forget the past’, and accept a profoundly unjust solution, because it is feasible and 
maintains peace. Much like the people in our previous example, the international 
community becomes frustrated with ongoing unresolved territorial disputes and is 
interested in a peaceful solution, not a just one. Justice has been replaced with peace and 
feasibility. An unjust solution, which would have never been considered moments after 
the invasion, is now pressured upon the invaded state. Time legitimizes; so far, in a 
descriptive sense. 
 
Is it possible that time legitimizes in a normative sense? Suppose, as is reasonable to 
assume, that the standard of legitimacy of the UN is peace and ensuring that certain 
basic rights of states and individuals are not violated. Now suppose that extreme famine 
that cannot be dealt with creates a sudden extreme limitation of world’s food sources, 
inadequate to feed the world population, even with the most efficient or fair allocation 
of wealth and food. Given the need of human nature to survive and that the UN is not 
just an international organisation but the world’s forum, finding and allocating food is 
now the standard of legitimacy of the UN. It would be then legitimate to even allow 
wars of limited scale if that is the only way to focus resources on finding and allocating 
food, instead of prioritizing prevention of wars, leaving the world to starvation. The 





is that time, with change of circumstances, has an effect on the normative standard of 
legitimacy because what is appropriate or proper sometimes depends, at least partly, on 
circumstances at each point in time. Therefore, what is the standard of normative 
legitimacy may at least partly depend on facts. This dimension is lost in Tier 2 where 
standards are set a priori on the objects of legitimacy. However, imaginative examples, 
like the aforementioned, help us realize that this dimension is always lurking in the 
background. It could be argued that this is an exception that could be built in from the 
beginning. So the normative standard of legitimacy of the UN is ‘peace and ensuring 
that certain basic rights of states and individuals are not violated, but if there is 
famine…’. However, this would not save the problem because future circumstances are 
not restricted in an exhaustive list. It is reasonable for the normative conception of 
legitimacy of the UN to be peace. But at a time when genocides are still committed by 
states against their own citizens, without even war between states, then justice, in the 
sense of protection of basic human rights, becomes relevant as standard of normative 
legitimacy. A change of circumstances as in the food shortage example would bring 
finding and allocating food in the agenda. And so on and so forth.   
 
3.4.3. Essential Contestability within the Conception: Democracy 
Another category of cases where legitimacy is rendered an essentially contested concept 
is when the single conception of legitimacy in question is itself essentially contested. 
Although we will not conduct a detailed analysis of a specific conception (Tier 3), 
which will take place in the next chapter, we can give examples of conceptions which 
are themselves essentially contested. A great example is the conception of legitimacy in 
the realm of political legitimacy, i.e. the right and acceptance of the government and 
justification for coercion, because the predominant conception here is obviously 
democracy. In the way democracy is understood today, it is a rather vague idea, contrast 
to democracy literally speaking as invented by the Greeks, which was a very clear 
concept with a well defined meaning. I will now clarify and define democracy and 
illustrate that democracy is an essentially contested concept. If I am successful, then 
legitimacy of domestic legal orders is consequently also essentially contested. To begin, 






Literally speaking, democracy (‘demos’, ‘δήµος’, people and ‘kratos’ κράτος, power) 
means people have, i.e. exercise, power, i.e. all powers. Hence, democracy in its literal 
sense means that legislative, executive and judicial powers are not exercised by elected 
representatives, but by the people themselves. Therefore, democracy did not exist first 
in 5th century BC Athens, but only in 5th century BC Athens. This is the only time in 
world history where citizens exercised all three functions, thus truly had power. The 
Athenian citizens voted for their own laws (Assembly of the People – ‘Ekklesia tou 
Demou’), exercised executive power (600 magistrates each appointed for annual term) 
and adjudicated cases (‘Heliaia’ – ‘Ηλιαία’).  
 
System of governance we now call democratic, with elected representatives, is exactly 
what democracy in its literal sense negates, and is in that sense anti-democratic. 
Democracy, people exercising power, is thus contrasted with systems of governance 
where others, contrast to the people, exercise power, whether that is a king, oligarchy or 
a larger number of representatives such as members of parliament, elected or not. 
Therefore, ‘indirect democracy’, as is confusingly called, that we have today, is not 
democracy in the literal sense of the term, since people do not exercise any of the three 
functions – legislative, executive or judicial, but it is representativism since elected 
representatives exercise powers. Even the idea of representativism is construed, because 
members of the parliament vote with their own consciousness, not whatever the people 
want them to vote. Thus, it is possible for the majority of voters to desire A, and for 
‘representatives’ to vote for B. Power cannot be exercised indirectly. The idea of people 
exercising power is substituted by the idea of people not exercising power but voting 
every four years who will exercise power in their behalf. This would be so, even if 
people were electing a monarch every four years. The system of governance according 
to which people vote for their rulers,140 is anti-democratic; it is the negation of 
democracy in its true sense; it is exactly what the 5th century Athenians were negating 
with their system of governance. The only democratic institution which has survived is 
the referendum, where people do legislate, to the usually limited extent referendums 
																																																								
140 The fact that certain of their ‘rulers’ are not even elected, e.g. part of the legislative function in some 
states such as the House of Lords in the UK, renders the representative system even less democratic and 
thus further supports my point. The fact that judges are typically not elected by the voters but in many 
cases appointed only strengthens my argument: even if the appointment is made by elected rulers, the 





allow. Democracy in its literal sense has been substituted with the right to vote once 
every four years.  
 
It could be argued that aside from referendum, what has survived from democracy in 
terms of systems of governance is not democracy itself but something quite different: 
the vague idea of participation of the people in the exercise of power by voting. This is 
thought to be the commonality between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ democracy, which 
renders them conceptions of the same concept. However, the problem with this 
argument is that by voting rulers every four years, voters do not ‘participate’ in the 
exercise of power. They do not adjudicate cases. They do not participate in the exercise 
of the legislative power because, as mentioned above, members of the parliament vote 
in their own consciousness and they cannot be revoked by the voters during their term. 
The expectation of re-election pressuring elected representatives to vote in accordance 
with the expectations of their voters is an explanatory reason why elected 
representatives sometimes vote the way they do; it is not an instantiation of people 
participating in the exercise of power. This would have been the case if the vote of the 
elected representatives was valid only if it was within certain contours or guidelines 
established by the people. However, this is not the case. In the executive function, 
again, rulers are not restricted by the voters, who have no say in the exercise of 
executive power. This is so regardless of how members of the executive function are 
appointed – by the legislative function (parliamentary systems), by a specific body such 
as the Electoral College (presidential systems like the US), or by popular vote 
(presidential systems like Cyprus). The power to rule ourselves has been substituted by 
the right to vote who rules us. Different systems of governance are more indirect as 
others. For example, in Cyprus citizens vote directly for the President, whereas in the 
US this is the competence of the Electoral College. Such a system allows for incidents 
where one presidential candidate (Hillary Clinton) wins the popular vote whereas 
another presidential candidate (Donald Trump) wins the vote of the Electoral College. 
Such anti-democratic results permitted by democracy as understood today makes one 
wonder how more indirectness can further ridicule the idea of democracy. Direct 
democracy and indirect democracy are not conceptions of the same concept, but clearly 






The claim is a conceptual one, not a deontological or political one: I am claiming that 
two entirely different concepts should not be misconceived as two conceptions of the 
same concept; I am not claiming that modern societies ought to establish direct 
democracy, as that is obviously unfeasible.141 Direct democracy, democracy in its literal 
sense, may be an ideal system of governance and has indeed existed effectively in a city 
with a population of 300 000 people in which only 30 000 people (Athenian adult 
males) were full citizens, but implementation of such a system in contemporary legal 
orders of much larger population142 would render such a system of governance unable to 
function. Therefore, in contemporary reality, democracy in its literal sense is obviously 
not a reasonable/desirable system of governance to have. 
 
It is equally unreasonable and perhaps manipulative, however, to rely on the common 
word ‘democracy’, in the terms ‘direct democracy’ and ‘indirect democracy’, in order to 
legitimize (in the sociological sense) the decisions of the established system of 
governance. If the current system of governance of the western world is legitimate must 
be assessed from within it, from its consequences etc., not from false comparisons 
drawing on the charm and desirability of the term ‘democracy’ which gives the 
impression of participation of the people. Just because a decision has been made in 
accordance with the current systems of governance, it does not mean that the decision is 
democratic in the literal sense, i.e. that the majority of the population supports it. The 
use of the word ‘democracy’ though, points to that direction which can be misleading, 
and to the extent that it attempts to legitimize (sociologically) such a decision, also 
manipulative. 
 
Therefore, the word ‘democracy’ nowadays refers to a different concept. The word 
‘democracy’ used to express the concept of people exercising power, whereas now it 
expresses the different concept of a representative system (the extent to which the rulers 
actually represent the people is of course a different matter). The same word used for 
different concepts may cause confusion (democracy – which one?), but the confusion is 
linguistic, not conceptual. The confusion lies on which concept is meant by the use of 
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that it pertains to conceptual analysis, not political. 
142 One can also add to this: decisions made by states nowadays are far more complicated and 
sophisticated than in ancient times, making it harder for lay people to be able to exercise executive 





the word. But there is no confusion as to the meaning of any of the concepts. So far 
then, neither democracy in its literal sense, nor representativism are contested concepts, 
let alone essentially contested.  
 
It could be argued, however, that the concept referred to as ‘liberal democracy’ or 
‘western liberal democracy’ is an essentially contested concept. Liberal democracy is a 
system of governance which includes not only elected representatives as described 
above, but also transparency of governance and human rights. The latter, human rights, 
is what ascribes liberalism to ‘liberal democracy,’ as it establishes rights which typically 
protect the individual from the government and the representative majority. Democracy 
in its true sense is largely the majoritarian rule: the majority of the Athenian citizens 
decide what the law is, what the decision of the public court is, etc. Human rights, by 
contrast, limit the majoritarian rule, but also the representative majority, to the extent 
that they set limitations to what the majority (of people or of representatives) can do. 
Thus, if the majority democratically decide to torture a minority, this is impermissible 
because of human rights. The possibility of the majority tyrannizing the minority, the 
tyranny of the majority, was presented by John Stuart Mill at the very beginning of his 
famous book On Liberty. There is thus a contrast between the majoritarian rule (which 
elects representatives/rulers) on the one hand, and human rights on the other. This 
contrast may render liberal democracy as an essentially contested concept: one 
conception of liberal democracy may consist on policies which favour the majoritarian 
rule over human rights, whereas another conception may consist on policies which 
favour constitutionally protected (and thus not easily amended by the majority) human 
rights. In the absence of an argument solving the dispute between these two 
conceptions, the concept of a western liberal democracy is an essentially contested 
concept. Consequently, so is the concept of legitimacy of domestic legal orders, if the 
conception of legitimacy is liberal democracy.  
 
The last part reflects a confusing contrast stipulated in the public debate as ‘democracy 
vs republicanism.’ Given the analysis above, the use of ‘democracy’ here is confusing 
and misleading, and best understood as representativism. Most modern states, like the 
United States, are democratic republics. The former indicates representativism, i.e. a 
representational system where citizens vote to elect politicians, and the latter indicates 





(even if it has been elected by a majority of voters), protected by a charter of rights or 
more typically by a constitution. Both components are part of democracy in the sense of 
western liberal democracy as the conception of political legitimacy used today and as 
part of system of governance of most modern states. However, these two elements 
oppose each other and they render democracy an essentially contested concept. One 
conception stresses representativism more, including more to what is determined by the 
legislature and the government and less to what is not, and on the other hand the other 
conception would move more towards republicanism restricting the legislature and the 
government, stressing and increasing the list of inalienable human rights. Both 
conceptions are most certainly supported by respectable arguments – for this, there is no 
doubt. How can the dispute between these two conceptions possibly be resolved? 
Different lines can be drawn depending on our moral intuitions, moral views, political 
views, our worldview and  understanding of human nature, thus transferring the dispute 
to disagreement between worldviews, political ideologies, substantive moral 
disagreements and all such disputes which humans have disagreed with each other since 
the dawn of time. There is no argument which can solve the dispute between 
representativism and republicanism, so the dispute between these conceptions is 
inevitably endless. 
 
Admittedly the argument suffers from oversimplification. For liberal democracy to be 
proven to be essentially contested, the complete conceptions must be presented. Each 
conception must fully specify ‘how much’ representativism vs ‘how much’ human 
rights component it includes in concrete terms. Here, I do not proceed to such an issue. I 
restrict myself to claiming that if such equally well argued conceptions are possible, in 
the absence of an independent argument solving the dispute between them, legitimacy 
of domestic legal orders would be an essentially contested concept. I will merely 
present an example, at least to show the usefulness of understanding this concept as 
essentially contested. 
 
Suppose the following situation. In a western liberal democracy, the government is 
considering a referendum which, if answered positively, will harm to a certain extent 
some interests protected by human rights principles, but not to the extent that it would 
be unconstitutional given the established interpretation of human rights. Such an 





Suppose the government decides to go ahead with the referendum. Is this decision of the 
government legitimate? If the conception of liberal democracy assumed is the one 
emphasizing majoritarian rule, then the decision to proceed with the referendum is 
legitimate, because the majority of the people will decide. If the conception 
emphasizing human rights is assumed, the choice of the government is illegitimate 
because it risks harming human rights.  
 
3.4.4. Dealing with Essential Contestability 
We should not suffer from an ‘essentially contested fetishism’ and neglect the fact that 
other concepts are not like legitimacy which is content neutral and receives meaning 
from its conceptions; most concepts have much more content. It seems that nowadays, 
racism is treated as an essentially contested concept, which is false. On the one hand, 
one conception understands racism to mean regarding someone as an inferior human 
being in virtue of his/her race (any race). On the other hand, a different conception 
understands racism as any action which makes someone belonging to a race which has 
previously been oppressed feel uncomfortable. Under the second conception, one can be 
racist (in the sense of the first conception) against someone else, and that does not 
constitute racism because the race of the latter is not regarded as having been oppressed. 
Sarah Jeong, US citizen of South Korean origin, wrote tweets about liking to see white 
people suffer.143 Explicitly stating that one enjoys seeing people suffering because of 
their race constitutes racism in the sense of the first conception, where it does not matter 
which race is being referred to. However, many regarded Sarah Jeong’s comments as 
not racist because they assumed the second conception: white people have not been 
oppressed as a race (arguably true, as many white ethnic groups have been oppressed 
over the centuries), so the comments are not racist. According to the second conception, 
racism can only function towards certain races, not towards all. After those tweets, 
Sarah Jeong was hired by New York Times as an editor and later given a bigger 
platform. According to the second conception of racism, which is obviously infiltrating 
the public domain, one can regard members of a race which has not been oppressed (or 
believed to have not been oppressed) as inferior and express her pleasure in seeing them 
suffer without this constituting racism. This assumes that people of certain races are 
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worthy of inferior treatment in virtue of their race, i.e. that different races are worthy of 
different treatment, which is exactly what the first conception of racism negates. 
Therefore, the second conception is a direct negation of the first. Like the two 
aforementioned conceptions of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ democracy, they are two distinct, 
insufficiently similar, and in fact very different concepts. If equality of races belongs in 
the sine qua non of the concept of racism, then only the first conception is valid and 
there is thus only one understanding of the concept. Conceptual clarity and intellectual 
honesty demand we use concepts with their true meaning and not manipulate concepts 
to advance opinions, political ideologies or personal temperament. Apart from the 
danger of ‘essentially contested fetishism’, what other impact can possibly occur with 
the understanding of legitimacy as an essentially contested concept? 
 
Legitimacy being an essentially contested concept is an inconvenient truth. Consider 
current sensitive issues people feel strongly about, such as immigration policies. One 
view is open border policy, the opposite view advances closed borders, with the closest 
example being Japan, whereas most views lie somewhere between these two sides of 
the spectrum. For many such policies, a complex array of factors is considered, ranging 
from interests of immigrants, citizens, ability of the states to provide, security etc, and 
different weight is given in the balancing of these considerations. Different 
views/policies may reflect different conceptions of legitimacy of immigration policies. 
For example, the open border view maintains that immigration helps reduce poverty and 
that treating human beings differently because they were born on the other side of a 
national boundary is unethical. This may also be part of the normative conception of 
legitimacy of immigration policy according to this view. If so, according to this view, 
other immigration policies which reduce or block immigration are illegitimate because 
they do not contribute – or do not contribute enough- to reducing poverty and they treat 
human beings unethically. By contrast, in the other extreme, the closed borders view 
holds that a society has the collective moral right to protect its way of life and culture, 
its distribution of wealth, standards of living, and that we have different moral 
obligations to our fellow citizens than to foreigners. This view may be a part of a 
normative conception of legitimacy of immigration according to which immigration 
policies which allow non citizens without restrictions or qualifications to settle in a 
country treat citizens unethically as they harm their interests and unjustly benefit 





between well argued competing conceptions of legitimacy, the nature of legitimacy as 
an essentially contested concept appears. Sociologically speaking, given how sensitive 
the topic of immigration policy is at present, it is hard for supporters of each view to 
accept that their position is illegitimate from the standpoint of the other views. 
 
Legitimacy being an essentially contested concept may well be a more inconvenient 
truth to accept than the difficulty of tolerance in democracy. In the case of difficulty of 
tolerance in a democracy, one only needs to accept that other citizens have the right to 
their opinion and pursuit of happiness and lifestyle, etc., although they are radically 
different. By contrast, here we are asked to accept, at least where legitimacy will 
include substantive and especially moral criteria, that our values do not pose in the 
discussion the necessary truth claim we assume they do. With the difficulty of tolerance 
in democracy, I only have to accept that you have the right to make a public protest 
about something I may disagree about. I do not have to accept that your opinion is 
reasonable. I am perfectly consistent maintaining that I am right and you are wrong, my 
claim is true and yours is false and also unreasonable, and I merely tolerate the exercise 
of your right. By contrast, with legitimacy being an essentially contested concept, I have 
to accept that your conception is as reasonable as mine.144 I have to accept the harder 
truth that it is the nature of the question which invites these kinds of disagreements and 
my stance does not pose an absolute truth claim.  
 
Let’s take religious fundamentalist movements as a final example. A few centuries ago, 
certain European powers forced natives in their colonies to convert to Christianity. 
More recently, Taleban enforces a literal interpretation of the Sharia law and the Quran 
with the well-known brutalities. If one seriously believes that he has the moral 
obligation to convert people to Christianity as that is the only way to rescue their souls 
from eternal damnation, then not acting so is immoral. If one takes the commands of the 
Sharia law and the Quran (including ‘kill the infidels’, etc.) literally and believes they 
are moral obligations and as such ought to be fulfilled to the utmost, not acting as per 
Taleban is immoral. The religious beliefs of the Christian colonizers on the one hand 
and the Taleban on the other pose an absolute truth claim. The truth value of their 
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beliefs necessarily entails that everyone else is wrong (God and Allah both claim 
exclusivity), all other metaphysical beliefs and secularization alike; it is impossible to 
accept the grounds of the other views. The truth claim of such views is incompatible 
with pluralism. Fundamentalist Christian colonizers and Taleban reject any other 
ground for any other metaphysical belief or atheism and they both agree to disagree. It 
is only third parties (atheists, secular governments, etc.) who have the luxury to discuss 
the right of freedom of religion and acknowledge the right of all to hold any 
metaphysical beliefs without commenting on the truth value of those beliefs. Both the 
Christian colonizers and the Taleban disrespect anyone else’s right of freedom of 
religion, and they feel their disrespect is entirely legitimate, because they both believe 
that only they hold legitimate beliefs, so everyone else has no moral right to hold 
contrary or even incompatible beliefs. The Christian colonizers and the Taleban agree to 
one claim: one of them is right, everyone else is wrong, and everyone else has to submit 
to the one truth.  
 
The last bit is taken away with criminal law and human rights. It is easy to disregard 
these religious fundamentalist views from the public debate on the grounds of them 
being illegitimate because they violate fundamental human rights. However, if we take 
away certain illegal and illegitimate aspects of these views – murders, forced 
conversions, etc. – the remaining part overlaps with legitimate religions of Christianity, 
Islam, Judaism etc.: all religious views assume that the others are wrong. The difficulty 
of tolerance in democracy is accepting pluralism, respecting the rights of others to have 
and express their views even if they are inconvenient for the rest, regardless of the truth 
value of their beliefs. Free market of ideas in a democracy gives the hope that with the 
public debate and exchange of ideas, there may be a convergence of views, as there may 
have been, for example, in the case of pornography which was once the exception, but 
having been justified in the public debate as giving alternative views in sex life, it has 
now become ordinary and widely accepted. The nature of religious views differs from 
the nature of views regarding sexuality, in so far as the latter refers to what can be 
studied with unbiased objectivity and science (positive sciences, psychology, etc). 
Certain truths regarding sexuality are verifiable with scientific method and social 
experience. This is not the case with religious views which are grounded on belief. Free 
market of ideas cannot lead to normative truths about religion. Legitimacy as an 





nature of the disagreement is such that the legitimacy of views, e.g. religious views, is 
essentially contested. It casts doubts on the hope or possibility of convergence of views. 
 
Of course, like Applbaum also maintains, the barriers are not fixed. What is an 
essentially contested concept may change. Consider the word ‘democracy’. In antiquity, 
it meant that people exercise power, as the etymology clearly states, whereas now it 
means the opposite, i.e. representativism, a system of governance where people do not 
exercise power. It is possible that with the lengthening of the list of human rights, the 
gradually broader interpretation of human rights by the courts and in general the 
increasing emphasis on human rights and which we feel must not be reduced by future 
governments or legislatures, the word ‘democracy’ may come to mean a system of 
governance more republican than the current western liberal democracies.   
 
A concept being essentially contested is dependent on the contestability of a 
notion/claim with the semantic connection between words and meanings at any given 
point in time. It is thus possible that although at present legitimacy is an essentially 
contested concept, in the future it may become detached from a vague sense of 
properness (Tier 1) and come to have a much narrower scope manifested only in given 
contests with established meaning. It may become, for example, entirely identified with 
political legitimacy alone, i.e. justification of governmental authority, and especially 
with a specific standard, e.g. democratic legitimacy in the sense of western liberal 
democracy more towards republicanism. Language is a creation of human intellect and 
such possibilities are limitless. It is thus important to stress that the claim that 
legitimacy is an essentially contested concept is conditioned by the current conceptual 
framework and use of terminology – the semantic connection between terms and 
meanings. Language and concepts are by nature amenable to change.   
 
Although the barriers may change and legitimacy as a concept may change so as to 
become a different concept and thus perhaps a non-essentially contested concept, 
legitimacy as meant at present (properness) is an essentially contested concept by its 
nature. The conclusive argument why legitimacy is an essentially contested concept 
consists both on what legitimacy as a concept is, i.e. standard of properness, and 
respectively what it is not, i.e. it is content-free. Indeed, as discussed in the previous 





conceptions, the only content in this concept (apart from the vague standard of 
properness) is that it is a moral power, which merely tells us what kind of right it is 
within the Hohfeldian scheme. The rest of the content depends on the context, which 
often depends on the specific circumstances, so legitimacy may be situational. In such 
cases, since we cannot anticipate the context, we do not know the content, which is 
what gives rise to different conceptions. There are bound to be cases where, due to 
circumstances/facts/context, different competing conceptions will be equally well 
argued without an independent argument possible to solve the dispute between them. 
 
For sure, legitimacy being an essentially contested concept does not mean that it is so in 
every instance that it is invoked, but the fact that in certain instances it will be, that 
reveals the nature of the concept detached from its conceptions. There are indeed 
instances where only once conception grounds legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of an object. 
For example, in self-defence,145 the nature of the concept of legitimacy as an essentially 
contested concept is not revealed, since there are no competing conceptions of self-
defence, let alone lack of argument solving the dispute between them. The fact that in 
certain cases, due to the nature of the object of legitimacy in question, the 
conceptions/content of legitimacy depend on context (facts/circumstances) which is not 
predetermined means that in some cases there are bound to be equally reasonable 
competing conceptions without an argument which can solve the dispute between them, 
revealing the nature of legitimacy as an essentially contested concept.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed the conceptual relationships pertaining to the concept of 
legitimacy. In particular, I discussed the so-called ‘legal legitimacy’, the relationship of 
the concept of legitimacy with authority, entertained the distinction between the concept 
and several possible conceptions and concluded that legitimacy is an essentially 
contested concept.  
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order that anticipatory self-defence is included in the concept of self-defence (it is a kind of self-defence, 
not a different concept), more importantly, this is an entirely different point from the issue at hand, which 





First, I claimed that there is no concept of ‘legal legitimacy’. Assuming legal 
positivism, not as a robust theory of law but merely as a proposition of validity of legal 
norms, ‘legal legitimacy’ collapses to legal validity. ‘Legal legitimacy’ signifies a legal 
obligation to submit to an object of legitimacy (action, rule, actor or system). However, 
only legally valid norms create legal obligations. Therefore, ‘legal legitimacy’ collapses 
to legal validity. Natural law cannot make a case for the so called ‘legal legitimacy 
either. On the one hand, if natural law is understood, as per Finnis, as assuming legal 
positivism (‘bad law is not law’ means that bad law is not morally obligatory), ‘legal 
legitimacy’ collapses again to legal validity, as when assuming legal positivism as 
explained above. On the other hand, if natural law is understood, as legal positivists 
understand it, as negation of legal positivism (‘bad law is not law’ means that moral 
justifiability is an essential condition of legal validity), then ‘legal legitimacy’ collapses 
to legitimacy, or at least certain normative conceptions of legitimacy. 
 
Second, I discussed the concept of authority and its connection with legitimacy. With 
Raz’s ‘service theory’ of authority, authority is understood as granting second order 
reasons for action which exclude first order/deliberative reasons from consideration, so 
that by complying with authority the addressee conforms better with reason. Effective 
(de facto) authority consists in power, with the claim to legitimate authority. In the 
concept of legitimate authority, the two concepts are indeed intertwined, as authority 
contributes the issue of power, whereas legitimacy brings in the right, necessary for 
legitimate authority to be distinguished from effective (de facto) authority. In a purely 
legal sense, the term ‘authority’ may refer to a different concept, that of legal 
competence, as in ‘The police officers have the authority to arrest suspects.’ Obviously, 
this concept is more closely related to legal validity, rather than legitimacy. 
 
Third, I discussed the relationship between the concept of legitimacy and its individual 
conceptions, with reference to Gallie, Hart, Rawls, and Dworkin. A contested concept is 
simply a concept regarding which there are different conceptions. Essentially contested 
concept, as per Gallie, is the concept regarding which there is more than one equally 
reasonable and well argued conception, and there is no argument that can solve the 
dispute between competing conceptions. Hart does not discuss essentially contested 
concepts but draws on the concept vs conception distinction. He understands justice as 





in determining when cases are alike or different is a shifting or varying criterion. These 
shifting or varying criteria form conceptions of the concept. Rawls also makes the 
concept vs conception distinction. He claims that the concept of justice is contested, i.e. 
there are various conceptions of justice, and that his progressive conception is the 
correct one. In his theory of interpretation, Dworkin also makes the concept vs 
conception distinction and believes that the dispute between different conceptions of a 
concept (such as ‘cruel’ punishment) can be resolved, so the concept is not ‘essentially 
contested’.  
 
Finally, I claimed that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept. There can be 
various conceptions of legitimacy, some of which are equally reasoned and well argued; 
in the absence of an argument that can resolve the dispute between them, the concept of 
legitimacy remains essentially contested. What the normative standard of legitimacy is 
depends on the object of legitimacy and the context, the circumstances. As illustrated in 
the previous chapters, the only permanent content of the concept of legitimacy, i.e. the 
only content of legitimacy which is always present regardless of the specific normative 
conceptions of legitimacy, is that it is a vague standard of properness (which is specified 
by conceptions) and it is a moral power. Consequently, the concept of legitimacy is 
open ended, content-neutral and lends itself to equally well argued 
standards/conceptions, without an argument to solve the dispute between competing 
conceptions.  
 
Having discussed the distinction between concept and conceptions and clarified that 
legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, it is now time to turn to normative 
conceptions of legitimacy, in international law in particular. This choice already begs 
two questions. First, since the claim the discussion advances is that legitimacy, detached 
from its individual conceptions, is an essentially contested concept, why bother with 
individual normative conceptions? Second, why choose legitimacy of international law 







Tier 3 – Justice, Legitimacy and Essential 
Contestability 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Discussing certain normative conceptions illustrates the concept as essentially 
contested. Towards the end of the previous chapter, we noticed that one of the instances 
in which legitimacy is an essentially contested concept is where the standard of 
legitimacy itself is essentially contested. In this chapter, I have chosen to discuss a 
theory which will help illustrate this exact point. The theory is Buchanan’s theory of 
justice, in the sense of protecting human rights, as a standard of legitimacy of 
international law. Since justice is itself an essentially contested concept, so is 
legitimacy.   
 
It so happens that there may be a double contestability here. On the one hand, 
legitimacy of international law may be an essentially contested concept. Justice, in the 
sense of protection of basic human rights, is one conception, whereas a different 
conception is peace and stability, as per the UN Charter. Another conception, as we 
shall briefly see in the end, is Steven Ratner’s two-pillar standard which includes both 
peace and human rights. If there is no independent argument solving the dispute 
between these conceptions, then legitimacy of international law is an essentially 
contested concept. ‘Legitimacy of international law’ means that the concept of 
legitimacy is latched on the object of ‘international law’ – it thus belongs in Tier 2. On 
the other hand, analysis of the normative conceptions of legitimacy belong to Tier 3. 
Such conceptions themselves can be essentially contested. Although it is hard to see 
‘peace’ as an essentially contested concept, the analysis in this chapter will show that 
the opposite could be the case for justice. Justice may consist of protection of human 
rights, or, in a higher level of abstraction, giving one what is worth as presented by 
Aristotle.  
 
Since moving from Tier 2 to Tier 3 means moving from the concept of legitimacy to 





concept; why then move to conceptions of legitimacy of international law in particular? 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are quite a few reasons for this choice. First, 
since Plato, legitimacy in domestic legal orders has been heavily discussed. In political 
legitimacy, i.e. the right and acceptance of the government and justification for 
coercion, it has become clear that several standards, i.e. conceptions of political 
legitimacy, are available: for Plato, the standard of legitimacy is that philosophers 
rule,146 for Aristotle three standards of legitimate government are royalty, aristocracy 
and constitutional government,147 for Egyptian pharaohs, certain French kings and 
contemporary North Korean dictators, the right to rule derives from the divine,148 
whereas a few centuries ago, for Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau it is social contract with 
which we consent to form and abide by a government because of the prudential reason 
of avoiding the state of nature.149 Second, it has now become common ground that none 
of these standards hold to scrutiny. Even though certain writers voice human rights per 
se as the dominant conception of political legitimacy,150 this is so only in the broader 
context of democracy, which actually nowadays has come to include human rights. 
Indeed, the most prevalent standard of political legitimacy is democracy, which 
includes, apart from participation of people through elections, human rights, 
transparency and system of checks and balances. As regards legitimacy of domestic 
legal orders, democracy tends to dominate. This tendency is so widespread that 
																																																								
146 See generally Plato, The Republic and Other Works (Benjamin Jowett translation, Anchor 1980). 
147 Aristotle, Politics (Benjamin Jowett translation, Clarendon 1985) Book III, Chapter VII. 
148 For examples of claims to divine ordination from Japan to England, see Reinhard Bendix, Kings or 
People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (University of California Press 1978). 
149 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (first published 1651); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social (first 
published 1762); John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (first published 1689). Hobbes and 
Rousseau, true adherents to the contractarian vision and representatives of the ‘pure’ or ‘primary’ social 
contract theory, hold that mutual consent of individuals is the ultimate justification of all legitimate social 
and political institutions (ultimate source of political legitimacy), while Locke and Kant emerge as 
advocates of derivative social contract theory, maintaining that the primary justification for such civil 
institutions is found in something that is both logically antecedent to the social contract and independent 
from it – for Locke it is labour, which justifies individual’s absolute and fundamental natural right to 
property, the protection of which is the only true function of the government, function for which 
unilateral consent is required) and for Kant inherent individual rights and duties. Michel Rosenfeld, 
‘Contract and Justice: The Relation between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory’ (1985) 
70 Iowa Law Review 769, 847-863. 
150 Jack Donnelly, ‘Ethics and International Human Rights’ in Jean-Marc Coicaud & Daniel Warner 
(eds), Ethics and International Affairs, Extent and Limits (United Nations University Press 2001), 137: 
‘Human rights have become the dominant conception of political legitimacy’ and Charles Jones, Global 
Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (OUP 1999), 50: ‘rights approach’ is the ‘most popular form of 
cosmopolitanism in both academic and non-academic discourse’. Both in Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘Legitimacy, Rights and Ideology: Notes Towards a Critique of the New Moral Internationalism,’ 7 





legitimacy is often used as shorthand for ‘democratic legitimacy.’151 In 2011, when 
former US President Barack Obama stated that ‘Qaddafi has lost the legitimacy to rule 
and needs to leave’, he was referring both to Libyans no longer supporting Qaddafi, i.e. 
democratic legitimacy. It was later revealed that this allegation was one of the three 
myths used to eliminate Qaddafi,152 but the point here is not whether Qaddafi had 
indeed lost legitimacy,153 but the fact nowadays, it goes without saying that political 
legitimacy in the context of domestic legal orders is conceptualized as democracy. 
Similarly, it is the same conception of legitimacy, i.e. democratic legitimacy, that he 
assumed in his speech to the UN General Assembly regarding attack on Iraq, former US 
President George W. Bush, when stating that the regime in question had ‘lost its 
legitimacy.’154   
																																																								
151 Manfred Elsig, ‘The World Trade’ Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis: What Does the Beast look Like?’ 
(2007) 41 Journal of World Trade 75. 
152 The three myths were that Libyan people were no longer supporting Qaddafi, that Qaddafi was 
authorizing mass rapes and stories of hordes of African mercenaries. The myths were revealed as such 
five years after the war, in London in September 2016, by an explosive report from Christian Blunt 
(Member of the Parliament), who launched an investigation on the war in Libya. However, people 
working on the ground knew that these were myths even when they were happening. For example, 
“Donatella Rovera, senior crisis response adviser for Amnesty, who was in Libya for three months after 
the start of the uprising, says that ‘we have not found any evidence or a single victim of rape or a doctor 
who knew about somebody being raped’.” in Patrick Cockburn, ‘Amnesty questions claim that Gaddafi 
ordered rape as weapon of war’, The Independent (24 June 2011) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/amnesty-questions-claim-that-gaddafi-ordered-rape-as-
weapon-of-war-2302037.html. Donatella and other officials such as Vincenzzo Camporini,, Italian Chief 
of the Defense General Staff (2008-2011) who revealed that the ‘photo of mass grave’ shown by Franco 
Fattini, Italian Foreign Minister, to Bellusconi, was in reality photo of an ordinary cemetery taken at a 
time when they were digging graves of people who had died natural deaths, have revealed the truth in the 
documentary ‘Killing Gaddafi’.  
153 It could be argued that I am conflating normative with sociological legitimacy, because whether 
Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy believed that Qaddafi is illegitimate pertains to 
sociological legitimacy, not normative. It is true that the legitimacy-related beliefs of people, both the 
aforementioned politicians and others, such as Secretary of State of the US Hillary Clinton, and also non-
politicians such as masses of the public, constitute sociological or perceived legitimacy, not normative 
legitimacy. However, I am specifically referring to the standards/conceptions of legitimacy which are 
relevant, which in this case are democracy and human rights, not whether these standards actually do 
render this object of legitimacy, i.e. Qaddafi’s regime, legitimate or not. Since the allegations against the 
Qaddafi regime have been proven to be false, the regime was sociologically illegitimate but normatively 
legitimate (unless it is proven to be normatively illegitimate based on different conception of legitimacy). 
Interestingly, if it is proven that the politicians who advanced the aforementioned allegations/grounds of 
illegitimacy against the Qaddafi regime knew that they were not true, based on technologically advanced 
and shared secret intelligence of their states, it makes one wonder whether the Qaddafi regime is even 
sociologically illegitimate, since the people in question do not really perceive the object of legitimacy to 
be illegitimate but merely pretend they do. This question however pertains exclusively to the nature of 
sociological legitimacy and its role in the public debate and though interesting, it far exceeds the scope of 
this discussion. 
154 ‘The security council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met 
or action will be unavoidable and a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.’ For the 
text of the entire speech see, e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/12/iraq.usa3. As regards 







In the international legal realm, however, it is more recently that legitimacy is being 
discussed, especially after the aforementioned Kosovo report, which identified an 
intervention at Kosovo as ‘illegal but legitimate’ in order to prevent a humanitarian 
catastrophe. Plato and Aristotle discussed legitimacy in domestic legal orders, but not in 
international law. Later understandings of international law derived from natural law. 
Nowadays, unless provided by specific context, the conception of legitimacy in 
international law remains rather unclear. Although there are voices about democracy in 
international law155, it is believed that this is too high of a standard and even utopian.156 
Despite the UN Charter referring to peace and security, it is often clear that the 
conception of legitimacy pertains to humanitarian concerns, prevention of genocide and 
torture, and protection of basic human rights.  
 
It is for this reason that Buchanan’s theory of human rights as a conception of 
legitimacy in international law will be discussed. Even though Buchanan himself may 
have departed from this view with his more recent Metacoordination view, human rights 
as a conception of legitimacy remains prevalent so it deserves the attention it will 
receive. Since the US/UK attack on Kosovo, there is a growing tendency toward 
justifying interventions in order to protect human rights. A manifestation of this 
growing tendency is the Responsibility to Protect, which, though not a legally binding 
norm, at least not yet, is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all 
member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit. Although the 
Responsibility to Protect currently restricts itself to measures that already exist, i.e. 
mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and powers of Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, and does not provide for a right to use military force against a state 
without a UNSC authorization, the reaction towards such uses of military force seems to 
be weakening, with the belief that protection of basic human rights being increasingly 
important lurking at the background. Buchanan’s theory is the most complete theory of 
human rights as a standard of legitimacy of international law and it well deserves the 
attention it receives.  
 
																																																								
155 See, e.g. Roland Rich, ‘Bringing Democracy into International Law’ [2001] 12 Journal of Democracy 
20. 
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Human rights aside, why not choose more prominent discussions of legitimacy of 
international law such as Mattias Kumm's and Thomas Franck's? Besides, Buchanan 
himself, as we shall see, has changed his view regarding legitimacy in international law, 
from justice in the sense of protecting human rights, to the Metacoordination view 
which will be briefly mentioned later. Another prominent view of legitimacy of 
international law is Mattias Kumm's view as presented in the Legitimacy of 
International Law: A Constitutional Framework of Analysis.157 In this article, Kumm 
develops ‘a constitutionalist model for assessing the legitimacy of international law that 
takes seriously the commitments underlying constitutional democracy.’158 He grounds 
his model on four principles: the formal principle of international legality, the 
jurisdictional principle of subsidiarity the procedural principle of adequate participation 
and accountability and the substantive principle of achieving outcomes that are not 
violative of fundamental rights and are reasonable. In this particular conception of 
legitimacy, the principle of international legality establishes a presumption in favour of 
the authority of international law. This presumption can be rebutted by international 
legal norms that seriously violate countervailing normative principles relating to 
jurisdiction, procedure or outcomes. Finally, another great work in legitimacy of 
international law is Thomas Franck's The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations,159 
which, is, however, about sociological/descriptive legitimacy, not normative legitimacy. 
Indeed, in this great study, Franck employs a broad range of historical, legal, 
sociological, anthropological, political and philosophical modes of analysis to explain 
what makes states and people perceive rules as legitimate. These discussions are indeed 
more prominent discussions of legitimacy of international law. 
 
Why then has Applbaum's theory of international law as justice in the sense of 
protecting human rights been chosen here? Simply because the purpose of this chapter 
is not to determine which discussion presents the most prominent or valid theory of 
international law, nor to present the most prominent discussions of legitimacy of 
international law, but merely and specifically to exemplify/illustrate that legitimacy is 
an essentially contested concept. The theory chosen is an excellent example of essential 
contestability of legitimacy, exactly because of the concept of justice and human rights. 
																																																								
157 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ 
(2004) 15 5 European Journal of International Law 907. 
158 Ibid, 907. 






4.2. Human Rights as a Standard of Legitimacy 
In Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International 
Law, Allen Buchanan advances basic human rights as the normative conception of 
legitimacy of international law; in other words, he advances basic human rights as the 
normative standard of legitimacy. In his later book Heart of Human Rights, he takes a 
rather different approach focusing on justifying the current international human rights 
system and its practice. That will be very briefly mentioned in the end for reasons of 
completion but will not be discussed as it does not help us see legitimacy of 
international law as an essentially contested concept. I am focusing on the theory as 
illustrated in Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination because his theory is 
specifically a normative conception of legitimacy and the standard of justice is an 
essentially contested concept, thus also rendering legitimacy as such. I will now place 
this theory in the conceptual framework of legitimacy as illustrated in this discussion 
thus making a few important clarifications.  
 
4.2.1. Theory of Legitimacy of ‘International Law’ 
The object of legitimacy is quite less obvious than what it seems. The object of 
legitimacy is the answer to the question ‘What is legitimate?’ Buchanan refers to 
‘international law’ as the object of legitimacy. ‘International law’ may mean quite a few 
different things. It may, for example, refer to the international legal order as a system of 
legal norms per se, regardless of the political institutions that create, interpret and apply 
them. This is how Kelsen discusses international law in Principles of International Law. 
On the other hand, ‘international law’ could mean the system of legal norms together 
with the political institutions that create, interpret and apply those norms. So, for 
example, a violation of international law that goes unpunished due to the lack of central 
enforcement mechanisms in the international legal realm is a problem of the 
international legal system in the second sense, because the problem consists on 
application of international law. Enforcement alone is not an issue for international law 
in the sense of legal norms alone (unless of course these norms become inapplicable to 
such an extent that the legal order as such is not effective). Also, anything that pertains 
to the regime of international law at a specific point in time relates to international law 





not to international law in the former sense, a legal order consisting of a system of legal 
norms, regardless of institutions of interpretation and application etc. For example, the 
UN system per se pertains to international law in the second sense, not the former. 
Thus, international law at the times of the League of Nations was international law in 
the former sense, but different international law in the latter sense. In antiquity, there 
was international law in the former sense, as there were rules regulating the 
relationships between states, such as peace treaties or unwritten customary rule that the 
winner of a war has the right to take the population of the loser as slaves, but it may as 
well not count as international law in the latter sense as there were no international 
organisations whatsoever. There were no legal entities to create, interpret, let alone 
apply international legal norms.   
 
Buchanan, however, by ‘international law’, does not refer to any of these two intuitive 
meanings, but to something different, yet relevant to the latter. He clarifies from the 
beginning that even though in the book he occasionally refers to ‘the international legal 
order’ or ‘the ‘international legal system’, he is particularly referring to the global law-
making institutions themselves, not to international law as a legal order.160 The object of 
legitimacy is thus not individual laws, nor a legal order, nor actions, but actors. 
 
4.2.2. What Does the Theory Do? 
So, what is it that Buchanan’s theory actually does? It is clear that Buchanan’s theory is 
a normative conception of legitimacy of international global law-making institutions, 
and that Buchanan intends it to have practical consequences. He evaluates “some of the 
most important principles of the existing international legal order” and proposes “new 
principles or modifications of existing ones that are more consonant with the demands 
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of justice.”161 In some cases he makes concrete suggestions for institutional reform, “not 
just in the sense of incorporating new principles into old processes and structures, but 
also in the sense of changing some of the processes and structures themselves.”162 His 
enterprise, then, is to articulate a set of moral principles that should guide the design and 
reform of international law as an institution in the broad sense that includes not only 
principles but also roles, processes, and structures.163 It is clear then that on the basis of 
certain moral principles, Buchanan evaluates certain fundamental aspects of the 
international legal order and proposes reforms which, if implemented with reasonable 
care, would make the system more just; his concern then, is with what the law should 
be.164   
 
It is quite important to understand that ‘de lege ferenda’, i.e. what the law should be, is 
the end goal of Buchanan’s theory. One could assume that morally evaluating the law 
merely tells us whether the law is good or bad, without giving any suggestions. This is 
entirely reasonable given that there may be a distinction between morally evaluating the 
law on the one hand, and on the other hand deciding what the law ought to be, or what 
the goal of a legal order is or should be. It could be assumed that morally evaluating the 
law would merely consist on setting out certain moral principles, certain a priori moral 
criteria, and deciding whether the law based on certain moral criteria is morally 
acceptable or not. On the other hand, how the law ought to be could be understood as a 
policy question, which can be morally evaluated, but not determined by specific moral 
criteria or moral principles. It is important to note that Buchanan attempts to do both. 
So, what are these reforms that Buchanan’s theory brings about and how does he get 
there? His reforms lie largely in the area of self-determination. He argues that “a 
principled, human rights-based approach to the problem of secession would reduce the 
need for armed humanitarian intervention by providing constructive alternatives to 
secession and the massive violations of human rights that almost always accompany 
it.”165 The theory starts with the claim that there is a limited moral obligation “to help 
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Buchanan then constructs “an account of legitimacy according to which political entities 
are legitimate only if they achieve a reasonable approximation of minimal standards of 
justice, again understood as the protection of basic human rights. This account of 
legitimacy is then adapted so as to encompass both the legitimacy of individual states 
within the international legal system and the legitimacy of the international legal system 
itself.”167 In the third part, Buchanan uses this justice-based conception of a legitimate 
state to construct a position on how the international legal order should respond to the 
problems of self-determination and secession. In particular, he argues that international 
law should recognize a unilateral right to secede - as distinct from a negotiated or 
constitutional right – only as a remedy of last resort against grave injustices.  
4.2.3. The Theory 
4.2.3.1. Justice as human rights and justice as an essentially contested concept 
The normative standard is justice, in the sense of protecting basic human rights. It is 
extremely important to notice the tricky term ‘justice’ and also focus on what exactly is 
meant by it, i.e. protecting basic human rights. This is because ‘justice’ and ‘human 
rights’ have not always necessarily fully overlapped. Since Plato and Aristotle, a 
traditional meaning of the term ‘justice’ is more generally giving each person what 
he/she deserves; giving each person his or her due. Protecting basic human rights is a 
specification of this general traditional meaning.  
Even ‘basic human rights’ requires further specification. Does that include only 
individual, so-called ‘negative’ human rights alone, or does it also include rights of 
distributive justice (social and economic rights), so called ‘positive’ rights?168 In the 
international legal realm, individual rights, so called negative rights, are found in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), such as the right to life, 
the right to not be required to perform forced or compulsory labour, etc. Rights of 
distributive justice, also called social rights or positive rights, are found in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Examples 
include the right to social security, right to housing, food, etc. Individual rights are often 
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called negative rights because they consist on negative obligations. Being (claim) rights 
and not liberties, they consist on correlative duties. With classical liberalism at the 
background, i.e. the idea that there is a sphere around the individual that ought to be 
protected from interference by either the state or other individuals, the implied 
obligations of the individual rights are understood to be negative duties, i.e. obligation 
to refrain from certain actions. In other words, these rights were understood merely as 
rights of non-interference. Thus, the right to life consists on the negative obligation 
towards everyone to not take my life away arbitrarily. My right to not be tortured 
(Article 7: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment) consists on the obligation towards everyone, state and other 
individuals alike, to not torture me. By contrast, economic, social and cultural rights are 
positive rights, i.e. they entail positive obligations toward the state, which has to 
intervene in order to satisfy the interests they protect. For example, the right to social 
security does not consist on non-interference, i.e. the government is not hereby 
obligated to refrain from any action, but on the contrary to interfere in the economy, 
increase taxes etc, in order to provide social security. This understanding draws a clear-
cut distinction between individual rights entailing negative obligations and positive 
rights entailing positive obligations, which justifies the use of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ 
rights respectively. However, through interpretation, individual rights are understood as 
entailing not only negative, but also positive obligations, even though that is not 
obvious from the letter of the law. For example, the right to life is understood not only 
as implying the negative obligation to not take one’s life away, but also the positive 
obligation of the state to intervene by establishing an effective criminal and justice 
system which protects the life of individuals. The right to not be tortured does not only 
consist, as the letter of the law reads, on the obligation toward everyone else to not 
torture, but also on the state to have measures in place, such as an effective criminal and 
justice system, which protects individuals from torture. I may occasionally use the terms 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ rights for convenience, but it must be noted that the negative 
rights are interpreted as entailing positive obligations as well.  
Does the fact that ‘negative’ rights are understood to entail not only negative but also 
positive obligations equate them with ‘positive’ rights? Although the ICESCR and the 
ICCSPR have the same standing in international law and the rights are indeed of equal 





question. First, unlike the individual rights, the economic, social and cultural rights are 
dependent on the resources of the state (ICESCR Article 2, par. 1169). Therefore, based 
on the ICESCR, a state does not violate such rights if it does not provide because of 
lack of resources. In all actuality, the question transforms to how much is provided, it is 
a question of degree. The point however is that the same is not the case with individual 
rights, in the sense that as a matter of logic and Hohfeldian analysis of rights, the bearer 
of the obligation toward the claim right in question cannot invoke lack of resources as 
justification for not satisfying the correlative negative obligation, whereas that is 
possible with the positive obligations. The state can claim that it does not have enough 
resources to provide social security (‘positive’ right of distributive justice of the 
ICESCR) or to invest more in improving the criminal and justice system to better 
protect the life of individuals (positive obligation entailed by the individual ‘negative’ 
right to life – ICCPR). However, the state cannot claim that it is unable to refrain from 
killing or torturing people because of lack of resources. Negative obligations, unlike 
positive obligations, because of their nature as mere non-interference, do not depend on 
availability of resources. This means that although individual, so-called ‘negative’ 
rights, entail positive obligations as well, they are not the same as the rights of 
distributive justice, also called ‘positive’ rights, because the ‘negative’ rights can be 
understood, if read literally with the Hohfeldian scheme in mind, to consist on only 
negative obligations. The theory observes the first part, i.e. that both kinds of rights 
relate to positive obligations, but misses the second part.170 My claim here is not that 
‘negative’ rights should be interpreted/understood as consisting only on negative 
obligations. My point is that individual and social rights are not of the same kind. 
Understanding ‘negative’ rights as entailing positive obligations as well is an 
interpretative or political choice, not an obligation necessarily entailed by the stipulation 
of the right as a matter of Hohfeldian analysis. From ‘right to life’, only obligation to 
not take life away can be inferred as a matter of logic. All other obligations, which are 
positive obligations (such as to establish criminal and justice system), are 
interpretative/political choices (in a broad sense of ‘political’). The reason why it is 
																																																								
169 ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.’ 





unknown what other positive obligations can be inferred as correlative in the future,171 
is exactly because these positive obligations are inferred by interpretative/political 
choices. These interpretative/political choices are correct because they better protect the 
interests172 that the rights in question aim at protecting. Indeed, it would be futile to 
prohibit anyone from taking my life away, if anyone can do so without consequences, 
because no one has the obligation to establish mechanisms that prevent someone from 
taking lives away. The point here is that the choice of interpreting ‘negative’ rights as 
also entailing positive obligations is exactly this: a choice. There is a logical primacy173 
of refraining from causing harm, compared to actively intervening in society to protect. 
Although positive obligations are (correctly) regarded as correlative to both ‘negative’ 
and ‘positive’ rights, these two kinds of rights are not the same and that is necessarily 
reflected on the latter being conditional on availability of resources, since they are in 
essence rights pertaining to distribution of wealth (rights of distributive justice or social 
rights/rights of social justice174).  
																																																								
171 This is precisely what gives grounds to views seeing human rights as standards of behavior. 
172 I am assuming the ‘interest’ theory rather than the ‘will’ theory of rights as correct. The ‘interest’ 
theory of rights maintains that rights are powers that protect certain interests. I thus understand legal 
rights as powers granted by the law to physical (people) and legal (companies) entities for the protection 
of interests which the legislator regards worthy of protection. The ‘will’ theory of rights maintains that a 
right is an option or power of waiver over the enforcement of a duty, and the right holder is the person 
who can demand performance or waive the duty, who can choose to sue or not sue. But such powers are 
not generally exercised by children, as MacCorcmick’s observed, nor by many mentally challenged 
individuals. The enforcement of duties which are owed to children is not left at the discretion of children 
or mentally challenged individuals but rests in the parents or their guardians. Therefore, according to the 
‘will’ theory, children do not have rights. Assuming they do, the will theory is false. Indeed, Hart who 
defended the will theory (before MacCormick) maintained that it is a mistake to ascribe rights to babies, 
at least. Indeed, Simmonds is right to observe that respect for rights is not the only possible basis for 
morality, as there are also duties of love and compassion to which rights are irrelevant. However, not only 
it is intuitive to regard that a baby, as a human being, has the right to not be killed arbitrarily, not be 
tortured, etc. it would be hard, if not impossible, to determine the specific point in time where a baby 
would grow old enough to be entitled to moral rights. It is inconsistent to hold that at a specific moment 
in time, a baby/child suddenly obtains moral rights. For details see Nigel E Simmonds, Central Issues in 
Jurisprudence (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018), 323-33, especially 331. 
173 It needs to be stressed that the primacy is strictly logical, not a matter of significance. In theory, there 
is no trade-off between civil and political rights on the one hand and socio-economic rights on the other. 
None is more important than the other. We need the right to food to enjoy our life. We need right to food 
so we can enjoy freedom of expression. We need freedom of expression so we can highlight violations in 
adequate standards of living. 
174 In the contemporary public domain, ‘social justice’ is broader than ‘distributive justice’ as the former 
also includes issues irrelevant to this discussion, such as combating racism and gender bias. For the 
purposes of this discussion, social justice ‘is essentially the same as that in which the expression 
‘distributive justice’ had long been employed. It seems to have come generally current in this sense at the 
time when (and perhaps partly because) John Stuart Mill explicitly treated the two terms as equivalent…’ 
Friedrich A. von Hayek (author), Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt R. Leube (eds), ‘Social or Distributive 
Justice’ in The Essence of Hayek (Hoover Institution Press 1984), 63 where the relevant statements of 






1. Justice – an essentially contested concept  
Ignoring this distinction when discussing individual rights and social rights causes 
intellectual confusion, a manifestation of which is reflected in the use of the term 
‘justice’. Before Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, ‘justice’ meant respecting individual 
human rights. It had a clear meaning. When one person violated another person’s rights, 
he treated him unjustly. A person treated another person unjustly only by violating his 
rights. The government treated a person unjustly only by violating his rights or failing 
to protect them, e.g. the slave’s liberty rights. Rawls recognizes this traditional meaning 
of justice in passing in A Theory of Justice, but then goes on to use the term differently, 
arguing that it is sufficiently similar to the traditional meaning. But it is not. Rawls 
argues in A Theory of Justice that certain patterns of distribution are unjust (progressive 
definition). According to him, for example, it is unjust that people of equal talent and 
motivation should have very unequal chances of success based on differences in their 
parents’ wealth. However, this is not unjust according to the traditional conception 
because one person does not violate another person’s rights simply in having 
advantages or giving their children advantages. Thus, the two conceptions of justice do 
not overlap, and they are not sufficiently similar. Social and economic rights have to do 
with distribution of wealth. Injustice, as traditionally understood, is a property of 
actions, not distributions. It is not the case that the one conception is right and the other 
wrong. Neither the traditional, nor the progressive conception of justice is confused. 
What is confused is the thought that theft and inequality are wrong in just the same way: 
in being unjust.175  
Hayek accepts the traditional understanding of justice and rejects the notions of ‘social 
justice’ and ‘global justice’ as fundamentally confused. John Stuart Mill states that 
“society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well of it’ and that ‘it 
is universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether good or evil) 
which he deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an 
evil, which he does not deserve.” Such statements which connect social and distributive 
justice with how society treats individuals according to their deserts bring out most 
																																																								
175 This point was brought to my attention by Professor Peter de Marneffe, Professor of Philosophy at 





clearly its difference from pure justice, and at the same time, the cause of the vacuity of 
the concept: the demand for social justice is addressed not to the individual, but to the 
society in the strict sense, i.e. separated from the apparatus of the government. As such, 
the society is incapable of acting for a specific purpose. Therefore, the demand for 
social justice becomes a demand that the members of society should organize 
themselves in a manner which makes it possible to assign particular shares of the 
product of society to the different individual or groups.176 This is why he believes that 
‘social justice’ as is used today is not ‘social’ in the sense of ‘social norms’, i.e. 
something which has developed as a practice of individual action in the course of social 
evolution, not a product of society or of a social process, but a conception to be imposed 
upon society.177 The primary question then becomes, he continues, whether there exists 
a moral duty to submit to a power which can co-ordinate the efforts of the members of 
the society with the aim of achieving a particular pattern of distribution regarded as 
just.178 Many theorists of social justice start from the assumption that satisfaction of 
needs ought to be shared and that would require equal shares for all in so far as special 
considerations do not demand departure from this principle.179 However, the prior 
question is whether it is moral that people are subjected to the powers of direction that 
would have to be exercised in order that the benefits derived by the individuals could be 
meaningfully described just or unjust. Because the burdens and benefits are apportioned 
by the market mechanism and are not the result of deliberate allocation to particular 
people, Hayek answers this prior question to the negative. The shares of each one of us 
in society is the outcome of a process, the effect of which on particular people was 
neither intended nor foreseen by anyone when the institutions first appeared.180 Indeed, 
when it comes to justice in the sense of individual rights, there is an answer as to who is 
has been unjust: the perpetrator of rights. By contrast, “our complaints about the 
outcome of the market as unjust do not really assert that somebody has been unjust; and 
																																																								
176 Friedrich A. von Hayek (author), Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt R. Leube (eds), ‘Social or Distributive 
Justice’ in The Essence of Hayek (Hoover Institution Press 1984), 63-64. 
177 Ibid, 78. 
178 Ibid, 64. 
179 See, e.g. Antony M. Honoré, ‘Social Justice’ [1962] VII McGill Law Journal and revised version in 
Essays in Legal Philosophy (Robert S. Summers ed, University of California Press 1968), 62 of the 
reprint: ‘The first [of the two propositions of which the principle of social justice consist] is the 
contention that all men considered merely as men and apart from their conduct or choice have a claim to 
an equal share in all those things, here called advantages, which are generally desired and are in fact 
conducive to well-being.’ Also Walter G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Routledge 
& Kegan Paul 1966), 261. Both in Hayek (author), Nishiyama and Leube (eds) (n 176), 64 note 8. 





there is no answer to the question of who has been unjust. … There is no individual and 
no cooperating group of people against which the sufferer would have a just complaint, 
and there are no conceivable rules of just individual conduct which would at the same 
time secure a functioning order and prevent such disappointments.”181 “The general 
failure to see that in this connection we cannot meaningfully speak of the justice or 
injustice of the results is partly due to the misleading use of the term ‘distribution’ 
which inevitably suggests a personal distributing agent whose will or choice determines 
the relative position of the different persons or groups. There is of course no such 
agent…”182 183 
																																																								
181 Ibid, 69. 
182 See Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (Yale University Press 1949), 255 note: ‘There is in the 
operation of the market economy nothing which could properly called distribution. Goods are not first 
produced and then distributed, as would be the case in a socialist state.’ Cf. also Murray R. Rothbard, 
‘Towards a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics’ in Mary Sennholz (ed), On Freedom and 
Free Enterprise (New York, 1965), 231; both in Hayek (author), Nishiyama and Leube (eds) (n 176), 72. 
183 It is hard to not notice the resemblance with Adam Smith’s invisible hand, which is ‘nothing more 
than the automatic equilibrating mechanism of the competitive market.’ Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Contract and 
Justice: The Relation between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory’ (1985) 70 Iowa Law 
Review 769, 875. Adam Smith’s economic theory comes after the drawbacks of traditional contract 
theory. Hobbes’ theory is problematic because in order to address the issue of society continually being 
on the verge of war, Hobbes is persuaded that absolute monarchy is preferable to democracy or 
aristocracy, so that a single source, a commander-in-chief, is in full control of the army. Since the only 
duty of the absolute monarchs is to refrain from taking the lives of the citizens, the monarchs can 
legitimately interfere with their subjects’ contractual relations – the ultimate purpose for which civil 
society was presumable established is thereby undermined (865). Lock’s theory fails because since Locke 
maintains that duties are delegated to the government, ‘in the absence of natural rights transcending all 
social and political bonds, government as a trust may well be too weak to sustain civil society for too 
long’ and authority of the trustee to enforce contracts depends entirely on the arbitrary will of the 
majority, so enforcement of contract relations may be as uncertain as in the Hobbesian state (867). 
Rousseau, by maintaining that each individual has a dual role, member of the sovereign toward other 
individuals on the one hand and member of the governed body toward the sovereign on the other, and that 
the social contract is between each individual qua individual on the one hand, and society as a whole (of 
which each individual is but a part) on the other (867), reintroduces the split between the individual and 
the society to within the individual. ‘This displacement of the fundamental rupture inherent in traditional 
social contractarianism resolves one set of problems by posing a series of new ones.’ (868) ‘The 
dissociation of man from citizen means that two different sets of criteria govern the individual’s conduct’ 
so when the two pursuits directly conflict, the private interests of the individual must yield to the public 
interests of the citizen, and if an individual refuses to give up these private interests, the body politic is 
justified in forcibly compelling the individual’s adherence to the general will: ‘whoever refuses to obey 
the general will shall be compelled to it by the whole body’ (869). The voluntary sacrifice of the man to 
citizen a per Rousseau presents the logical conclusion of individualism as being totalitarianism. 
‘Compounding the disturbing aspects of this belief is Rousseau’s hopelessly antiquated view of the 
economy, according to which one man’s wealth comes directly from the impoverishment of another – any 
increment in one’s wealth automatically entails a corresponding diminution of the wealth of another, so 
reconciling the private interest of the individual to the public interest appears impossible (971-872). ‘The 
premise that all humans are born equal seems to preclude, at least prima facie, the notion that distributive 
justice is achieved by means of a social contract that establishes or perpetuates inequality in the 
possession of wealth. If all individuals are inherently equal, why should some volunteer to be perpetually 
delegated to an unequal, inferior position? It may seem that attempts to bridge the gap between man and 
citizen, private interest and public interest, and individual desire and the common good, through use of 
the social contract are headed either towards the suppression of individual freedom -when directed to 






This in no way constitutes an attack against social policies or social rights; the claim is a 
conceptual one, not political. Rights of distributive justice are important for a society 
which cares about the interests and minimally decent life of everyone. It is of course 
necessary for all states to have policies regarding distributive justice to alleviate the 
suffering of people in need. An extreme focus on individual rights with complete 
disregard for social rights may lead to libertarianism where certain people, due to bad 
choices or bad luck, are left untreated. The contrary, extremely deep intervention of the 
government in the economy and society more generally, would lead to totalitarianism. 
Neither extreme is desirable; both kinds of rights are necessary and serve a purpose. It is 
most certainly important and necessary in a society that social policies and welfare are 
provided and that there is a safety net, i.e. a safeguard against hardship or adversity, for 
the obvious humanitarian reasons. Hayek himself agrees with such social policies:  
 
There is no reason why in a free society government should not assure to all 
protection against severe deprivation in the form of an assured minimum 
income, or a floor below which nobody need to descend. To enter into such 
an assurance against extreme misfortune may well be in the interest of all; 
																																																																																																																																																																		
justice - when focus on preserving private interests at the expense of common interests.’ (872) Escaping 
this vicious cycle rests on justification of the proposition that increments in the wealth of individual leads 
to an increase in the general welfare of society as a whole. This is where Adam Smith’s economic theory 
comes in. ‘Combining the individual’s exclusive pursuit of self-interest with his or her lack of self-
sufficiency leads to competition, which surprisingly enough, is what binds the fabric of society together. 
Competition, for its part, ensures the most efficient allocation of goods and services within society, and 
thus provides the most satisfactory solution to the problem posed by the lack of individual self-
sufficiency.’ But regulation is needed in order to prevent perfect-hungry individuals from exacting 
exorbitant prices from society. Individual self-interest can lead to the common good “only when it is 
mediated through confrontation with their self-interests of other individuals.’ In the context of an 
economic marketplace, this confrontation is called ‘free and universal competition.’ Competition, in turn, 
is also regulation because ‘for each individual in the market who seeks to maximize profits without regard 
to social consequences there are a great number of similarly situated individuals with precisely the same 
goal’ who can drive them out of the market. Competition is market’s self-regulator, arising automatically 
and inevitably from the clash of conflicting individual self-interests. Competition is a famous ‘invisible 
hand.’ (874) It ought to be stressed that no case is made here for libertarianism, a society with minimal 
state. Governmental intervention in the economy is desirable for the protection of the vulnerable. Also, 
even under ‘optimal conditions, which include a free market economy fueled by atomistic competition, 
the individual’s right to autonomy is safeguarded by the existence of equality in bargaining power. The 
welfare of each individual is made possible by the silent operation of the invisible hand of competition.’ 
(ibid 896) Since, as a matter of fact, in the non-ideal but real societies we live in there is sometimes no 
equality of bargaining power, even more so nowadays as more and more atomistic competition is 
displaced by corporate capitalism, governmental intervention in the economy is in some cases justified. 
The point made here is with the narrative, the rhetoric used: the term ‘distributive justice’ creates an 





or it may be felt to be a clear moral duty of all to assist, within the organised 
community, those who cannot help themselves.184  
 
The mistake is regarding such assurances as justice, because that entails there is 
someone to be blamed for, a perpetrator of injustice, which is absent here. Equality of 
opportunity does not entail equality of outcome. It is desirable to have policies in place 
to provide a certain minimum protection to all, make sure all people have housing, food, 
etc, and thus lessen gross inequalities of outcome for pure humanitarian concerns. 
However, although this may well be a moral requirement toward our fellow human 
beings, it is wrong to assume that this is a requirement of justice per se, as that would be 
misconceiving the market as relying on a non-existent anthropomorphic distributor, 
since it is essential for justice that there is a perpetrator. It is a conceptual mistake. 
Equality of opportunity makes no claims regarding equality of outcome. The latter is 
also dependent on luck. Conflating justice with reducing inequality of outcome is also 
tantamount to confusing different notions of fairness. 
 
There is much confusion about the notion of fairness. In general, we can understand 
unfairness as arbitrariness. However, there are two very different kinds of arbitrariness: 
cosmic arbitrariness and personal arbitrariness. If I have arbitrarily disfavoured 
someone in some process, then I have treated him/her unfairly, which is unjust. If only 
fate has disfavoured him/her, then no one has treated him/her unfairly or done him/her 
any injustice. Hayek identifies that social justice advocates often seem to argue as if 
cosmic arbitrariness is an injustice which needs to be corrected. However, on the 
traditional conception of justice, only personal arbitrariness is an injustice.185  
 
It thus seems, so far, that ‘social/distributive justice’ and ‘justice’ are two different 
concepts, not conceptions of the same concept. Justice is protection or at least not 
violation of individual human rights, in the case of which unjust acts necessarily require 
a perpetrator, whereas distributive or social justice pertains to distribution of wealth 
with no perpetrator of injustice. Using the term ‘justice’ to refer to distributions is 
																																																								
184 Hayek (author), Nishiyama and Leube (eds) (n 176), 87. 
185 Rawls clearly recognized the distinction, but some of his arguments seem to presuppose that cosmic 
arbitrariness is an injustice. So he did not always keep the two kinds of unfairness distinct. The points 
made in paragraph were pointed out to me by Professor Peter de Marneffe, Professor of Philosophy at 





confusing because it creates the false impression that there is a distributing agent 
whereas there isn’t one. It can also be regarded as manipulative because it seems to 
suggest that everyone is guilty or open to blame if these distributions exist, so as to 
motivate people to act so as to change the distributions. However, even if the 
distributions are unjust in the extended sense of being prohibited by rules that are 
necessary to protect important interests, it does not follow that anyone is open to blame 
for them or that anyone should feel guilty. I, an individual, cannot control the 
distribution of wealth. The distribution of wealth does not result from any action of 
mine. Therefore, I am not in any way to blame for inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth and should not feel guilty for it.186   
 
This is true even of government officials. Unless a government official has sufficient 
power to prevent the objectionable inequalities, he is not to blame for them. It is not 
even true, arguably, that legislators have a moral duty to vote for policies that eliminate 
these inequalities. Suppose that an inequality is impermissible because it is prohibited 
by some valid moral rule. Suppose either that there are enough votes, however, to 
prohibit it without my vote or that even with my vote there will not be enough votes. Do 
I have a duty to vote for a law prohibiting it? This is questionable. The old-fashioned 
use of ‘injustice’ entails that someone did something wrong, something for which they 
should feel guilty, something they should not have done, something disrespectful to 
others that calls for redress or apology. This is not true of the new use of ‘injustice’. So, 
although it is used because people think of it as a serious criticism that will motivate 
people to act, it does not actually entail that anyone has done anything wrong or that 
they have any duty to act to change things. For this reason, the term appears to be 
manipulative and intellectually confused. 
 
Therefore, if justice is defined as protecting human rights, it is not an essentially 
contested concept. There is a perpetrator in any instance of violation of rights/injustice, 
so social rights which call for distribution of wealth are simply a different concept, not a 
conception of the concept of justice. Therefore, justice in terms of protecting or at least 
not violating human rights is not an essentially contested concept and includes only 
individual rights.  
																																																								






On the other hand, Aristotle drew a distinction between rectificatory187 and distributive 
justice.  This is because distributive justice employs geometric proportion: what each 
person receives is directly proportional to his or her merit, so a good person will receive 
more than a bad person. This justice is a virtuous mean between the vices of giving 
more than a person deserves and giving less. Rectificatory justice remedies unequal 
distributions of gain and loss between two people. Rectification may be called for in 
cases of injustice involving voluntary transactions like trade or involuntary transactions 
like theft or assault. Justice is restored in a court case, where the judge ensures that the 
gains and losses of both parties are equalled out, thus restoring a mean. 
It becomes obvious then, that Aristotle did distinguish two kinds of justice, but in doing 
so, he understood justice quite differently. Justice for Aristotle is not protecting or at 
least not violating human rights – importantly, human rights were not developed as a 
concept back then as they are today-, but more abstractly ‘giving each person his or her 
due.’ Individual human rights constitute a specification of ‘giving each person his or her 
due.’ But then again, so do social rights. It is in this sense that they are entitlements, 
even though there is no perpetrator of injustice if they are not given. Justice, for 
Aristotle, is stipulated in a higher level of abstraction. There is a commonality between 
rectificatory and distributive justice, giving each one his/her due, which justifies both as 
categories of justice. Notably, Aristotle correctly understands them as categories of 
justice, not as conceptions of the same concept. A conception of a concept excludes the 
other conceptions. The conception of art being what is displayed in art museums and 
exhibitions excludes by definition art in the streets. Street art is simply not art according 
to this conception. By contrast, rectificatory and distributive justice, as per Aristotle, are 
not mutually exclusive. They conflict only if we define justice as protecting or not 
violating individual human rights, but in that case, as illustrated by Hayek, they are 
different concepts. If justice is defined as giving each his/her due, then rectificatory and 
distributive justice are simply two different categories of justice that apply in two 
different realms, the one in society/interaction between the individual and the society, 
and the other one in interpersonal interactions.   
																																																								
187 Also called commutative or compensatory justice. See, e.g. Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Contract and Justice: 
The Relation between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory’ (1985) 70 Iowa Law Review 





Let’s briefly state the conclusions we have reached so far in this part of the discussion. 
We have concluded that justice in terms of protecting or at least not violating human 
rights includes only individual rights, whereas social rights belong in distributive justice 
which may use the same word ‘justice’ but it employs a different concept, since theft 
and inequality are not both wrong in being unjust. Similarly, we have also concluded 
that Aristotle’s rectificatory and distributive justice are not different conceptions – let 
alone essentially contested conceptions – of the concept of justice, but different 
categories that apply in different realms.  
If at this point there is feeling of unease, you are not alone. Indeed, justice in terms of 
human rights is lower in the level of abstraction than justice in terms of giving each 
what is worth. The former is a specification of the latter, but it does not exhaust it. It is 
not the case that giving each what is worth is simply a more abstract way of stipulating 
human rights protection, because it includes more content. It includes giving someone 
what is worth, even if that person does not have an individual claim right. That does 
include distribution of wealth, but it does not necessarily include social rights as per 
ICESCR, as that depends on one’s definition of ‘worth.’ It could be the case that only 
veterans of war who defended the country are ‘virtuous’ and ‘worth’ of certain 
entitlements beyond protection of their individual rights. This is where virtue becomes 
relevant. Therefore, these two conceptions do not communicate. Although they partly 
overlap, they have, in overall, different content and they lie in levels of abstraction. One 
can understand justice as being only rectificatory (individual human rights) justice, 
whereas another can understand justice as being giving each what is due. These are 
entirely different conceptions of justice that do not communicate with each other. The 
first person would understand justice/injustice merely as a property of actions, not 
distributions, whereas the other would understand justice more broadly. The first person 
would understand injustice as meaning that someone has acted wrongly, whereas the 
other not necessarily.  
It is worth noting that this conclusion exemplifies a point stated previously in the 
conversation, made by Applbaum: barriers may change. Justice, as per Aristotle, giving 
each what is due, is not essentially contested but has two distinct categories and is 
stipulated and understood with conceptual clarity. Human rights narrative has distorted 





our moral intuitions, has made us identify justice with protecting, or at least not 
violating, human rights, thus detaching it from giving each what is due. Human rights, 
under the traditional conception, are not one category of justice, but the justice; they 
exhaust the entire spectrum of the concept of justice. This creates tensions with 
distributive justice which now becomes a different concept, renders the ‘giving each 
other what is due’ a different conception, and inevitably renders justice as a contested 
concept. In the absence of an independent argument solving the dispute between these 
two conceptions of justice (individual human rights and giving each what is worth), 
since the issue largely depends on one’s moral intuitions, justice is an essentially 
contested concept. Although I favour Aristotle’s classification as my moral intuitions 
match with his conceptual framework and thus do not see justice as an essentially 
contested concept, I cannot regulate neither language nor people’s intuitions and how 
they are reflected on concept creation; therefore, with the scheme presented above, 
justice is indeed an essentially contested concept.  
This analysis leads the discussion to an important criticism against Buchanan’s theory 
of justice in the sense of protecting human rights as a standard of legitimacy. As we 
have seen, if justice is defined as protecting or at least not violating rights, social rights 
do not come under the same category, but under the category of distribution of wealth 
and we have explained the intellectual confusion of conflating these two. In order to 
incorporate both rights and distributions under the same concept of justice, it has to be 
the case that justice is more abstract than protecting rights, i.e. giving each what is 
his/her due. What is a mistake is to define justice as protecting rights, yet include both 
individual and social rights under ‘justice’. This is exactly what the theory does. If 
social rights are to be included, the theory ought to be presented as theory of justice, in 
the sense of giving everyone what they are worth. That would include virtue, as per 
Aristotle.  
Buchanan’s theory supports rights of distributive justice as being the same kind as 
individual rights because they both protect the same interests. ‘Our fundamental human 
interests in well-being and autonomy are served by freedom of speech and the right to 
political participation, but also by rights to basic health care and education.’188 There is 
no doubt that social rights and individual rights pertain to the same interests, because 
																																																								





these are interests of the same human beings. Both individual and social rights pertain 
to human dignity. It could be argued, in defence of the theory, that human rights are 
understood as deriving from human dignity and that is a specification of giving each 
what is due. The theory here fails, however, insofar as it conflates two different 
questions, namely where human rights come from (our interest in human dignity, well-
being), and what sort of entitlements they are. Although they derive from human 
dignity, they are, as we explained above, different kinds of entitlements. 
It is important to note Buchanan corrects this error in his later book The Heart of 
Human Rights. In this later book, Buchanan heavily relies on the distinction between 
moral and legal rights and makes the following two claims. He maintains that either it is 
the case that there are moral economic and social rights, or economic and social rights 
are only legal, but in the right sort of legal system, they have moral force. In any case, 
and that is the second claim, states have moral obligation to provide legal positive 
rights. Failing to do so counts against their being legitimate. Therefore, even if rights of 
distributive justice are only legal, states have moral obligation to enforce them. This 
position accommodates the criticisms raised in this discussion because it allows for 
social and economic rights to be merely legal, not moral, and thus leaves the notion of 
justice unaffected. At the same time, the standard of legitimacy, justice, being 
essentially contested does not arise, which is why the former theory was chosen for the 
purposes of this discussion. In Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law, even though he is not clear on distinguishing moral 
and legal rights, Buchanan is mostly thinking of moral rights, as is evident from his 
explanation of how these rights are derived: human dignity, interests, well-being, rather 
than powers granted by law for the protection of interests the legislator regards worthy 
of protection. The main point of his later book is that there are good moral reasons to 
have international legal human rights, including social and economic rights, and when 
such justified legal rights are in place, be part of the legitimacy criteria for institutions, 
including states. 
2.  Which rights? 
In his previous theory that we are discussing here because it best helps us see legitimacy 
as an essentially contested concept through the essentially contested concept of justice, 





particular? Buchanan devotes an entire chapter to rights of distributive justice beyond 
the right to the means of subsistence which is already widely recognized as being 
included in the theory and maintains that global institutions are currently lacking the 
capacity to regulate the global basic structure in order to achieve distributive justice. 
Lack of capacity of institutions is a deficiency which ought to be remedied. The theory 
understands, however, social and economic rights as part of ‘justice in the sense of 
protecting human rights’, thus rendering itself susceptible to criticisms raised above. At 
the same time, the theory assumes only a short list of very basic rights as the crust of the 
theory. Buchanan’s theory recognizes that not all rights stipulated in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR are equally important, because the interests they protect are not equally 
important. Consider the following the example. The Council of Europe (distinct from 
the EU, as the Council of Europe legislates through a series treaties) established a 
conventional access to documents. Treaty 205 established as a fundamental human right 
a right of access to government information, which becomes effective on deposit of 10th 
ratification. At the moment of writing, there are only 9. Suppose the 10th ratification is 
completed. It would indeed be absurd to regard this ‘fundamental’ human right to 
access to access government information as equally important as the right to life, to not 
be tortured and to have a minimum subsistence. The fact that not all interests and thus 
not all rights are of the same significance implies that not all of them ought to have the 
same impact as standard of legitimacy.  
So, which are, according to this theory, the ‘basic’ human rights? Buchanan provides a 
very satisfying answer:  
My hypothesis is that the most basic human rights—those most important 
for the capacity to live a decent human life—include the following: the right 
to life (the right not to be unjustly killed, that is, without due process of law 
or in violation of the moral constraints on armed conflict), the right to 
security of the person, which includes the right to bodily integrity, the right 
against torture, and the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, 
or imprisonment; the right against enslavement and involuntary servitude; 
the right to resources for subsistence; the most fundamental rights of due 
process and equality before the law; the right to freedom from religious 
persecution and against at least the more damaging and systematic forms of 
religious discrimination; the right to freedom of expression; the right to 
association (including the right to marry and have children, but also to 
associate for political purposes, etc.); and the right against persecution and 
against at least the more damaging and systematic forms of discrimination 





These rights are acknowledged in the central human rights conventions of 
the existing system of international law. These same conventions also 
recognize other rights, but in many cases it would be more difficult to argue 
that they are necessary conditions for a good human life or at least a 
minimally decent life. In some extreme cases, such as the notorious right to 
holidays with pay, it is pretty obvious that they are not necessary for a 
decent human life, though they may make for a better life for many 
people.189 
A few reflections are important. Buchanan gathers these rights from international 
conventions, mainly the ICCPR and the ICESCR. However, it is not all the rights 
stipulated in these conventions. He admits that the rights he chose, protect interests 
which are more important than the interests protected by the rights left out of the list. 
Which interests are more important that others does not seem like a matter of opinion 
but an objective claim, a truism: interests protected by these ‘basic’ rights are 
‘necessary conditions for a good human life or at least a minimally decent life.’ Indeed, 
although different societies and cultures may have different standards of ‘minimally 
decent’, it is quite uncontroversial that the right to not be tortured is more important 
than the right to holiday pay. If the choice of rights is objective, the selection is more 
than just a ‘hypothesis’. 
It is a value judgement. In deciding which interests of the human condition are more 
important than others, which rights are thus more ‘basic’ than others, in other words 
which are the ‘necessary conditions for a good human life or at least a minimally decent 
life’, we are making a value judgement. We value the right to freedom of religion more 
than the right to social security and holiday pay.  
The value judgement reveals an extremely important point: the human rights narrative 
keeps the true standard of legitimacy, i.e. the values/interests we try to protect, hidden. 
The standard of legitimacy is essentially moral: the moral value/interest of protecting all 
people from being tortured, arbitrarily killed, detained or imprisoned, etc. By presenting 
the protecting of values/interests in terms of rights, the theory becomes susceptible to 
the human rights narrative and thus the interpretation of human rights by courts, which 
is broad and dynamic, and thus allows for hard conflicts between same and different 
rights. The value of not being persecuted or discriminated for religious beliefs is 
uncontroversial, and thus so is the ‘right to freedom from religious persecution and 
																																																								





against at least the more damaging and systematic forms of religious discrimination’. 
The reason why this value/interest/right is uncontroversial is because of the negation of 
discrimination, i.e. the equality/fairness premise. Being discriminated because of 
religious beliefs is unfair. This is a negative right against discrimination. Even positive 
obligations which may be entailed, such as having a judicial system protecting people 
against such discriminations, aim at non-discrimination.  
However, when this value is entangled in the human rights narrative, it is broadened to a 
problematic extent. In our example, the right to not be discriminated because of 
religious beliefs becomes the vague ‘right to freedom of religion’. This is much higher 
in the level of abstraction, it is more unclear what obligations are entailed by it and it 
causes conflicts with other rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, which are 
resolved by courts, which will have to add on to these values, other values which are not 
equally uncontroversial, and perhaps not legitimate. Therefore, presenting 
values/worthy of protection in human rights narrative may lead legitimacy to 
illegitimacy.  
Let us take an example, which may be repeated as a theme of the argument. Drawing 
comics of an important figure of a religion may offend some religious people who thus 
feel that their right to freedom of religion is violated. The court thus will even restrict 
the right to freedom of expression to the extent that such comics are not permitted, or 
will restrict the right to freedom of religion to the extent that such comics are permitted 
and religious people have to tolerate it. Therefore, if both rights are included in the 
standard of legitimacy, any decision will be both legitimate and illegitimate. Of course, 
there is no conflict of law because the court will do just that: delineate rights. It will 
decide which specific claim rights and correlative obligations, here the right to draw 
comics of religious entities and the obligation to tolerate religiously offensive 
manifestations of right to freedom of expression on the one hand and right to not accept 
your religion to be offended with the correlative obligation to not draw comics of 
religious entities, are included in the right to freedom of expression and right to 
religious freedom respectively.  
This problem seems absent if we protect the interests/values per se. The value of not 
being prosecuted because of religion does not conflict with the value of expressing our 





values/interests are translated into human rights language, the right to not be persecuted 
because of religion (correlative obligation to not persecute anyone on the grounds of 
religion) becomes a broader vague right to freedom of religion (unclear what the 
correlative obligations are). The high level of abstraction of rights includes different 
contested conceptions of protected values: one conception of religious freedom 
understands it as prohibiting manifestations of freedom of expression which offend 
religion, whereas a different conception does not. There is no independent substantive 
argument that resolves the dispute between these two conceptions. The answer partly 
depends on one’s metaphysical beliefs and it is thus essentially a political decision 
courts make. To claim legitimacy, we have to rescue human rights, rather say 
values/interests that human rights protect, from the human rights narrative. 
With these reflections in mind, I will now present the three parts of the theory and raise 
some further criticisms, showing the difficulties that a theory with a standard of 
legitimacy which is itself essentially contested faces. 
4.2.3.2. Justice 
Justice, being the crux of the theory, is a commitment this theory makes, with three 
claims: 
 
1. The normative claim that justice is a value that should be a primary moral goal 
of the international legal system. 
2. Justice is not a morally permissible, but morally obligatory goal of the 
international legal system. 
3. Taking seriously the idea that justice is a primary, morally obligatory goal of the 
international legal system requires a particular conception of the state.190 
  
1. Peace or Justice?191 
 
A simple reading of the UN Charter and common understanding of the UN-based 
international legal order yields the understanding that the primary goal of the post-
WWII international legal order is peace and stability. Buchanan argues that even if this 
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is still the case, the primary goal of international law ought to be justice. Indeed, peace, 
being merely the absence of war, is compatible not only with unjust status quo, but also 
with ‘unspeakable violence within states – systematic torture perpetrated by 
governments against their own citizens, pervasive violence against women, ethnic 
cleansing of minorities, even genocide.’192 
 
Peace, being as desirable as common-sense dictates, is a goal Buchanan presents as not 
essentially in conflict with justice. 193  Justice requires the prohibition of wars of 
aggression (morally unjustifiable attacks as opposed to justified wars of self-defence or 
humanitarian intervention) because they inherently violate human rights. To that extent, 
the pursuit of justice is the pursuit of peace. Furthermore, in terms of relations within 
states, protecting some important human rights is securing peace, such as with the right 
of securing the person and prohibition of torture. 
 
In order to establish the claim, however, that justice, instead of peace, is the primary 
goal international law ought to have, the theory must justify this primacy in the 
instances where these two goals, peace and justice, do conflict. Buchanan tries to justify 
this primacy with two grounds and a qualification. The first ground is a historical 
example which indicates that sometimes it is required to break the peace among states 
for justice. Quite unsurprisingly, the example is the Allies in WWII having fought to 
stop fascist aggression with all its massive violations of human rights.194 Indeed, there 
could be peace in the Nazi-occupied areas, had the Allies not invaded. The Allies did 
prevent such peace for the protection of the most basic human rights. The second 
ground is that examples of clashes between peace and justice show “not that justice 
cannot be a primary goal of the system that takes the value of peace seriously, but only 
that clashes between these goals can be expected to occur during the transition toward 
justice.”195 For example, it is justified, on the grounds of justice as protecting basic 
human rights, to use military force to oust a junta.196 Finally, Buchanan tries to justify 
the primacy of justice as the primary goal of international law with the following 
qualification. In his own words:  
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a sincere commitment to justice as primary goal of the system does not 
require allowing considerations of justice to trump all other moral 
considerations in every instance. For one thing, not all injustices are serious. 
In some cases it may be morally permissible to tolerate a relatively minor 
injustice or forgo a reform that would further improve a situation that is 
already commendable from the standpoint of justice, in order to reap some 
significant gain, not just with respect to some other moral value, but also in 
efficiency. My view is only that the core of justice, protection of basic 
human rights, should be a primary goal of the international legal system. 
This is compatible with the realization that justice is not all that matters.197 
 
Notably, this is a strength and weakness of the theory. It is a strength because it puts 
justice and peace at their place. We all agree that an unjust status quo is not desirable. 
We all agree that peace under occupation by foreign power is undesirable and use of 
force is morally permissible if it is the only path to freedom. However, note that in 
arguing for primacy of justice over peace in such instances, the conception of justice we 
are assuming is not the one of protecting fundamental human rights and making the 
individual the centre of international law as the theory purports, but a conception 
pertaining to the freedom of a collective (society, ethnic group, etc) from external rule: 
it is not ‘fair’ to accept an unfair status quo, a peaceful order maintained by a foreign 
power which invaded. Historically speaking, unjust status quo pertained to ethnic 
identities - Persians invading Greeks, Mongols invading Asian nations, Ottoman Turks 
conquering the Balkan and eastern European nations, colonial powers ruling foreign 
lands etc. – and this lack of ‘justice’ was the ground for subsequent wars of 
independence. When a group/ethnic identity was fighting for freedom from external 
rule, it was assuming that the legally valid order may have established peace, but it was 
unjust because it had invaded their land. Wars of independence assume an unjust status 
quo. The theory cannot accommodate this conception because the rights belonging in 
the crux of the theory are, with the exception of the right to subsistence which pertains 
to distributions of wealth in a society, individual rights, not in an unjust status quo after 
usurpation of land. The theory is very clear about making the individual, contrast to 
state, central in international law and this is reflected in the conception of justice. The 
theory does not accommodate the typical instances of unjust status quo.  
 
																																																								





Another immediate reflection on the theory, which does not in way disprove it, is that 
one ought to be careful not to get entangled in the relevant rhetoric. It is indeed true that 
unjust status quo is morally impermissible, and it is desirable to fight against a peace 
which either violates fundamental human rights or consists on occupation of a land 
from a power which has invaded. What is also true is that although the latter cases are 
more obvious than the former. It is not the case that every time a state has invoked 
human rights as a justification to invade, the justification was actually true. It is often 
actually the opposite. More often than not, human rights rhetoric has been used as an 
excuse to break peace, but not for justice, but for injustice, not to protect human rights, 
but to illegally invade a state and violate human rights. Adolph Hitler used the 
justification of human rights of German citizens who were oppressed to invade 
neighbouring states with the subsequent human rights violations. Turkey used the same 
excuse to invade Cyprus a week after domestic tensions had ceased, to illegally occupy 
38% of a sovereign state with the subsequent human rights violations ranging from 250 
000 refugees, frequent rapes (which lead Cyprus to modify the law on abortion) and 
destruction of cultural property, and establish a regime recognized by two UNSC legally 
binding resolutions as illegal, and implement its future plans for the region as drafted by 
Nihat Erim in 1952. Certain western states used human rights (rapes – one of the three 
myths, another one being democracy as mentioned before) as justification to attack 
Libya and take out Qaddafi even though there was no evidence of the Qaddafi regime 
committing the claimed human rights violations. There are probably more examples of 
misuse of the ‘justice over peace’ argument than actual implementations of it, often 
because states which are able to restore justice over an unjust peace are the ones that 
caused the unjust status quo at the first place or have interests for unjust peace to remain 
in place. Becoming too entangled in the rhetoric makes one assume that there are human 
rights violations whenever human rights violations are advanced. There is a distinction 
between whether certain states claimed that human rights violations took place and they 
are attacking for the sake of human rights, and whether there have indeed been human 
rights violations and the attack is indeed to protect human rights and bring justice. 
Again, this reflection does not attack the theory. It does, however, set it in perspective. 
The claim is that what has priority over peace is justice, not whatever states claim that 
constitutes justice. In terms of public international law, states are legally permitted to 
even advance justification for attack after the attack. However, the point here is whether 





justifications of public international law, language of public international law, to justify 
their illegal attacks. Such justifications are self-defence (also used from Adolph Hitler 
when invading Poland) and protection of human rights. The fact that a justification has 
been presented, it does not mean that it holds true. 
 
Returning to the theory, in arguing that in some cases it may be morally permissible to 
tolerate relatively small injustices for other moral values or efficiency, the critical 
question becomes which rights or how much injustice must be sacrificed for what/how 
much value or efficiency. Stated at such a high level of abstraction, the theory finds 
Hitler, Stalin and Mao, paradoxically enough, agreeable. The first violated the right to 
life of many physically incapable people for efficiency (since the state providing for 
them as they were unable to work would be inefficient), whereas the second and the 
third exterminated even more people, violating their right to life, but they did for a 
moral value, such as social cohesion. Although the theory surely intends to negate such 
entailments, the high level of abstraction in which it operates does not allow it to do so, 
as the theory becomes all-encompassing: any violation of rights can be regarded as 
serious or not serious if there is no hierarchy of human rights. In assuming that arbitrary 
killing of an individual is morally worse than not giving social security to an individual 
(both human rights), we are assuming that the interest of being alive is more important 
than the interest in obtaining social security, which in human rights language translates 
to the assumption that the right to life is more important than social security. I am not 
advancing a hierarchy of human rights, nor am I certain that it is even possible. I am 
claiming, however, that given the vast array of ‘human rights,’ the high level of 
abstraction in which the theory operates deprives it of substantial meaning. For justice 
to be a normative standard, some qualification is needed for what counts as ‘serious’ 
injustice. In the absence of that, anyone’s own moral intuitions can be projected into 
‘seriousness’ of an ‘injustice,’ rendering the theory a mere rhetoric rather than an actual 
standard of legitimacy. Different moral intuitions can lead to different conceptions of 
‘serious’ injustices and in the absence of an independent argument solving a dispute 
between competing conceptions, the concept of justice in the context of this theory 
easily becomes essentially contested. Is the injustice incurred on Tibetan people by the 
Chinese government which, after invading and occupying Tibet, violates their right to 
rule themselves ‘serious’ enough that would justify the use of force of Tibetans against 





freedom be more unjust than the injustice already in place because at least some people, 
probably both combatants and non-combatants as is often the case, will be killed? If by 
justice in such cases one means the freedom of people native to a land to rule 
themselves, an intuitive understanding of justice which applies in context, the answer is 
obvious: if the only way for Tibetans to be free from an invading and occupying power 
is the use of force, then they are morally entitled to it. In the absence of any such moral 
value that would give this normative standard some content, justice as protection of all 
human rights is more of an abstraction rather than a standard of legitimacy.  
 
At this point Buchanan moves from arguing that ‘it is reasonable to make justice a 
primary moral goal of the international legal system – that a proper appreciation of the 
value of peace does not preclude us from attempting to make the international order an 
instrument for and an embodiment of justice’ to the stronger claim that doing so is 
morally obligatory.198 Given that both claims are normative ‘Justice should be the 
primary goal’ and ‘Justice is morally obligatory,’ the difference between them seems to 
be in the relevant sense of ‘should’: the arguments mentioned so far can be regarded as 
arguments of reasonableness, whereas claiming that justice is morally obligatory 
requires moral obligation. The use of moral obligation here raises issues, which I will 
address further on. Buchanan presents an argument for this stronger claim, central to the 
theory, to the examination of which I will now proceed.199 
 
2. The Natural Duty of Justice Argument 
 
According to this argument, we all have a limited moral obligation to contribute to 
ensuring that all persons have access to just institutions, where this means primarily 
institutions that protect basic human rights.200 (The modifier ‘Natural’ signals that this 
obligation attaches to us as persons, independently of any promises we make, 
undertakings we happen to engage in, or institutions in which we are implicated).201 
Buchanan maintains that “if we add to the assertion that there is such a Natural Duty of 
Justice the premise that international law can play an important role in ensuring that all 
persons have access to just institutions, we get the conclusion that justice is a morally 
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obligatory goal of international law.”202 He also emphasizes that his Natural Duty of 
Justice demands more from us than Rawls’ principle with the same label, as that 
‘requires that one support just institutions that (already) apply to one.203  
 
The Natural Duty of Justice rests on three premises, one factual and two moral. The 
factual premise is that just institutions (including legal institutions) are required to 
ensure that all persons are treated justly. The first moral premise is that all persons are 
entitled to equal respect and concern - or, in Kant’s terms, that each is to be treated as 
an end. Buchanan calls this premise the Moral Equality Principle (or the Equal Moral 
Consideration or Equal Regard Principle). The second moral premise is that treating 
persons with equal concern and respect requires helping to ensure that they are treated 
justly, where this primarily means helping to make sure that their basic human rights are 
not violated (not merely refraining from violating them ourselves).204   
 
Buchanan regards the factual premise as ‘unproblematic’;205 yet, it is important to make 
two important observations. Although all human beings have certain common interests, 
not all human beings are in need of the specific rights which protect those interests 
because people stand differently towards certain interests. All human beings have 
interest in not being arbitrarily killed or tortured. All human beings have an interest in 
enjoying at least minimum standard of living – thus the right to social security. 
However, the fact that all human beings have an interest in enjoying at least a minimum 
standard of living does not entail that all human beings satisfy the conditions of the 
right to social security. Many do not need it because their individual circumstances 
provide for a standard of living higher than what is regarded as minimum and claimed 
for by the right to social security. Giving social security to some and not to others is 
differentiating treatment based on individual circumstances, depending on which 
people’s interest is violated and which people’s interest is already satisfied. This leads 
to the conclusion that ‘all persons being treated justly’ does not entail same treatment to 
all persons. It entails that all persons are entitled to a minimum level of protection, that 
human rights are about that minimum and that in the case of at least certain rights, such 
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as the right to security, the individuals whose interest is violated – individuals whose 
living conditions lie below that minimum - have the right, whereas the individuals 
whose interest is not violated – individuals whose living standards are above that 
minimum - do not have the right to social security. The first observation then is that 
what all human beings equally have in common is certain interests, not all the rights that 
protect those interests.  
  
The second observation is that what the factual premise does not address is the 
possibility where it is, as a matter of fact, impossible to treat all people justly, and in 
order to satisfy the interests of some persons, the interests other persons have to be 
violated and vice versa. What if, in order to satisfy the interests of freedom of 
movement of people, illegal immigrants who arrived by state-organised illegal 
emigration after an invasion ought to return to their country? If they return to their 
country having lived in the invaded county for a significant amount of time, their 
interests are harmed, whereas if they stay, the interests of the legal citizens are harmed. 
There is no middle way which can satisfy the interests of all and thus treat all persons 
‘justly’, assuming that ‘justly’ means satisfying the interests that all basic human rights 
protect. A perhaps clearer example would be a more straightforward conflict of rights 
(and interests): freedom of expression vs religious freedom. If comics making fun of 
religious symbols are permitted, the freedom of expression is protected but the right to 
religion is restricted, and the other way around. If such comics are prohibited, the right 
to religion is protected and religious people of the religion in question are treated 
‘justly’, whereas others are treated unjustly, to the extent that their freedom of 
expression is restricted. What if the only way of protecting the life of millions is 
torturing one? The problem of the theory is that it is sometimes impossible, as a matter 
of fact, to treat all people justly, because sometimes, the only way to ensure that some 
people are treated justly is to treat certain others unjustly. The issue becomes even more 
complicated if we bring in public interest, which is also a legitimate interest, and a 
typical restriction of human rights. It is indeed ‘unproblematic’ to state the moral claim 
that all people should not be discriminated against/mistreated/disrespected because of 
their skin colour, race, ethnic identity, sex, gender, religious, linguistic and/or sexual 
identity. However, this claim is different from the claim that institutions are required to 
ensure that all persons are treated ‘justly’, if justice is understood as protection of a long 





obviously arising from the letter of the law. Indeed, in order for this theory to succeed 
and avoid such internal conflicts, justice has to be defined as a very short list of the very 
basic human rights – freedom of religious discrimination rather than the broader and 
vaguer ‘freedom of religion’. We will see later that the theory indeed keeps the list short 
and the rights narrowly construed. However, the theory also allows for extension of the 
list, broadening of the concept of justice, without realizing the implications.  
 
The second premise presents the same issues with the first premise. It is most certainly 
true and hopefully uncontroversial that there is a certain kind of respect and concern we 
owe to any human being in virtue of him/her being a human being. There are indeed 
certain things that we are not allowed to do, and ought to not be allowed to do, to 
people, in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. If ‘basic human rights’ are kept 
to a short list of the truly fundamental human rights that the theory uses to make its 
case, such as right to life, prohibition of torture and right to non-arbitrary arrest, then the 
premise is unproblematic. Neither the negative nor the limited positive obligations of 
these rights conflict in a manner that is restrictive of freedom. If, however, basic human 
rights are proliferated and/or construed high in the level of abstraction thus broadly 
entailing many more positive obligations, then it will sometimes be the case that 
showing that amount of respect and concern to certain individuals will entail depriving 
some of that respect and concern to others – either in terms of the same right or a 
different basic human right. In order for the premises to be consistent, the ‘basic human 
rights’ requirement needs to be concrete. 
 
The third premise requires justification. Buchanan seems to derive the third premise 
from the second. In particular: 
 
Consider first the implausibility, if not the outright incoherence, of 
acknowledging the Moral Equality Principle, that we ought to accord all 
persons equal concern and respect, while at the same time denying that we 
are obligated to bear any significant costs to help ensure that their basic 
human rights are protected. This combination of views would be plausible 
only if a proper equal respect and concern for persons required only that we 
do not ourselves violate their human rights, leaving us entirely free to 
refrain from helping to prevent others from violating those rights, even 






Suppose, for example, that I do nothing to violate your human rights, stating 
that I do so out of equal concern and respect for you, out of a proper 
recognition of the fact that you are a person. But suppose also that someone 
else is intent on violating your most basic human rights and I can help 
prevent you from being treated unjustly, without incurring serious costs to 
myself—all I need do is to help support a police and court system that will 
prevent you from being murdered by people who hate you because of the 
color of your skin or from being persecuted because of your religious 
beliefs. If I refuse to make such efforts to prevent you from having your 
most basic human rights violated, can I reasonably expect you or anyone 
else to believe me when I say that I respect all persons and am concerned 
about their well being?  
 
Only a laughably anemic conception of what it is to recognize the moral 
importance of persons—an absurdly attenuated view about what it is to 
respect persons and to be concerned about their well being — would count 
my merely refraining from violating other persons' rights as sufficient. Of 
course it is another matter as to whether or under what conditions I ought to 
undergo sacrifices to help ensure that other persons' basic human rights are 
protected. But the Natural Duty does not generally require sacrifices.206 
 
Therefore, the derivation of the third premise, the limited moral obligation to ensure that 
all persons have access to just institutions, primarily institutions protecting basic human 
rights, when no sacrifices are required, consists on the observation that it not being the 
case would render the Moral Equality Principle meaningless. The Natural Duty of 
Justice is part of the meaning of the Moral Equality Principle. The respect that the 
Moral Equality Principle requires seems to imply that we have the Natural Duty of 
Justice. The relationship between the two is one of implication/entailment. Buchanan 
continues: 
 
The fundamental point can be put in another way, by making more explicit 
the connection between equal concern and respect for persons, human 
rights, and basic human interests. One of the most important ways we show 
equal concern and respect for persons is by acknowledging that there are 
human rights. Assertions of human rights signal that certain basic human 
interests are of such profound moral importance that they merit 
extraordinarily strong protections. If, for example, there is a human right 
against religious discrimination, the implication is that the interest in being 
free to practice one's religion without fear of oppression or penalty is so 
important that even the good of society as a whole is generally not sufficient 
reason to justify discrimination. In other words, human rights principles 
																																																								





specify fundamental moral constraints on actions, policies, and institutional 
arrangements; they are not merely assertions of desirable or worthy goals.207 
 
The need to ‘keep the list short’ becomes obvious from the understanding of human 
rights as principles. The right to life, the right to prohibition of torture, the right to 
prohibition of religious discrimination and the right to means of subsistence can and do 
function as principles. It is hard to say the same about the right to holiday pay which is 
not only less important, but also a specific claim right, contrast to a general principle.   
 
Although it is true that human rights are not mere aspirations, it may not be true that 
human rights necessarily impose fundamental moral constraints on actions, policies, 
and institutional arrangements. Buchanan’s claim must receive two qualifications. First, 
as a matter of logic of rights, human rights may be liberty rights (liberties) or claim 
rights. Indeed, they are interpreted as being claim rights, and in that sense, Buchanan is 
absolutely correct here. My point is that interpreting all of them as claim rights rather 
than liberties is an interpretative/political choice, probably a good one, but not a 
necessary truth. For example, it could be the case the right to religious freedom is 
interpreted and understood as merely expressing the freedom of people to follow any 
religion they wish, without that freedom entailing the obligation on behalf of the state to 
provide conveniences for people to practice their religion. Understanding the right to 
religion as a liberty means that the right holder merely has permission to hold any 
religion and that no other person has claim forbidding the right holder from doing so. It 
does not create any obligations, so it does not necessarily set constraints on actions, 
policies and institutional arrangements. Indeed, when it comes to whether a right is a 
claim right or liberty, the correct established terminology – ‘right’ is a claim right and 
‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ is a liberty right – is unhelpful. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights refers to ‘Rights’, but Article 18 refers to ‘freedom’ of 
thought, conscience and religion. Yet, in interpreting that ‘freedom’ as entailing 
correlative obligations, courts are in effect conceptualising this right as a claim right, 
not as a liberty right. Either the initial intention was for the right to be a liberty right and 
it was later, through interpretational choices turned into a claim right, or the initial 
intention was for the ‘freedom’ to be understood as a claim right, but the term ‘freedom’ 
may have been chosen for non-legally relevant, perhaps symbolic reasons. In any case, 
																																																								





the observation made here is that although the theory is absolutely correct to assume 
that human rights establish fundamental moral constraints on actions, policies and 
institutional arrangements, this is because they are interpreted as claim rights, or general 
principles which include claim rights, and not as liberties, despite the wording of some 
basic human rights; this interpretation a political choice, not a conceptual or necessary 
truth. ‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ can be understood as a liberty right 
without any change in the words – understanding it as a liberty right would, in fact, be 
more consistent with the use of chosen terminology.  
 
The second and more important qualification pertains to the Natural Duty of Justice 
being a limited obligation. The Natural Duty of Justice Argument becomes persuasive 
because it presents itself as claiming that we out to help others join just institutions 
when there are no costs or sacrifices incurred on us.208 “In particular, the Natural Duty 
of Justice is presumably most plausibly construed, as are the duties of beneficence and 
of rescue, as including an implicit proviso that the cost of acting on it is not ‘excessive.’ 
This is not to say that there is no such duty, only that it is a limited duty.”209 Stated like 
this, the argument bears an intuitive force, just like the mentioned duties of beneficence 
and rescue. One only need to consider Peter Singer’s ‘girl drowning in the pool’ 
example: I have the moral obligation to help a little girl drowning in the pool, if doing 
so occurs minimal costs to me, such as merely getting my clothes wet. The argument 
has strong moral force because the exception (‘if…’) is built from the beginning so the 
moral obligation is presented as conclusory.  
 
This is a crucial point of the theory: if one understands moral obligations as 
conclusory,210 then the Natural Duty of Justice Argument, on which this standard of 
legitimacy, this entire theory, rests, becomes problematic. A conclusory moral 
obligation of Natural duty of Justice would imply that since exceptions have not been 
built in from the beginning, in all possible instances, we have the moral obligation to 
ensure others have access to justice, even though such course of action would negate the 
satisfaction of a morally more compelling obligation. The ‘others’ renders the Natural 
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Duty of Justice Argument impossible or contradictory: when ensuring that A has access 
to just institutions negates ensuring B, someone closer and dearer to me, has access to 
just institutions, then it is impossible to perform this moral obligation. According to the 
Natural Duty of Justice, I have moral obligation towards A and B, yet courses of action 
satisfying these two obligations are mutually exclusive. This is solved only by 
exceptions: ‘we have moral obligations to help ensure individuals have access to just 
institutions, unless acting so entails injustice to other individuals, and so on and so 
forth.’ In such instances of prima facie conflict, the one reason for action would prevail 
over the other, manifesting that ‘limited’ moral obligations means presumptive; 
consequently, the so called ‘obligation’ is reducible to reason for action. Since the 
Natural Duty of Justice Argument requires that it reaches not only a moral value but a 
moral obligation, it requires that the moral obligations are limited.  
 
Indeed, on a first glance, it makes sense to see moral obligations as limited obligations. 
Suppose I agree with you to meet at the pub at seven, I need half an hour to get there 
and leave forty minutes before in order to make sure I am on time. (Assume that 
promises create obligations). Suppose that while I am on my way to meet you and being 
ahead of time, I see a helpless heavily wounded biker at the side of the street with no 
people around, and it is the case that I am his only chance of survival. As a matter of 
fact, I either save his life and show up at the pub late, or I let him die and show up at the 
pub on time. I feel obligated to be at the pub at seven, but I feel more obligated211 to 
save a human life even if that means failing on my obligation to be on time at my 
appointment. I attend the biker and consequently arrive at my appointment late. The 
immediate response of a lay person would be that the morally compelling obligation to 
save the life of the biker overrides the moral obligation I have to be at the pub on time. 
This assumes that the obligation to fulfil my promise is a limited moral obligation: I 
have the moral obligation to be at the pub at seven, unless I need to save someone’s life 
on the way. A paraphrase would be that the moral obligation to be at the pub on time is 
a presumptive obligation: the moral obligation to save the life of the biker overrides the 
moral obligation to be at the pub on time. This entails that being at the pub on time is 
reducible to reasons for action: I have a reason to be at the pub on time, but a stronger 
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reason to save a human right, so my moral obligation is to save a human life. Moral 
obligations are requirements, and as such they do not have a dimension of weight as 
reasons do. It is not the case that I am a little obligated to arrive at the pub on time and 
more obligated to save a human life. Saving a human life is the obligation and that 
renders my reason to arrive at the pub on time as not morally obligatory. Arriving at the 
pub on time would have been morally obligatory, if it wasn’t for this exception.  
 
One could attack the equation of moral reasons being limited with moral reasons being 
presumptive. The latter, the counter argument would go, requires that moral obligations 
have the dimension of weight as illustrated in the previous paragraph, the former does 
not. A moral obligation is conclusory in the sense that it is not presumptive, it does not 
have the dimension of weight, yet it is limited because there are exceptions. However, 
this results to the same thing: if all the possible exceptions are built in, then we have a 
moral obligation (conclusory, not limited/presumptive). In the absence of exceptions 
(because they are unknown; no known exhaustive list), what is stated is not a moral 
obligation, but a principle: I have the moral obligation to be at the pub at 7 unless a 
biker needs my help to survive, unless I am physically unable to make it (ought implies 
can), unless my sister calls me informing me my parents are in the emergency room of 
the hospital, etc. entails that these moral obligations (presented here as exceptions), 
negate, in these instances, the ‘moral obligation’ to be at the pub. Since the 
circumstances in which I actually do have the moral obligation to be at the pub are 
indeterminate, being at the pub because of my promise is revealed as being a reason for 
action rather than an obligation. I cannot have mutually exclusive moral obligations. If 
one moral obligation is stronger than the other (note how ‘limited’ overlaps with 
‘presumptive’), then the one moral obligation is more ‘moral’ than the other. This 
negates the meaning of being obligated, which is that no matter what, I just have to do 
something, or else I am breaching a moral duty, I am committing a moral wrong. No 
matter how detestable an action is, it is morally permissible if all the other options are 
worse. Ascribing the dimension of weight to moral obligations and assuming that a 
detestable action done because the other courses of action are worse is still somewhat 
wrong, leads to the paradox of violating the ‘ought implies can’ rule. No one can be 
blamed for any action or omission, no matter how appalling, if it was the best choice 
under the circumstances. Taking a life away may be regarded not only as morally 





One cannot possibly be morally wrong and morally not wrong. Moral obligations are 
requirements, and thus conclusory, not limited/presumptive. Or else, we might as well 
do away with moral obligations and remain with reasons for and against. 
 
Indeed, if we understand limited moral obligations as being moral obligations ‘unless’ 
an infinite number of exceptions are substantiated, then the limited moral obligation 
does not mean much. That’s because it will fall under the long list of general standards 
of behaviour: I have a limited moral obligation to help the elderly, I have a limited 
moral obligation to treat animals well, I have a limited moral obligation to protect the 
environment, etc. All these are not moral obligations, but general moral principles. It is 
only in the light of specific circumstances, when there are no exceptions, that we see 
what our (conclusory) moral obligations are. I have the moral obligation to help an old 
man cross the street; I do not have a moral obligation to help a man cross the street 
when others are in better position to do so and I am in a hurry to arrive at the emergency 
room of the hospital to see my injured wife. I have the moral obligation to not engage in 
forms of fishing which deplete the oceans from marine life; local fishermen whose only 
means of survival is engaging in this kind of fishing do not have the moral obligation to 
abstain from it. Helping the elderly, protecting the environment, helping others have 
access to just institutions are reasons for action which must be considered in relevant 
deliberations for action on the balancing of reasons to conclude what the moral 
obligation is in each instance; the reasons are not moral obligations per se. 
 
Note that if the obligation is limited, it seems unclear how exactly this moral obligation 
is to play the role of the standard of legitimacy. The more exceptions are built in, the 
narrower the scope. The standard of legitimacy has substantial meaning, when the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for its application are determined. If not, we do not 
know when it applies, and there will be fundamental disagreements about its application 
in the light of circumstances. The standard will be unable to solve these disagreements 
because it does not determine the conditions of its application, rendering the standard, 
the concept, essentially contested. Suppose we maintain the standard of public 
international law is peace and that is a limited moral obligation. Some states resort to 
war in self-defence assuming self-defence is one of the limitations/exceptions of this 
limited moral obligation. Other states resort to war in order to gain access to the sea 





And so on and so forth. The standard of legitimacy does not determine the limitations; it 
does not determine the necessary and sufficient conditions of its application. Thus, 
‘peace’ here, as a standard of legitimacy, becomes essentially contested, because the 
concept itself does not allow for an argument to determine whether certain exceptions 
are permitted or not. One conception of ‘peace’ as a standard of legitimacy in this 
hypothetical example is refraining from war apart from instances of self-defence, 
whereas another conception would be refraining from war apart from instances of self-
defence and need to satisfy vital interests by access to sea. As such, it cannot function as 
a standard of legitimacy, but only as a goal and general principle. Peace can be regarded 
as a standard of legitimacy of international law under the UN regime, because the 
limitations/exceptions are defined by public international law itself: self-defence 
(custom and UN Charter), use of force under authorization from the UNSC (Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter) and humanitarian intervention (custom – aims at protecting only 
citizens of the intervening state). It seems that just like the Natural Justice Argument is 
best understood as a general principle rather than a moral obligation, human rights are 
best understood as general principles rather than standard of legitimacy, unless their 
conditions of application are specified. This is why they are best used, in the context of 
standard of legitimacy, as specific claim rights prohibiting extremes (e.g. prohibition of 
genocide and ethnic cleanings) rather than a long list of vague moral principles. 
 
What is at stake, one could ask, when wondering whether moral obligations are 
conclusory or not? What is at stake, to be clear, is the idea of moral obligations as moral 
requirements. I cannot be presumptively morally obligated. I am either morally 
obligated or not. What is also at stake is the relevance of obligation to our moral 
thinking. To be relevant to our moral reasoning, obligations must be requirements. 
Otherwise, we would do better to forget about obligations and think only about reasons 
pro and con. 
 
All obligations and rights are conditional. What we are permitted to do, whether this 
pertains to keeping a promise, or to freedom of speech or to helping others access just 





bit of violation’ of a right. Either what we are doing is permissible, or it is not.212 This is 
how the human rights narrative causes confusion. Human rights, being essentially 
principles, which include several other (claim) rights and liberties, are, both morally and 
legally, susceptible to restrictions typically either from other human rights or from 
public interest. Therefore, presenting access to human rights as moral obligation is 
problematic because it is bound to be the case that we will be morally obligated to help 
individuals access certain claim rights of some rights-principles, and by doing so 
deprive other individuals from other claim rights of the same or different right-
principles. 
 
Since the conditions themselves can be translated into human rights language, ‘human 
rights’ as a standard of legitimacy may be rendered an essentially contested concept. 
Suppose that in order to help certain individuals enjoy freedom of speech, I support the 
government in power. Suppose that a condition of this is that the freedom of religion of 
certain religious individuals is not violated. Suppose that in order to protect their 
freedom of religion which is violated by freedom of expression supported by the secular 
government, I have to support certain anti-government groups. At this level of 
abstraction at least, the ‘limited moral obligation’ seems to be translatable into human 
rights narrative, as much as its condition of application (exception). Therefore, under 
the abstraction of justice as protecting human rights (principles which are entirely 
unclear as to the full extent of implied obligations), different conceptions of ‘justice as 
protecting human rights’ can be conceived. It is legitimate to support the government to 
help individuals enjoy freedom of speech whereas a different conception of ‘justice as 
protecting human rights’ would entail opposing the government so that other 
individuals enjoy freedom of religion. The lack of specificity of human rights (i.e. 
which specific obligations are correlative to each human right) is not just a problem; it 
renders the so-called standard of legitimacy as a mere abstraction, perhaps a goal to 
pursue, but a non-standard.  
 
To be clear, it is possible to derive moral obligations from general principles and we can 
know in advance what they are. For example, we can know in advance that we may not 
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intentionally kill someone (outside of war, in civil society) ‘unless…’ and list the 
conditions under which this is permissible. Furthermore, we can derive this from 
general moral principles such as ‘act only in accordance with principles that no one 
affected by your action can reasonably reject.’ Assuming, for example, that others 
whom one might kill could reasonably reject any principle allowing you to intentionally 
kill them unless they are threatening you or someone in your care, this principle about 
killing can be ‘derived’ (loosely speaking) from this core general principle. Granted, 
this example may suffer from oversimplification. Perhaps we need to add further 
situations that justify killing; for example, that it is in the person’s best interest to be 
killed and they have given their consent. However, we can also derive this more 
complicated principle from the general principle, and we can know it in advance. 
 
It would be impossible, however, for the theory to derive moral obligations from 
general human rights principles alone. First, the complexity of certain rights principles 
is not parallel to the aforementioned example. The most important reason, however, 
why the theory cannot provide an exhaustive list of obligations deriving from human 
rights principles, is that it is the courts, not philosophers, who have the authority to 
interpret basic human rights and thus determine what obligations are and are not implied 
by each right.  
 
All obligations, to be clear, consist of principles that have a conditional form. ‘Do not 
do A, unless x,y,z. Do A unless x,y,z.’ The obligations always apply in the relevant 
circumstances. Detached from circumstances, it is possible to discuss principles, not 
obligations per se. Consider the rescue principle: do what you can to save others unless 
trying to save them imposes a substantial risk or burden on you. Whenever some needs 
saving, and I can save them, and saving them does not impose a substantial risk or 
burden, then I have an obligation to save them. General principles like this are abstract. 
But we can know that they are valid ‘ahead of time’ and the fact that they are abstract 
does not prevent us from applying them in real circumstances, so they are action 
guiding. 
 
It could be argued that my disagreement with the theory is merely a linguistic one. 
Indeed, the terms ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’ can be used differently. ‘Rights’ can be a 





something. So understood, rights can conflict. So can obligations. When lawyers talk 
about rights conflicting, they are talking about interests conflicting.  When they talk 
about obligations conflicting, they are saying that there are reasons for acting pro and 
con.  When the law refers to ‘right to privacy,’ or ‘freedom of expression,’ it is referring 
to principles/interests. When a court decision is referring to ‘the right of compensation 
of A against B’ or ‘the right of a group of people to perform a march through village B,’ 
the text is referring to rights, not principles/interests.  
 
However, my disagreement with the theory is not merely of linguistic nature. This is 
because the theory itself acknowledges the distinction between interests and rights: 
‘Assertions of human rights signal that certain basic human interests are of such 
profound moral importance that they merit extraordinarily strong protections.’ (See 
above). Whether the theory captures the importance of this distinction is of course 
another story.  
 
At this point, two observations need to be made. First, being not concerned and being 
unjust are two different things. As we saw above, the Natural Justice Argument makes 
its case by assuming that “If I refuse to make such efforts (something minimal as 
supporting a police and court system) to prevent you from having your most basic 
human rights violated, can I reasonably expect you or anyone else to believe me when I 
say that I respect all persons and am concerned about their well-being?”213 In the 
absence of other reasons, being not concerned about the suffering of a fellow human 
being renders one detestable, yet not unjust, as there is no violation of rights per se. It is 
thus in relation to ‘respect’ that obligations are established. Respecting human beings, 
according to the theory, consists in our limited moral obligation to help others access 
institutions which protect their human rights. Note that it is the institutions which 
clearly have the obligation to protect human rights. The theory extends such an 
obligation to all of us. 
 
Second, the obligation is conditioned with the ‘no costs’ requirement. Or so it states. It 
could be argued that ‘limited’ obligation refers not to the presumptive vs conclusory 
obligation issue but to the costs incurred on us in relation to performing the moral 
																																																								





obligation of the Natural Duty of Justice. I have the obligation to support someone 
access just institutions when this amounts to limited costs to myself, but not when it 
amounts to excessive costs to myself, e.g. losing my job to dedicate my life on helping 
people access just institutions. However, the ‘costs’ understanding of ‘limited’ in 
‘limited obligation’ seems to amount to the obligation being presumptive: I have the 
obligation to help individual A access just institutions, unless this may cost me rescuing 
my own son or my job. Rescuing my son is a morally relevant reason for action and in 
the absence of more morally compelling considerations, such as in this case, a moral 
obligation. So, the moral obligation to save my son wins over the presumptive 
obligation to help A access just institutions. It can also be stipulated as follows: losing 
my son comes at an excessive cost (in a moral conception of ‘cost’) so then I have no 
obligation to help A access just institutions.  Keeping my job is not a morally relevant 
reason, but a prudential reason (reason of self-interest) which in this case is conclusive 
and trumps over the less weighty consideration of helping people access just 
institutions. In other words, losing my job (in a non-moral conception of ‘costs’) is 
excessive cost to bear, so I do not have the obligation to help A access just institutions. 
In line with conventional and intuitive understanding of morality, the theory accepts that 
people are not morally required to be heroes and sustain heavy costs/sacrifices to help 
others, apart perhaps on certain exceptional cases, e.g. if we have certain obligations to 
certain individuals which require access to justice. “Of course it is another matter as to 
whether or under what conditions I ought to undergo sacrifices to help ensure that other 





Having used the ‘no costs on us’ component for the argument to gain intuitive force, the 
theory moves on to argue that we have moral obligation to even bear significant costs to 
help others join unjust institutions.  
 
But surely if these interests are so extraordinarily important that the 
corresponding rights should not be violated even when violating them 
would promote overall social utility, then recognizing their importance 
																																																								





requires not only refraining from violating the corresponding rights, but also 
being willing to bear some significant costs to ensure that these rights are 
not violated by others. How could it be the case that a particular interest is 
of such profound moral importance that we should not violate the 
corresponding right even to achieve a significant benefit for many people 
and yet also be true that we have no significant obligation to help ensure 
that all persons have access to institutions that protect this interest? A regard 
for the moral equality of persons sufficiently robust to ground the assertion 
that there are human rights also implies that we ought to bear significant 
costs to ensure that all persons’ rights are protected.215 
 
This is not a big step from theory’s previous claim. If one maintains that there is such a 
thing as limited moral obligation, the amount of sacrifices that each one of us is morally 
obligated to sustain in order to perform that duty depends on the specific circumstances 
of the individual case when we are called on that duty. The amount of sacrifice is not 
determined a priori, so it is not part of the argument. The argument is neutral towards 
the specifics. This is exactly where the view of moral obligations being conclusory finds 
ground to argue that without such context, it is indeterminate what our moral 
obligations are which depend on the balancing of all the relevant considerations. The 
amount of sacrifice is one among the several considerations in the balancing of reasons, 
both moral and non-moral, which is required to determine whether there is, in a given 
case, a moral obligation.  
 
Therefore, like the duty of benevolence, the natural duty of justice does not establish a 
moral obligation. Just like the duty of benevolence, it is a moral principle, ‘Do good to 
others if there is no substantial cost to yourself’ and thus a reason for action which is 
balanced with other reasons in guiding our behaviour, but it is not, out of context, a 
moral obligation, certainly not without the ‘unless’ possibilities of individual 
circumstances. Moral obligations are conclusory - exceptions are built in from the 
beginning. 
 
Note that if the natural justice argument is a limited duty, then it does not carry with it 
the force it claims to have. Since it is not a genuine obligation but essentially a reason 
for action, it is weighed and balanced with other reasons and values in deciding what to 
do. Buchanan turns values into moral reasons. With this move, a number of other values 
can be turned to reasons for action. For example, is the protection of the environment 
																																																								





not essential for the survival of the human species? Is it not necessary to protect it for 
the sake of the current and future generations? Does this environment not enhance 
living standards of human beings? Is this not a value we ought to pursue? If the answer 
to all these questions is positive, then there is a reason for everyone to not only avoid 
protecting the environment, but with the same rational as the so-called natural duty of 
justice argument, assume that there is an obligation to positively act in order to help so 
that everyone lives in a safer and cleaner environment. Suppose it is the case that an 
action with negligent costs to us hugely benefits the environment and the rights of 
others. Suppose this action prevents us from performing a different action with more 
costs/higher sacrifice to us which potentially contributes to a few more people accessing 
institutions which help justice. Which action is morally obligatory?  
 
Two issues are to be noted. Suppose the former action only indirectly helps the living 
standards of many fellow human beings, whereas the latter directly helps much fewer 
people achieve justice. First, notice how easily we create obligations with this rationale. 
Second, if everything is translated into human rights, then it seems that human rights is 
not a moral value or moral reason, but an abstraction. This is a main problem to which, 
having reflected on the natural Justice Argument, we shall now turn.  
 
4.2.3.3. Identifying the crucial problems 
 
1. Abstraction (lack of specificity) of human rights 
 
The fundamental problem with the theory is that it underestimates the effect of the level 
of abstraction of human rights. Indeed, the theory contests to the fact that lack of 
specificity of human rights is an issue. It accurately calls it ‘Deep indeterminacy’.216 For 
example, there is consensus ‘as to the nature of the interests that the right against 
religious discrimination accords extraordinary protection to,’ but there is no consensus 
‘as to whether freedom of religious discrimination requires outlawing a state religion of 
the relatively benign form found, say, in Norway, or the prohibition of ‘Christian 
Businessmen’s’ organizations that give their members special opportunities for 
advantageous networking in the United States. We may all agree that no one should be 
																																																								





penalized for his religious affiliation, but on closer inspection we may disagree as to 
what counts as a penalty (as opposed to a mere lack of benefit).’ 
 
Indeterminacy also causes two cost problems.217 The first pertains to assigning priorities 
between different rights, given that resources are limited. For example, suppose that 
although the incidence and severity of torture are declining, further progress will be 
extremely difficult and very costly, whereas right to healthcare and right to freedom of 
expression have not shown such progress; “you have no rational principled way of 
deciding just when the marginal costs of continuing efforts against torture are too high, 
given that every additional dollar spent in the antitorture campaign could be spent in 
support of other human rights. You cannot locate such a unique rational trade-off point 
because you have no rational way of commensurating the evil of n cases of torture with 
n + m cases of interference with freedom of religion, etc.” 
 
Indeed, different emphasis on different interests would lead to different conceptions of 
human rights as a standard of legitimacy. Human rights protect values, and as long as 
there is plurality of values, tension between them will reveal different conceptions of 
protection. In the absence of an argument settling the dispute of whether more resources 
should be allocated to reduction of torture or increase of healthcare and freedom of 
expression, the human rights standard itself is rendered essentially contested.  
 
The second cost problem “would persist even if there were only one human right to be 
supported” as it concerns excessive demands.218 The theory correctly recognizes that 
both individual rights and rights of distributive justice are understood as implying not 
only negative but also positive obligations.219 “And the question will always remain: 
What costs are we obligated to bear to reduce violations of these rights?”220 This is 
where the language of obligations vs language of rights and perhaps a restrain on 
judicial activism (so that additional obligations are added through treaties, rather than 
courts themselves deciding at each point in time what obligations, not existing in the 
letter of the law, are implied in a right, thus essentially legislating), can be useful. If one 
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insists in the human rights narrative, however, then as the theory admits, “moral theory 
seems to yield no uniquely correct answer.”221  
 
2. Lingering from abstraction to legality 
 
The theory admits that the problem of deep indeterminacy is ‘not even soluble in 
principle’ but it can be ameliorated by proceduralist justice: democracy. If 
specifications of human rights are determined in a democratic order, the results are 
likely better. The stress here is on ‘likely’. Democracy does not guarantee good result; it 
guarantees participation. This is less nowadays than in Hellenic antiquity, where with 
direct democracy, voters exercised all three functions and literally ruled. Direct 
democracy has been substituted by indirect democracy, where voters choose, once every 
four years, their rulers. The theory is realistic, there is indeed no solution, only 
amelioration.  
 
The theory does not recognize, however, that this amelioration may be rendering human 
rights as a non-standard of legitimacy. First, from a purely empirical/descriptive 
standpoint, the procedural justice of democracy has led to gross violations of human 
rights. Adolph Hitler was democratically elected and his use of Article 48 of 
constitution of the Weimar Republic of Germany that allowed the President, under 
certain circumstances, to take emergency measures without the prior consent of the 
Reichstag, was as legal as the use of the same Article by previous presidents. It was also 
legitimate, if legitimacy is understood in a procedural conception, assuming the Nazi 
regime followed the established procedures. The courts interpreted the law, including 
human rights, in accordance with the positive law at the time, as established by the 
relevant procedures. Most German lawyers under the Weimar republic remained in 
office when the Nazis took over and remained in place after 1945 when the German 
Federal Republic was created. Similarly, judges in Nazi courts engaged in standard 
legal methodology and rules. As Professor Friedrich Roetter stated in 1945 “the acts of 
the Nazi regime were committed under law. The Nazis recognised the necessity of 
law.”222  Even though the goals of certain courts were to eliminate the Jews, the legal 
rules and methodology were consistent with widely accepted practices of law. When 
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judges had to decide whether or not an individual was a Jew by law, they applied the 
same interpretive techniques that are accepted worldwide. The Nazi regime was 
illegitimate on substantive grounds, of course, mainly extermination of Jews, 
homosexuals and gypsies, but it is exactly the substance which procedural justice leaves 
out. Similar violations of human rights took place in the soviet revolution against the 
tsar or Russia and the communist revolution in China after WWII. Revolutions 
overthrew the existing legal order and did not follow democratic procedures, yet they 
resulted to the same violations of human rights that procedural democratic justice did. 
The conclusion is obvious. Procedural justice does not determine good results. Second, 
regardless of empirical reality, conceptually speaking, procedure does not guarantee 
good substance. Human rights have content when specified. The content is not 
determined by the theory, but by a different criterion, which is procedural, not 
substantive. By surrendering the essence of the theory, i.e. the content of the human 
rights which are the standard of legitimacy, to procedure, the theory is essentially 
transformed from substantive to procedural, without much content. As stated in Chapter 
2 of this discussion, although there is conceptual room for a procedural conception of 
legitimacy, legitimacy is best understood as substantive, if it is to avoid being consumed 
by legality. The procedural criterion guarantees legality since procedure is established 
by law (in the context of the theory, constitutions establish democracy and relevant 
procedures). The procedural criterion is unable to guarantee good substance, acceptable 
content, (substantively) legitimate result. Therefore, legitimacy in a procedural 
conception can lead to illegitimacy in a substantive conception.  
 
If protecting human rights is about protecting the relevant interests/values (the well-
being of individuals etc), the focus must be on substance, not procedure. Interests/values 
are substance, not procedure. By surrendering specification of human rights to 
procedure, we shift the focus from interests/values/substance, to human rights 
language/narrative, which, itself, can lead to the most gross violations of what it deems 
to protect. There is no way out: the deep indeterminacy is insoluble. The democratic 
justice procedure is the only way of specification. Thus, the theory seems to oscillate 
from a procedural conception of legitimacy (essentially legality) which is thus unable to 
guarantee a substantively legitimate outcome, to a non-standard, which is what we are 






Therefore, although the theory does identify specification of human rights as its 
weakness, it does not seem to realize that this is detrimental to the theory itself, i.e. it is 
crucial for human rights to function as standard of legitimacy. In understanding rights as 
entailing certain obligations, the theory assumes that human rights are claim rights and 
that claim rights include liberties and correlative obligations223, that obligations are 
especially weighty,224 and that especially weighty obligations owed to persons manifest 
protection of interests.225 Although rights do indeed protect interests, the other claims 
are not entirely true as they may seem to be in first glance. I will analyse these claims 
one by one, starting from the last one.  
 
3. Rights, liberties, interests and obligations  
 
It is important to distinguish interests that rights protect, from the rights themselves. In 
the case of basic human rights, the interests are weighty. Indeed, these human rights 
being basic, fundamental, do not protect just any interests, but presumably only 
important interests. How are interests protected? The common answer is: rights. The 
interesting observation is that since rights ground duties, the answer could also be 
duties. It is important to observe that choosing to stipulate protections of interests in 
terms of rights instead of obligations is a choice of narrative. The interest of every 
human being to not be tortured can be protected by a power stipulated in a language of 
rights (People have the right to not be tortured / No one shall be subjected to torture) or 
by a power stipulated in a language of obligations (The government is obligated to not 
torture and protect people within its jurisdiction from torture). Indeed, this is exactly 
what differentiates rights from liberties: rights are claims, and thus correlative to duties.  
 
The theory is not entirely correct on the issue of human rights being claim rights and 
liberties. The theory makes two distinct claims: first, human rights are claim rights and 
second claim rights consist of liberties plus correlative obligations. The problem begins 
with the second claim, which is false. It is simply not true that claim right equals to 
liberty + correlative obligation. By contrast, it is clear from the Hohfeldian scheme that 
the following three premises are true. First, a right is either a claim right or a liberty. 
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Second, one cannot derive a liberty from a claim right or vice versa. Third, the 
correlative to a (claim) right is a duty whereas the correlative to a liberty is a no-right. 
For example, my (claim) right to compensation against A consists on the obligation of 
A to give me compensation. My liberty to pick up a pebble at the beach consists on the 
absence of anyone’s (claim) right to that pebble; if anyone had (claim) right to that 
pebble, I would have the obligation to not take it, so I would not have the liberty to take 
it.  
 
Furthermore, the theory seems to falsely assume that obligations are somehow 
consequences of the (claim) rights so it can be decided later what these obligations are. 
Although obligations per se may be unspecified, it is specified what obligation is 
entailed. For example, if you damage my car, my right to compensation per se does not 
specify the exact amount of money you owe me, but it does specify that you have the 
obligation to pay me compensation. The right to due process implies the obligation of 
no arbitrary treatment, even though what constitutes arbitrariness is unspecified. 
Duties/obligations are the other side of the coin of the right. That is to say, it is not the 
case that a right somehow causes an obligation, there is no ‘distance’ between the one 
and the other, nor is it the case that a right ‘includes’ an obligation. By contrast, to say 
that the obligation/duty is correlative to the (claim) right is to say that the one 
constitutes the other. A having a right against B is B having a correlative obligation to 
A and vice versa. Buchanan’s theory does not seem to understand what ‘correlative’ 
means. It regards rights as boxes/claim rights which include several ‘essential elements’ 
inside them, namely liberties and obligations, so it remains to be seen what exact 
obligations are entailed. The theory thus ignores the issue of what constitutes a right, i.e. 
a correlative obligation, by misconceiving claim rights as including both obligations and 
liberties.  
 
The theory thus assumes human rights to be both claim rights and general standards of 
behaviour (interests) at the same time. To the detriment of the theory, this a key-issue. If 
we fail to identify which obligation is correlative to each right, then we fail to explain 
how it is that human rights are rights. The issue becomes more complicated with social 
rights. Rights and standards of behaviour are two different things. B owing 
compensation to A means that A has the (claim) right of compensation against B. This 





on the interest, which is distinct from the right itself. For example, there is an interest in 
human beings to not be tortured. We can stipulate that in a general principle against 
torture. From this principle, one can derive a (claim) right of individuals that their 
governments protect them from torture. Notice that the language of obligations can be 
more helpful because the stipulation begins with the subject of the obligation: 
governments have the obligation to protect people in their jurisdiction from torture.  
 
Whether a stipulation is a principle/interest, or a right may not always be clear and may 
be a matter of interpretation. Certain human rights, such as the right to be treated with 
‘humanity’ and ‘dignity’ when deprived of liberty 226  are more obviously 
standards/principles that include several other rights within them, perhaps both claim 
rights and liberty rights, maybe even immunities as well. For example, from the general 
principle/interest to be treated with humanity and dignity, the following 
rights/obligations can be derived: the right of individuals (and correlative obligation of 
the government) to not be inappropriately touched during body search, the right to not 
be disrespected because of sex, gender, racial, ethnic or religious identity, etc. By 
contrast, other human rights are not principles/interests but indeed (claim) rights, such 
as the right to seek pardon.227  
 
A hypothetical example with a dose of oversimplification for the sake of the argument 
can illustrate the difference between interests and rights. As a human being, I have an 
interest in freedom of expression. I am indeed better off, as a human being, in 
expressing myself freely than not expressing myself. Suppose that in western societies, 
my freedom of expression is restricted because certain people in power decided that 
several words ought to be used and other words ought not to be used because certain 
other people may feel uncomfortable, and the number of groups in society regarded as 
sensitive is increasing, with corresponding restriction of freedom of expression. 
Suppose that by contrast, in Thailand, which at the moment of writing a military junta is 
in place, the only restriction of freedom of expression is prohibition of saying anything 
bad about the king and in overall, individuals enjoy more freedom of expression in 
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Thailand than in western societies. In terms of interests, the interest of freedom of 
expression is greater, or better served, or more satisfied, in Thailand, in this example, 
than in western societies. In terms of rights and duties, the comparison is different: in 
western societies I have the obligation to not say so many things, whereas in Thailand I 
have the merely obligation to not say anything bad about the king – in both western 
societies and Thailand, I have the right to express myself with any way that is not 
prohibited.  
 
The distinction between rights and interests is extremely important because it helps 
dissolve three interrelated myths, namely that ‘the more rights the better’, that human 
rights are by default the correct narrative, and that human rights have improved living 
standards. There seems to be a shared understanding, at least in the western world, that 
human rights are something good, valuable, desirable. China has obviously a different 
understanding on the issue since it stresses social rights rather than certain individual 
rights, such as the freedom of expression. However, let’s grant Buchanan the benefit of 
the doubt at this point and accept that the shared understanding underlying human rights 
has grown. The belief created is that since human rights are something good, ‘the more 
the better.’ There is a pressure that legal orders protect more human rights to a greater 
extent. First of all, this is entirely illogical in and of itself, for the simple reason that 
expanding one right often entails restricting other rights. Expanding the right of 
religious freedom, restricts right of freedom of expression and vice versa. If the right of 
freedom of expression extends to creating comics making fun of religious symbols, the 
right to religion is restricted to the extent that believers of that religion have to tolerate 
such a disrespectful act. If, on the other hand, the right to religion is expanded as 
including the claim right against religious symbols being offended by comics, then 
freedom of expression is restricted to the extent that individuals are not allowed to 
express their personality by drawing certain kinds of comics. Besides, Alexy’s work A 
Theory of Constitutional Rights famously argues that constitutional rights are principles 
and that principles are ‘optimisation requirements’.228  
 
Second, one must separate the human rights narrative from human rights themselves. 
Human rights narrative is a language we use, a rhetoric. But it is not the rhetoric per se 
																																																								





which satisfies interests. Suppose I give food to a poor child in an undeveloped country. 
Many would say that I have supported the child’s right to food. It seems to me that 
human rights language is not the best tool to describe the situation. What is true is that I 
have satisfied, to a certain extent, the interest the child has toward being fed. However, 
it is not at all obvious to me that I have supported the child’s right to food, simply 
because the right of the child to food is not targeted toward me. A right, literally 
speaking, is a claim right, not an interest. The correlative of a claim right is obligation. 
The child’s right to food may entail obligation to feed the child on behalf of his/her 
parents and probably the government, perhaps also of other bodies which assume the 
obligation to feed children in the area. The right does not entail any obligation to me. 
Therefore, by giving food what I am satisfying is the child’s ‘right’ to food in the sense 
of the child’s interest to food, not the child’s claim right to food. A sense in which I am 
supporting the child’s ‘right’ to food is reducible to satisfying the child’s interest in 
being fed.  
 
This distinction helps dissolve the third myth, which is that human rights have improved 
the human condition, the living standards around the world. Living standards, human 
conditions are an interest. How humanity goes about protecting that interest and what 
language is used is a different point. It is a mistake to think that world poverty has been 
reduced because of human rights. The truth is that world poverty has been reduced, 
though sadly not yet entirely eradicated, not because certain rights have always existed 
or at some point in time have been granted to all human beings, but mostly due to 
technology. For example, in Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, local extension services are 
delivering real-time weather data to vegetable farmers via SMS, and in West Africa, 
private companies such as Ignitia are expanding the accuracy and precision of SMS 
weather alerts to remote farmers.229 Entities such as these private companies which help 
farmers avoid destruction of their produce do not think in terms of human rights but in 
terms of interests: both the farmers and people who need food are better off if farmers’ 
produce is not destroyed, because the more food in the specific market, the lower the 
prices will be and thus it will be more accessible to the people in need. What helped 
women gain control over their bodily functions is not any right, but technology of 
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contraception. Note how this discussion is meaningful without any use of the human 
rights narrative. This discussion takes place in terms of interests and means which 
satisfy these interests. This is a discussion of descriptive claims, not rights.  
 
The distinction between rights and interests helps conclude the main point. This 
distinction manifests a crucial reason why human rights work as standard of legitimacy 
only when stipulated in terms of values/interests, disentangled from human rights 
narrative. The latter increases the abstraction of human rights rendering them as a non-
standard. Human rights then conflict with public interest, which is also worthy of 
protecting, and with each other. On the other hand, their lack of specificity when 
stipulated as interests/general principles/standards of behaviour instead of specific claim 
rights or liberties, makes it unclear to determine which claim rights and liberties are 
covered by each principle, which is ultimately determined by judicial interpretation. The 
problem is even greater with social rights, such as the right to resources for subsistence, 
as they consist merely on positive obligations, so the certainty of that negative 
obligation of non-interference implied in individual rights is non-existent. The problem 
then with human rights as standard of legitimacy is that the human rights narrative 
renders them as an abstraction with no specified obligations, whereas human rights as 
interests/values renders the standard as an essentially contested concept, because the 
values are incommensurable and there is no argument to determine which value has 
priority when they conflict. Human rights are indeed a primary goal international law 
ought to pursue, but not necessarily a standard of legitimacy. The way human rights can 
be incorporated in a substantive normative standard of legitimacy is either by 
establishing one value, or by establishing more than one values in hierarchical structure, 
and/or by setting specific obligations (language of obligations rather than language of 
rights?) in regard to extremes, such as obligation of states and global institutions to 
prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing, obligation of states to provide means of 
subsistence, obligation of states to refrain from arbitrary persecution, obligation of 
global law making institutions to punish states which commit certain wrongful acts etc. 
Having made the point regarding the essential contestability of human rights as standard 
of legitimacy and identified the crucial problems of the theory which lie at its core, I 







4.2.3.4. Recognitional (or international) legitimacy 
Based on the account of justice in the sense of protecting basic human rights, the theory 
builds a conception of recognitional (also called international legitimacy).230 The theory 
states that:  
 
The traditional criteria for recognitional legitimacy, formalized in the 
Montevideo Convention of 1933, are purely descriptive: An entity is 
entitled to recognition as a state if and only if it possesses (1) a permanent 
population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a functioning government able to 
control the territory in question, and (4) the capacity to enter into relations 
with other states on its own account (not merely as an agent of another 
state).231 
 
The theory continues to explain why recognition is desirable.232 Being recognised as a 
legitimate state confers unique disadvantages, i.e. doing what states do, such as being 
party to alliances and treatise with other states, relationships not ordinarily available to 
nonstate entities. ‘If an entity is recognized as a legitimate state, then at the very least 
other states are prohibited from taking its territory or interfering in its internal affairs 
and are also prohibited from aiding others in doing so.’ Finally, legitimate states are 
participants in the processes by which international law is made.  
 
The theory then goes on to state its claim in recognitional legitimacy: “The criteria for 
recognitional legitimacy of states I propose include (1) a minimal internal justice 
requirement, (2) a nonusurpation requirement, and (3) a minimal external justice 
requirement.”233 Requirement (1) refers to justice as explained above, i.e. protecting 
basic human rights, as a standard of legitimacy of states. With this conception of 
political legitimacy, a wielder of political power is morally justified in wielding 
political power “if and only if it (1) does a credible job of protecting at least the most 
basic human rights of all those over whom it wields power and (2) provides this 
protection through processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect the most 
basic human rights.”234 Requirement (2) refers to a criterion of statehood which is 
advanced by some as additional to the ones of the Montevideo Convention, namely that 
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in coming into being, an entity that claims to be a state must not have breached a (basic) 
rule of international law.235 Requirement (3) extends the human rights conception of 
legitimacy to cover that the states act in ways that affect others beyond their borders, 
“relying on the intuitively plausible idea that how they act externally matters as to 
whether they should be regarded as legitimate states.”236  
 
The word ‘minimal’ is not random. “This two-part (internal and external) justice 
requirement is called minimal to indicate that legitimacy does not require perfect or full 
justice, but rather a threshold approximation of justice, along with a credible 
commitment to progress toward greater justice.”237 This is compatible with a claim 
made previously in this discussion, namely that the theory makes a stronger argument 
the more loyal it remains to the short list of the specific basic human rights advanced, 
whereas the more the list expands and rights become broader, the more the theory 
begins to suffer from internal conflicts, is elevated in the ladder of abstraction and/or 
rendered as essentially contested. The theory does recognize that “if it is to provide 
useful guidance for practice,” it “should not be so utopian as to be self-defeating.”238 
However, by ‘self-defeating, the theory does not refer to the crucial problems as 
explained above in this discussion, but to the fact that if the conception of recognitional 
legitimacy consisted on justice standards that “were so stringent as to imply that even 
the most admirable existing states are illegitimate would not likely be taken seriously in 
the world of action, even as aspiration.”239 
 
The theory offers two justifications regarding the internal and external justice 
requirements.240 The first is nonconsequentialist (‘rights-based’). It takes as a premise 
the obligation not to be an accomplice in serious injustice. Indeed, if international law 
recognized as legitimate states entities that were not internally politically legitimate, i.e. 
that did not respect the basic human rights of those within their borders, it would 
thereby confer legitimacy on entities that are not morally justified in wielding political 
power. ‘In other words, recognition supports and enhances the ability of an entity that is 
awarded this status to wield political power’ within its territory. The same holds true for 
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the external justice requirement. The second argument is teleological. Recognition, as 
institutional practice, provides incentives for behaviour. If advantages of recognition are 
awarded only to entities which respect human rights in and out of their territory, there 
will be incentives to do so. 
 
There are two criticisms for this part of the theory. First, ironically enough, perhaps due 
to lack of adequate understanding of public international law, the theory ends up 
conflating legal validity with legitimacy. The criteria of the Montevideo Convention are 
indeed descriptive. The theory does not seem to fully understand why. The reason is 
because the creation of a state, is a socio-political process. Therefore, whether an entity 
is a state or not can only depend on the existence of descriptive criteria, facts. The 
criteria of the Montevideo Convention simply describe what exists. Even if the 
convention had never existed, it would still be the case that these four descriptive 
criteria are the necessary and sufficient conditions of statehood, regardless of whether 
one would have to resort to custom as source of international law rather than treaty in 
order to identify them. The criteria explain when, as a matter of fact, an entity becomes 
a state, i.e. obtains legal personality as a subject of international law. Apart from 
population, territory and government with effective control, the entity, in order to be a 
state, must have the capacity to enter into relations with other states as a state. Then, 
and only then, an entity becomes a state. 
 
However, an entity becoming a state does not entail that the state is legitimate, 
especially if it is the case that the conception of legitimacy deployed is the one of 
human rights. Just like many states may be failing that standard and thus be illegitimate, 
such as China which violates fundamental human rights, they remain sovereign states, 
as opposed to de facto regimes, which are non-state entities. As explained in a previous 
part of the discussion, legal validity and legitimacy are distinct. Therefore, it is wrong to 
present the criteria of the Montevideo Convention as criteria of international legitimacy; 
they are criteria of statehood. They are criteria which determine when an entity becomes 
a state. They pertain to legal validity, not legitimacy.  
 
The theory, and this is the second criticism, conflates the criteria of statehood with 
conditions of recognition. Requirements for recognition of an entity as a state (the 





thus fixed, they do not vary from state to state; by contrast, requirements for recognition 
of a state are preconditions for entering into optional or discretionary relations with a 
state (the conditions for recognition) and can vary from state to state.241 The first is a 
matter of (public international) law. The latter is a matter of morality and politics. 
Although states often decide whether to recognize a state as such on political reasons - 
e.g. Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, which is a state, as a state, but 
recognizes the illegal de facto Turkish regime at the illegally occupied part of Cyprus, 
even though it has been recognized as illegal by international law - we are allowed to 
believe that morality becomes increasingly relevant, at least in instances where political 
interests do not stand in the way. The theory correctly maintains that the three additional 
criteria (internal/external justice and nonusurpation), are criteria which the states ought 
to consider when deciding whether to recognize an entity as a state, and this is a moral 
deliberation and decision. In the very words of the theory: “for any state or group of 
states to determine its relationships with other entities in accordance with the existing 
criteria for recognition is to take a moral position; to oppose the existing criteria is also 
to take a moral position.”242 Therefore, the theory does not refer to criteria of statehood 
like the Montevideo Convention, but to conditions for recognition. It conflates two 
distinct issues, namely when an entity becomes a state on the one hand, with when 
states choose to recognize an entity as a state on the other. Since the criteria the theory 
lays down include the standard of legitimacy, the theory is correct to the extent that it 
refers to recognition of legitimate states. It is not correct to the extent that it treats these 
criteria as criteria of statehood instead of conditions of recognition. The theory is a good 
advice for governments, not an amendment of the law. 
 
Buchanan is most certainly not alone in establishing morally relevant conditions of 
recognition. 243 Examples are plentiful: the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’ adopted by the EU Member States’ 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs on the 16th December 1991 make recognition dependent 
on fulfilment of rule of law, democracy, human rights, guarantee of minority rights, 
respect for the inviolability of existing boundaries, acceptance of all relevant 
commitments with regards to disbarment, and recourse to arbitration. The United States 
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had made a similar declaration during the same year and Japan prepared such guidelines 
for recognition.  
 
Admittedly, criteria of statehood and conditions of recognition are conflated if one 
blindly follows the constitutive theory of recognition, which is, however, abandoned 
and for good reasons. According to the constitutive theory, only recognition makes a 
state a state, and thus subject of international law.244 As Oppenheim put it: ‘A state is, 
and becomes, an International Person through recognition only and exclusively.’ 
Therefore, recognition is a matter within states’ discretion. The constitutive theory is 
correctly characterized nowadays as an expression of an outdated view of international 
law as a purely consensual system, where legal relations can only arise with the consent 
of those concerned. ‘From this point of view, fulfilling the conditions for statehood 
alone does not suffice to render an entity a subject of international law, thus leaving the 
non-recognized State without rights and obligations vis-à-vis the non-recognizing 
States; in other words, international law does not apply between them.’ Indeed, the most 
compelling argument against the constitutive theory is that it leads to a relativity of the 
state as subject of international law. This is because what one state may consider to be a 
state may, for another, be a non-entity under international law. However, states are 
natural-born, i.e. absolute, subjects of international law and are not relative subjects of 
international law created by existing states as, for example, international organizations. 
Indeed, the idea of one state deciding upon another State’s personality in international 
law is at odds with the fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of States. 
Furthermore, the constitutive theory is incapable of explaining the responsibility of non-
recognized states under international law. Not being subjects of international law, they 
are not only without rights in international law, but are also free from all international 
legal obligations. How, then, was it possible for the international community to ascribe 
responsibility to Rhodesia for acts of aggression, or other violations of international 
law, if it did not exist as a subject of international law? If the non-recognized State can 
violate international law, it must also (at least partially) be a subject of that law.245  
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Finally, Hersch Lauterpracht attempted to soften the negative consequences of the 
constitutive theory but he was, unsurprisingly, unsuccessful. He assumed that an 
obligation of recognition arises once the conditions for statehood have been met. 
However, and here Talmon brings us back to the point made three paragraphs above, 
“state practice shows that such an obligation does not exist, and that recognition is 
instead treated as a question of political and economic expediency.” It is exactly these 
political considerations of recognition that Buchanan wants to moralize; he does not 
seem to realize, however, that an argument on conditions of recognition does not get 
you to the conditions of statehood. It would be a paradox, rather say an obvious 
contradiction, if an illegitimate state, due to it having permanent population, defined 
territory, functioning and effective government and capacity to enter into treaties with 
other states as a state, would find Buchanan’s theory insisting that it is not a state 
because it violates human rights. It would obviously be an illegitimate state, just as 
obviously as it would be a state.  
 
Indeed, “The now predominant view in the literature is that recognition merely 
establishes, confirms or provides evidence of the objective legal situation, that is, the 
existence of a state.”246 There may be disagreements between states about whether an 
entity is a state, typically due to political reasons, but the fact that the issue is 
contentious is merely the result of the absence of an authority deciding on the question 
of statehood, its determination being binding for all, which is a problem of international 
law in general; ‘it does not mean that all states’ views are equally correct and that 
consequently, in applying the constitutive theory, the question of statehood is answered 
by looking to the views of individual States.’247 Talmon is correct to conclude that ‘the 
international legal personality of a State and its concomitant rights and obligations 
solely depend on it being able to satisfy the criteria for statehood.’248 Indeed, the 
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declarative theory is well supported by treaties, declarations of states and especially 
jurisprudence.249 
 
Therefore, Buchanan’s theory on international legitimacy needs to be presented 
differently. This standard of human rights and nonusurpation is normative, not 
descriptive and it is a conception of legitimacy of (already existing) states, not condition 
of legality/statehood. It is a set of considerations that states ought to consider when 
making the political/moral decision to enter into optional or discretionary relations with 
a state. The theory does not pertain to statehood, but to legitimacy. 
 
To complete this part of the discussion, it ought to be mentioned that the theory makes a 
claim regarding the legitimacy not of states, but of the international legal system. The 
theory maintains that like any system for the exercise of political power, the 
international legal system ought to be democratic, but should not be equated with 
increasing state majoritarianism in the workings of the system. The most serious 
‘democratic deficit’ is not that states are unequal, but that some people, a technocratic 
elite, are not democratically accountable to individuals and non-state groups, yet they 
play an increasingly powerful rile in a system or regional and global governance. 
 
Finally, the theory makes certain suggestions for reform. In particular, the theory 
applies the conception of legitimacy as justice in the sense of protecting human rights in 
secession and self-determination and maintains that international law should recognize a 
remedial right to secede but not a general right to self-determination. Although it is 
important that these suggestions have been mentioned for purposes of completion of 
presentation, they will not be discussed because they do not help us see legitimacy as an 
essentially contested concept.  
 
4.3. The Heart of Human Rights and the Metacoordination view 
In his latter book, The Heart of Human Rights,250 which will be discussed only briefly 
here, Buchanan slightly changes his views. The goal of the book is to set a framework 
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that justifies the international human rights system. He argues that despite moral 
criticisms, there are good reasons to support the system on moral grounds and good 
reasons for all states to participate in it. Buchanan draws a sharp distinction between 
moral and legal rights and rejects the Mirroring view, i.e. the belief that justifying an 
international legal human right typically involves defending the claim that a 
corresponding moral human right exists.251 Buchanan maintains that like legal rights 
generally, international legal human rights need not be legal embodiments of 
corresponding moral rights and they can be justified by appealing to a variety of moral 
considerations. As mentioned previously in this discussion, Buchanan makes two 
important claims regarding human rights that make this view differ from the view we 
discussed: that either it is the case that there are moral economic and social rights, or 
economic and social rights are only legal, but in the right sort of legal system, they have 
moral force. In any case, and that is the second claim, states have moral obligation to 
provide legal positive rights, a category of which is the social and economic rights. 
Failing to do so counts against their being legitimate.  
In this book, Buchanan makes a departure from his view on legitimacy which we 
examined, since human rights are not the (fixed) normative standard of legitimacy. He 
presents what he calls the Metacoordination view, i.e. that legitimacy assessments are 
best construed as the focus of a social practice. The object of this social practice is to 
achieve consensus on the question of whether we should accord to an institution the sort 
of standing that is generally required for it to perform its distinctive functions without 
undue costs. The Metacoordination view is not a normative standard of legitimacy, but a 
way to find such a standard, it is a heuristic method. This is a different question than the 
one addressed in this discussion which pertains to normative conception/standard, 
which is why this view is not explored in this discussion.  
However, and this is worth mentioning, the view advanced in this discussion regarding 
legitimacy as an essentially contested concept seems to be compatible with Buchanan’s 
Metacoordination view. Since institutions vary in nature, the Metacoordination view 
“casts doubt on the possibility of developing a substantive, action-guiding theory of 
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legitimacy that would cover all the different sorts of institutions to which this very 
general concept can be applied.”252 This claim well fits with the understanding of 
legitimacy in this discussion, more specifically with the fact that detached from its 
individual conceptions, legitimacy as a concept has no content other than it being a 
moral power. Here, Applbaum can complement Buchanan.  “This account of the general 
concept does not itself specify criteria of legitimacy, much less standards of legitimacy. 
Indeed, it explains why we should reject the assumption that we should expect an 
analysis of the concept of legitimacy to yield any determinate criterion of legitimacy, 
much less a single criterion that is applicable to all institutions.”253 Thus, the view is 
compatible with legitimacy being an essentially contested concept: in the absence of 
fixed/determined criteria of legitimacy, it is possible, not only that different institutions 
will have different standards of legitimacy, but also that there may be equally well 
argued and evidenced standards/conceptions of legitimacy for the same institution. 
Although the former is most certainly much more likely than the latter, the latter cannot 
be logically excluded at least as a possibility. Therefore, even though the 
Metacoordination view does not assume or entail legitimacy as an essentially contested 
concept, the two are definitely compatible. Finally, there is another point of contact 
between them: just like the Metacoordination view is sensitive to facts, i.e. it provides 
‘guidance for developing criteria of legitimacy in the light of the facts about particular 
institutions and their functions,’254 as explained in the last part of Chapter 3 of this 
discussion, the standard of legitimacy may sometimes depend on facts and is not 
fixed/determined in advance. In particular, I had presented the example of the UK 
referendum, claiming that it can be regarded as illegitimate because of a conception of 
legitimacy consisting not on a determined/fixed factor, such as democratic procedures 
being followed, voters being free in law and in fact to express their will, etc., but based 
on a fact of the specific instance, namely the fact that the referendum consisted of a 
binary question, of which only one answer was known to the voters (remain in the EU). 
This fact gives rise to conception of legitimacy of the referendum in this instance.  
																																																								










Note that this is accommodated by seeing legitimacy in the trichotomy as explained in 
the beginning. Since legitimacy is, at its most abstract form (Tier 1), a vague standard of 
appropriateness, by claiming that an object of legitimacy (here referendum) is legitimate 
or illegitimate, we are claiming a specification of that appropriateness or 
inappropriateness. If one sees legitimacy in this trichotomy, legitimacy is always 
understood as specification of appropriateness and this allows for sensitivity to the 
facts. The referendum is ‘inappropriate’ if voters are not aware of both answers to the 
binary question. By contrast, if one understands legitimacy outside the trichotomy, i.e. 
if one ignores legitimacy as a concept at its most abstract form, then one is assuming, 
consciously or not, some conception of legitimacy, ignoring the fact that legitimacy is a 
specification of appropriateness and more easily falls in the trap of assuming that the 
conception of legitimacy is determined by fixed criteria/conditions. This may 
sometimes be the case, depending on the object of legitimacy, but it is not necessarily 
the case.  
 
4.4. The Thin Justice of International Law and the Twin-Pillar System 
Before I end this chapter, I will briefly discuss Steven Ratner’s conception of legitimacy 
as presented in his book The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of 
the Law of Nations.255 In short, Ratner’s conception is justice, which comprises of peace 
and human rights. Indeed, the book analyses the international legal order from its 
contribution to global justice. It argues that although the core norms of international law 
came about as a result of political compromises, power politics, and historical 
contingencies, they “conform in major respects to a standard of global justice deserving 
of the name.”256 He sees global justice as a process or outcome that assigns rights and 
duties to global actors so that it is clear what each such actor is entitled or required to do 
or have. If international legal norms assign those rights and duties in a way that meets a 
substantive standard of justice, then they are just, or else they are unjust. Ratner calls 
this standard ‘thin’ justice, under which he assesses justice of international law norms in 
terms of two principles or ‘pillars,’ namely their advancement of international and 
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intrastate peace and their respect for basic human rights. To pass the test, an 
international legal norm must satisfy both conditions. They are both necessary and 
sufficient conditions of justice. In other words, international legal rules are just if and 
only if they advance international and intrastate peace and also respect, in the sense of 
not interfering with, basic human rights.257 This is Ratner’s conception of justice. 
 
The writer makes two more claims. He accepts that in some important areas, those core 
norms do not, or might not, meet that standard because they do not reflect the right 
considerations under those two pillars, so those norms are, at least if interpreted in a 
certain way by decisionmakers, currently unjust.258 Indeed, although he finds most 
fundamental legal norms fully just, he does not regard international trade and 
investment law fully just, partly because law in these areas is not developed enough yet 
so as to be measurable toward this standard 259 . Also, Ratner finds the ban of 
humanitarian intervention without UNSC authorization unjust. Finally, like Buchanan, 
he concludes with proposals for reforms, which must consider his account of justice in 
the norms at present, and more broadly the ethical ramifications of choices for new 
norms.260 
 
Given the discussion so far, it is easy to see how Ratner’s legitimacy, of international 
law is an essentially contested concept: justice. Think how many well argued 
conceptions of ‘justice’ one could present, without an independent argument solving the 
dispute between them. As we have seen, justice is understood only as human rights and, 
in some cases, opposing peace (see ‘Peace or Justice?’ above when discussing 
Buchanan’s justice as human rights view), as the latter includes unjust status quo, 
assuming it means merely absence of war. Furthermore, what is the argument solving 
the dispute about whether human rights as part of justice consists of not interfering with 
human rights (Ratner), or a ‘thick’ standard of protecting human rights, as per 
Buchanan? (How ‘thin’ or ‘think’ must the conception of justice be?) Absence of such 
an argument renders justice, and with that legitimacy, an essentially contested concept. 
Also, as we shall soon see, there could be conceptions of justice which do not pertain to 
human rights, given that the object of legitimacy here is international law.  
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How did Ratner commit to this conception of justice and what consequences does this 
have? Ratner finds his conception of justice from the law itself, just where he also finds 
peace (not only more intuitive, but also in the UN Charter). The obvious reflection 
anyone would have towards a theory that finds a standard from within law itself and 
then applies it back to the law is circularity. The theory “develops and applies a 
standard of justice in a way that takes account of core realities of international politics 
and the global system.”261 Indeed, Ratner ‘presents the standard of justice not as a fruit 
of his own intellectual enterprise but rather as something discovered within the legal 
material itself and then applies this standard to the legal material.262  
 
Such arguments are susceptible to two criticisms, as Kletzer rightly continues. First, 
“even if we accept that there is some standard inherent in the law, why should we label 
this standard one of justice, and not, say, one of effectiveness.”263 Indeed, how much 
justice is needed to satisfy the justice standard of this conception of legitimacy? As 
Kelsen correctly observed, the principle ‘ex injuria jus non oritur’ (‘a right cannot 
originate from an illegal act’) does not apply in international law.264 Therefore, a state 
invading, occupying and incorporating another state in its own territory – usurpation – 
is illegal but time can legalize this illegality by legalizing its results as the invading state 
has incorporated that territory in its effective and thus valid legal order. European states, 
having satisfied the four conditions of the Montevideo Convention, have been created 
after series of such illegalities. What resulted from such illegal acts is a number of 
(legal) states. Suppose that the invading state was not liberating occupied areas, but 
simply taking foreign land. This is, apart from illegal, also unjust, yet the passing of 
time legalizes the result of it as it establishes a legal order. Since in international law 
injustice creates law, international law is, to that extent, unjust. Note that law arising 
from injustice is not an international legal norm amenable to change. It is intrinsic to the 
very nature of international law; it is a truism inherent in international law. So how 
much justice must international law ‘have’ (e.g. by protecting human rights) in order to 
be rendered as just? How must injustice (e.g. lands unjustly taken by invading states) in 
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international law must be accepted before it is labelled ‘unjust’? What is the threshold 
in each answer? Which conception of justice overrides the other? All these questions 
invite equally well argued answers/conceptions and in the absence of an independent 
argument to resolve the dispute between them, legitimacy of international law is 
rendered an essentially contested concept. One could further wonder, and that is the 
second criticism, whether the standard of justice ‘is a good standard, i.e. whether it is a 
standard of justice well understood and not one of justice misunderstood, whether it is a 
standard of true justice and not merely one of positive justice.265 
 
Ratner claims to avoid circularity but he is not successful. “We can, without being 
circular, find justice in international law by applying a philosophical conception to legal 
norms, but also see the corpus of international law as saying something about what is 
just in the first place.”266 Kletzer rightly identifies the crucial word being ‘also’ and 
makes a correct observation.267 There are two tasks here. The one starts from a 
philosophic conception of justice and then applied to international law, whereas the 
other starts from international law and then applied to philosophy, telling us what is just 
in the first place. These two tasks avoid forming a circle only if disconnected. However, 
this disconnect is possible, Kletzer continues, “only if the ‘justice’ in the first task is a 
different justice than the ‘justice’ in the second task. We thus cannot avoid circularity 
or, put differently, we can only avoid circularity if we accept a hidden equivocation of 
the central term ‘justice’, which seems worse than, or at least as bad as, circularity.”268 
Indeed, since Ratner evaluates the law with a standard inherent in the law, the argument 
is bound to be circular. 
 
As we have seen, apart from being circular, Ratner’s conception of justice also renders 
legitimacy of international law an essentially contested concept. In the end, there is no 
answer to the question of how ‘thin’ or ‘thick the standard of justice ought to be. This is 
a consequence of justice being an essentially contested concept: the content of the 
concept does not determine the level of ‘thickness’ or ‘thinness’ because this is exactly 
what different conceptions do. Ratner choose the level of ‘thinness/thickness’ already 
existing in (most of) international law. Hence the circularity. One could only wonder 
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how meaningful and/or useful a conception of legitimacy is when the level/threshold of 
justice chosen is the one inherent in the law at its current state, thus predetermining the 
outcome. In any case, there can be several well argued conceptions of different level of 
‘thinness/thickness’ of justice, both in terms of human rights and also with different 
kinds of conceptions (it could be argued that international law with no central 
enforcement mechanisms to prevent and/or punish wars of aggression is unjust because 
of law arising from injustice) and with no independent argument solving the dispute 
between competing conceptions, legitimacy of international law is an essentially 
contested concept. Indeed, the analysis seems to suggest that in order for legitimacy to 
be a meaningful and helpful concept for moral reflection and deliberation, it ought to 
pose value or interest, thus avoiding essential contestability. Before any further general 
reflections on legitimacy arising from the analysis of this discussion, let’s sum up what 
has been discussed in this chapter.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Having illustrated in the previous chapter how legitimacy can be an essentially 
contested concept, in this chapter, I have explained how it is that, given the advanced 
conceptions, the concept of legitimacy of international law is an essentially contested 
concept. I chose to discuss Buchanan’s conception of legitimacy, i.e. justice in the sense 
of protecting basic human rights, because, as the analysis has shown, discussion on 
justice in the sense of human rights helps us see legitimacy as an essentially contested 
concept.  
 
The analysis of Buchanan’s standard of legitimacy, justice in the sense of protecting 
human rights, heavily relied on two interrelated distinctions, namely the distinction 
between rights and the interests the rights protect on the one hand, and on the other hand 
the distinction between rights-principles and rights in their true sense, i.e. claim rights. 
The distinction between rights and interests relates to the contrast between the human 
rights rhetoric and the interests that human rights protect. It is not the case that 
recognizing rights necessarily better serves the interests the rights deem to protect 
(though it may often be so, especially in the past). Other factors, such as technology, 
may have served certain interests more than recognition of certain rights. Recognition of 





specifying obligations protects interests better. The human rights narrative/rhetoric 
typically pertains to human rights principles. Most human rights stipulated in the 
ICCPR and ICESCR are rights principles, which explains why they include several 
rights and liberties. Courts, through interpretation, do exactly this: they decide which 
rights and liberties are included in each right-principle, thus expanding or restricting the 
scope of each right-principle. This distinction is extremely important in terms of 
rendering legitimacy an essentially contested concept, as we shall soon see again.  
 
Two ways with which legitimacy can be an essentially contested concept is by essential 
contestability lying within the conception of legitimacy (here justice in the sense of 
human rights, which is itself an essentially contested concept) on the one hand, and 
between different conceptions of legitimacy on the other.  
 
With Buchanan’s conception of legitimacy, we first explored the former. Justice, the 
standard of legitimacy as per Buchanan, is itself an essentially contested concept. One 
conception of justice is protecting individual human rights, whereas the other is 
Aristotle’s ‘giving each what is due’, in a higher level of abstraction. The discussion has 
shown how it is that justice in the sense of protecting human rights is not rendered as an 
essentially contested concept by individual and distributive rights as competing 
conceptions, because they are not different conceptions of the same concept, justice, but 
they refer to different concepts; individual rights refer to justice between individuals 
whereas distributive rights to distributions. The only way for these two concepts to 
serve as categories of justice is to elevate justice higher in the level of abstraction and 
understand justice in the Aristotelian sense mentioned above, namely ‘giving each what 
is due.’ Thus, justice in the sense of basic human rights (rectificatory justice) applies to 
relationships between individuals, whereas justice in the sense of distributions applies to 
relationships between individuals and the state. ‘Giving each what is due’ and justice as 
protecting human rights, two conceptions of justice which lie at different levels of 
abstraction, is a way with which justice has been shown to be an essentially contested 
concept in this conversation.  
 
We did see later, however, how then latter conception of justice, namely justice in the 
sense of protecting human rights, is itself an essentially contested concept. Due to their 





principles are unclear as to which specific (claim) rights with their correlative 
obligations, and which liberties they include under their scope (importance of this 
distinction mentioned above). This allows for courts to expand or reduce the scope of 
opposing rights principles, making a political choice as to which right to stress or value 
more. Stress on different opposing rights, e.g. freedom of religion or freedom of speech, 
would thus render ‘justice as protecting human rights’ essentially contested. There is no 
argument to settle whether it is better for freedom of religion to take priority over 
freedom of speech (thus comics of religious entities are impermissible) or if freedom of 
speech should take priority over freedom of religion (thus comics of religious entities 
are permitted).  
 
Towards the end of the chapter, we discussed a third conception of justice, namely 
Ratner’s twin-pillar standard/conception of justice, comprising of advancing peace and 
not violating human rights. In the absence of an independent argument solving the 
dispute between such competing conceptions – justice in the sense of ‘giving each what 
is due’, justice in the sense of protecting human rights (Buchanan), and justice in the 
sense of advancing peace and not violating human rights (Ratner) - justice is an 
essentially contested concept, and consequently so is legitimacy, of which justice is its 
standard/conception.  
 
Aside from the essential contestability within the advanced conception of legitimacy, 
i.e. within the concept of justice which is, in the aforementioned theories, the standard 
of legitimacy, legitimacy is rendered an essentially contested concept also from outside 
of the conception of legitimacy, i.e. essential contestability external to justice, between 
competing conceptions of legitimacy. For example, while one conception of legitimacy 
of international law may pertain to human rights, another conception could plausibly be 
peace/stability. One could make a case for uti possidetis or pacta sunt servanda. The 
analysis suggests that a single value, such as peace/stability, or an interest, may be more 
appropriate as standards of legitimacy because they are not essentially contested as the 
concept of justice and the standard consisting of one component avoids internal tensions 
within the standard and consequently legitimacy.  
 
Unless legitimacy of international legal institutions (Buchanan by ‘international law’ 





international law can be as legitimate for what it does as illegitimate for what it permits. 
If it is legitimate because it does ‘the best it can’, legitimacy depends on the definition 
of ‘can’. If by ‘can’ we mean what could be done with the means available, then 
international law is illegitimate because states, through the UN, could have created an 
independent body responsible for authorizing military interventions to prevent states 
and international organizations from doing so on their own accord without 
authorization. But states and the UN have not created such a body, thus allowing for 
injustices. By the same token, international law is illegitimate to the extent that the UN 
does not have the legal competence or the military capability to use military force to 
prevent illegal attacks and invasions, or force such armies to leave invaded territory 
after they have attacked or invaded. It is entirely possible for states and the UN to have 
so, in the sense that it is humanly possible. Illegitimacy of the international legal 
institutions consists on the fact that they can do so but they have not done so, allowing 
for injustices to take place. If by ‘can’ we mean what is realistically possible, then 
international law is probably legitimate, considering that it is nearly impossible for the 
UN to establish such a solution to prevent injustices, given the opposing political 
interests among states and inability of the UN to both (physically) oblige and (legally) 
obligate to do so. In the absence of an independent argument solving the dispute 
between such different conceptions, legitimacy of international law is rendered again an 
essentially contested concept. More general reflections on legitimacy belong, however, 










5.1. Summary of the Discussion  
The aim of this discussion was not to construct a conception of legitimacy, but, and this 
is the original contribution to knowledge, to perform a conceptual analysis of 
legitimacy, i.e. analyse the concept of legitimacy per se detached from its conceptions, 
explain how it is that legitimacy can properly only be conceptualised in a trichotomy 
and argue that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept.  
 
It is important to understand the conclusion of the argument. The claim does not imply 
that legitimacy is always essentially contested. There are obviously instances of 
legitimacy, both relevant and irrelevant to law, where legitimacy is not an essentially 
contested concept. An example of the latter is ‘legitimate daughter,’ where legitimacy 
has only one conception, so only one meaning. An example where legitimacy in the 
context of law is not an essentially contested concept is ‘legitimate self-defence.’ Given 
the nature of the objects of legitimacy in these two instances, there is only one 
conception of legitimacy for each object. What the claim that legitimacy is an 
essentially contested concept means is that it is in the nature of the concept to lend itself 
to one or more conceptions, so there are bound to be (some) instances where not only 
one, but several conceptions are equally well argued and evidenced, and in the absence 
of an independent argument solving the dispute between competing concepts, 
legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, because it is not the case that one of the 
conceptions is correct and the others are wrong. In which cases legitimacy is an 
essentially contested concept depends on the object the concept is attached on and/or 
facts. Because legitimacy is an open-ended concept, i.e. it does not have a specified 
content/meaning other than a vague notion of properness, it lends itself to conceptions 
which procure meaning to the concept by specifying the notion of properness.  
 
The vague notion of properness on the one hand and the substantive conceptions on the 
other which procure content to the concept entail that trichotomy (we can imagine a 





pyramid (Tier 1), legitimacy at its most abstract form is nothing but a vague notion of 
properness, at the next tier below (Tier 2), legitimacy is matched with objects and at the 
final tier, Tier 3, conceptions fully specify the concept by stating the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the concept to obtain. If in Tier 2 legitimacy is matched with an 
object which renders the concept of legitimacy fully specified and not contested because 
there is only one correct conception, then Tier 3 will consist of that conception. If the 
object legitimacy is matched with renders legitimacy essentially contested, then Tier 2 
will include the object, and Tier 3 will consist of all the equally well agued and 
evidenced conceptions. This conceptual framework helps us correctly understand 
legitimacy.  
 
Conceptual analysis of legitimacy in its legally relevant form, i.e. legitimacy when 
matched with objects which belong in any of the four object types of legal form 
(individual laws, actions, actors, legal systems) yielded interesting results. First, we 
made it abundantly clear that this discussion pertains exclusively to normative, not 
descriptive (or sociological or perceived) legitimacy, that these are two different 
concepts and that there is no logical connection between them. As a matter of 
conceptual analysis, none of the two is a necessary or sufficient condition of the other. 
Any logical connection between the two would have to be established by a particular 
conception of legitimacy (Tier 3), specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
legitimacy to obtain. Second, we concluded that in order to discuss normative 
legitimacy, nihilism, the view that there are no objective moral facts, has to be refuted. 
We did not attempt to disprove the negative thesis of nihilism. For the purposes of the 
argument in this discussion, it sufficed to conclude that none of the three nihilist 
theories mentioned (error theory, individual and cultural relativism) can be held 
consistently with normative legitimacy, because either there are, or there are no 
objective moral facts. Normative legitimacy, implying at least some objective morality, 
entails that it is at least partly substantive and not entirely procedural. We explained 
how it is that although as a matter of conceptual analysis an entirely procedural 
conception of legitimacy is (conceptually) possible, it would be highly problematic as it 
would commit itself to substantively inappropriate results stemming from obedience to 
procedure alone, and an argument for such a conception may not even be able to get off 
the ground, since absence of substance and reliance on procedure would lapse 





right were presented and rejected, and then the thesis explained, as per Applbaum, how 
it is that legitimacy is a moral power.  
 
In the next step of the analysis, we discussed the relation of legitimacy with 
neighbouring concepts on the one hand, and with conceptions on the other. We proved 
how it is that, assuming legal positivism, the so called ‘legal legitimacy’ is a non-
concept, as it lapses into legal validity, whereas natural law cannot make a case for such 
a concept either. Then, we analysed the neighbouring concept of legitimacy, namely 
authority and explained the relationship between the two concepts. The thesis proceeded 
to essentially contested concepts, as per Gallie, and then briefly explored how the 
concept vs conception distinction was entertained by Hart, Rawls and Dworkin. We 
then illustrated how it is that legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, which is the 
thesis, the main claim of the argument, and the main contribution of this discussion to 
knowledge. What the normative standard of legitimacy is depends on the object of 
legitimacy and the context, the circumstances. We explained how it is that in many 
instances, the vague standard of properness, which is the minimal content of legitimacy, 
is specified not by a priori fixed criteria, but in the light of circumstances which may 
give rise to different conceptions of legitimacy. Also, we referred to instances of 
legitimacy where the conception itself is essentially contested, such as the conception of 
democracy in political legitimacy. With the only permanent content of the concept of 
legitimacy, i.e. content of the concept detached from any normative conceptions, being 
a vague standard of properness, the concept of legitimacy is inevitably open ended, 
content-neutral and lends itself to different standards/conceptions which specify that 
standard of properness. Without an argument to solve the dispute between equally 
reasonable and well-argued competing conceptions, legitimacy is an essentially 
contested concept. 
 
Having completed the conceptual analysis in Tiers 1 and 2, we proceeded to Tier 3, the 
level of conceptions. The conception of legitimacy we analysed is legitimacy of 
international law in the sense of justice as protecting basic human rights, because it is a 
prevalent conception and mostly because this conception helps us see legitimacy as 
essentially contested in at least two ways. First, essential contestability lies within the 
conception of legitimacy (here, justice) on the one hand, and between different 





and consequently legitimacy, is an essentially contested concept with one conception 
being protection of individual rights and the other conception being Aristotle’s ‘giving 
each what is due’, at a higher level of abstraction. The second way with which 
legitimacy of international law is an essentially contested concept is by there being 
equally well argued conceptions with no independent argument to solve the dispute 
between them. Here the essential contestability lies outside justice, i.e. outside the 
conception of legitimacy. Conceptions of legitimacy of international law which render 
the concept essentially contested is justice in the sense of protecting basic human rights, 
Ratner’s twin pillar standard of advancing peace and respecting, in the sense of not 
violating, human rights, stability, etc. 
 
5.2. Reflections  
What is the difference, if any, between the standards including human rights on the one 
hand and stability on the other? Apart from justice itself being an essentially contested 
concept (individual rights vs Aristotle’s ‘giving each what is due’), human rights, we 
concluded, is also an essentially contested concept. This is due to the combination of 
their plurality (many rights) with their high level of abstraction. As explained in the last 
chapter, many human rights stipulated in international instruments are not claim rights, 
but human rights principles which include several claim rights and liberty rights. They 
are stipulated high in the ladder of abstraction, which renders their specification, i.e. 
identification of rights (and thus correlative obligations) and liberties that fall under 
their scope, quite challenging. The combination of their level of abstraction with the 
plurality of rights establishes the possibility of several conceptions of human rights 
standards to be established, depending on which human rights (pluralism) and up to 
which extent of these rights (abstraction) priority will be given over the rest.  
 
It so seems that justice and legitimacy are essentially contested concepts because they 
belong to the same category of concepts. Both justice and legitimacy do not refer to a 
thing, but to a property of things.269 This is why it is more intuitive to focus the 
explication on the adjective ‘just’ or ‘unjust’, ‘legitimate’, ‘illegitimate.’ This use 
facilitates clarification of how justice and legitimacy judgments are distinctive within 
the larger realm of moral judgments, and the even larger of evaluative judgments. The 
																																																								






application of ordinary empirical predicates such as ‘chair’ or ‘hard’, is two-tiered: it is 
based on a definition and on empirical facts. Thus, any dispute about whether such a 
predicate applies is reducible to linguistic and empirical differences. Such a dispute can 
be resolved by agreeing on a definition and settling the empirical disagreement. By 
contrast, evaluative predicates have this special feature: their application is only 
conditioned, not determined, by their definition and the empirical facts. It is for this 
reason that there can be reasonable disagreements about whether a painting is beautiful 
(Gallie mentions art as an example of essentially contested concept), even if the 
predicate is used in exactly the same sense and there is complete agreement regarding 
all the empirical features of the painting. In such cases, there are different conceptions 
of beauty and, as per Gallie, if there is no independent argument to solve the dispute 
between equally well-argued conceptions, the concept is essentially contested. The 
same holds for moral predicates. Despite agreement on all relevant empirical facts, there 
are reasonable and equally well-argued disagreements about whether something is 
praiseworthy or not, just or not, legitimate or not. Such disagreements could stem from 
failure to understand the meaning of the word (though such disagreements would not be 
referring to essentially contested concepts per se as different concepts would be 
deployed). However, more typically, the meaning of the word is known and the 
disagreement shows that the empirical facts and the meaning of the word together do 
not determine its correct application. Those who judge it praiseworthy to teach children 
by beating them are morally mistaken. They do not need linguistic instruction to 
improve their understanding of ‘praiseworthy’. They are well aware of both the word 
and the concept. They need a good discussion about how children should be educated. 
A dispute over the application of evaluative predicates such as ‘just’ and ‘legitimate’ 
may thus be due to differences of three kinds: empirical differences about the evaluated 
object, linguistic differences about the meaning, and theoretical differences about which 
substantive conception of the concept (justice, legitimacy) should guide its application.  
 
Indeed, it seems that in order for legitimacy to be a meaningful and helpful concept for 
moral reflection and deliberation, it ought to pose a value, such as a moral value, or an 
interest, such as one of the interests protected by human rights. This avoids essential 
contestability of the concept of legitimacy and allows it to function as a true standard 
law can be measured and evaluated by. One could say, for example, that peace/stability 






Peace/stability is neither a moral right nor obligation, but a moral value.270 It is a value 
we have good reasons to pursue because it is necessary for our survival, since without 
peace/stability in human interaction, chaos will ensue and human beings cannot 
flourish. Indeed, peace/stability is not just one of the goals of international law, but just 
like in all legal orders, the primary reason of its existence. One does not need to refer to 
Hobbes or Hart to understand that as a matter of fact, with the knowledge of human 
civilization as we know it and certain truisms about human nature, the primary need for 
law is to maintain social order so members of the society can (peacefully) coexist. 
Coexistence necessarily implies peace/stability because members of the society 
constantly using force against each other is a state of chaos/anarchy, not one of 
order/coexistence. A legal order necessarily implies social order, which in turn 
necessarily implies restraining the use of force and preservation of peace/stability. As 
Kletzer pointed out, all law is essentially primitive law.271 Despite the huge amount of 
legislation in contemporary legal orders and the many functions that law has in the 
society, such as helping us delineate our moral intuitions, in the roots of every legal 
order (both domestic legal orders and the international legal order) lies one fundamental 
element: restraining the use of force. It is not an accident that historically states have 
been understood as the only subjects entitled to use force and that philosophy of law 
and political philosophy have for very long time been discussing political legitimacy 
which has historically meant justification of coercion by the state. The question of what 
justifies the government to use coercion and restrict freedom of individuals is premised 
on the need for peaceful/stable mutual coexistence of members in a society/legal order. 
Whether we like it or not, the subjects of international law are still states and 
international organizations with states still being far more important actors in the 
international legal and political realm. Therefore, despite the importance of human 
rights as a goal of international law, peace/stability as a standard of legitimacy is 
inherent to law and the primary reason for the existence of law, which is why it has 
always made sense for it to be the standard of legitimacy. Peace/stability is inherent to 
very nature, main function and primary need of law, all law, thus both international and 
domestic.  
																																																								
270 This refers to the distinction between ethics or moral philosophy, i.e. what is right and wrong, on the 
one hand, and value theory, i.e. what is valuable and good, on the other.  






One need not be concerned, based on Buchanan’s argument which I very strongly agree 
with, that sometimes it is morally obligatory to violate peace for justice. First, as 
mentioned above, peace/stability is a value, not an obligation. Thus, there are good 
reasons to pursue it and a legal order achieving it counts for it being legitimate. Second, 
as argued in Chapter 2, legitimacy being a moral power entails that normative 
relationships may change, not that there is always moral obligation to obey. Thus, the 
moral right to violate peace/stability on the grounds of justice (either justice in terms of 
human rights or justice in terms of reclaiming unjustly taken territory) is 
accommodated. Legitimacy as peace/stability would not mean that human rights are not 
or ought not to be an important goal of international law. What it means is that 
legitimacy may best be understood without the essentially contested concept of justice, 
but with the value that international law, like all law, is destined, as a legal order, to 
maintain. Human rights can only be protected when there is a legal order in place. It is 
that legal order that peace/stability maintain. Therefore, peace/stability is not an 
antagonist of human rights or any other goals a legal order may set, but a 
presupposition.  
 
Two important points must be made for peace/stability as a standard of legitimacy. 
First, it applies particularly for the object of legal orders/systems. It does not apply for 
actors, actors or legal norms, or at least not necessarily so; it will depend on the nature 
and role of the given actor, action or norm. The argument I presented here is intended to 
apply only to peace/stability as a standard of legitimacy of a legal order, international or 
domestic. Second, perhaps just as obvious, peace/stability is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of legitimacy of a legal order. The 18th century US legal order did 
maintain stability but it is illegitimate because it deprived of slaves their liberty (ground 
of objective morality).  
 
There is no doubt that in order for a conception of legitimacy to be meaningful and 
useful in our deliberation and moral evaluation of the law, a well argued conception of 
legitimacy of a legal order must include, apart from peace/stability, some substantive 
morality. The latter does not have to be the problematic standard of human rights. 
Objective morality as a necessary condition of legitimacy of legal orders may take the 





prohibition of torture, prohibition of aggressive war, etc. Having argued for two 
conditions of legitimacy of a legal order stemming from reflections on this discussion, I 
will leave this issue to rest, as constructing a new normative conception of legitimacy of 
legal orders is outside the scope of this discussion.  
 
Buchanan’s conception of legitimacy of protecting basic human rights sets the 
individual at the forefront of international law, but it could perhaps be the case that 
some implications of this move have not been sufficiently explored. Law as a 
phenomenon serves humanity, individuals, by establishing social order. In terms of law 
as a legal order, domestic legal orders have historically been established mainly to 
protect individuals from external attacks. The traditional ‘agreement’ between 
individuals and states is that the former pay tax and the latter provide protection from 
external, but also from internal, threats. Law is thus correctly seen as serving the 
individual. Therefore, it is expected that, in an era where in the international realm non 
state actors obtain increasingly more capacity, the idea of international law serving the 
individual (contrast to the subjects of public international law: states and international 
organisations) and the idea of the individual being at the forefront of protection of 
international law would start to play a role and seem particularly attractive. Indeed, the 
charm of justice as conception of legitimacy in international law is that it makes the 
individual centre of international law.  
 
However, states remain the main actors of international law and more importantly, it is 
the states which assume obligations to protect interests of the individuals. Rights have 
meaning because of their correlative obligations. In the case of human rights, the 
obligations correlative to human rights, are mostly on states. It is the states that ought to 
have an efficient criminal and justice system in order to protect the right to life and right 
to not be tortured, it is the states that have to negatively and positively protect the 
freedom of expression and religion, it is the states that ought to satisfy the obligations 
entailed by the social rights, etc. Therefore, it could perhaps be argued that although 
from a humanitarian standpoint what is more important is who has the right, it could be 







Besides, there could be more obligations than rights. Since rights, contrast to liberties, 
consist on correlative obligations, obligations are what give meaning to rights and there 
cannot be more rights than obligations. There could be, however, more obligations than 
rights. Consider this simple example. A friend asks me to let him stay with me because 
he is in some need. I have moral duty to let him stay but he has no moral claim right. 
This is why if he feels entitled to me letting him stay, I am justified in being less 
inclined to let him in. Perhaps this thought can be helpful in the context of distributive 
rights. If there are more obligations than rights and obligations give meaning to rights, 
perhaps it is best to specify what exactly the obligations of states are in terms of 
distributions, and inferring from these obligations the correlative rights, rather than the 
other way around. 
 
Finally, the observation that we must save human rights from human rights law is in 
agreement with the most recent work in human rights. Discussion on Buchanan was 
premised on a sharp distinction between human rights as principles on the one hand and 
as (claim) rights on the other. The latter imply obligations, which give rights their 
normative content. The discussion is thus in agreement with Tasioulas’ claim that we 
must save human rights from human rights law partly because the latter overlooks the 
distinction between universal moral interests and universal moral rights.272 In order for 
international human rights law to achieve its primary goal, which is to give effect to 
universal moral rights (not generally human interests), human rights law must clarify 
obligations implied by human rights.273 A manifestation of the failure of international 
human rights law to be regulated by a background morality of human rights “is the 
widespread anxiety about human rights inflation,”274 an issue which has also been raised 
in the analysis of Buchanan’s theory.  
 
With the conceptual framework of legitimacy as an essentially contested concept and 
the above reflections in mind, a further fruitful exploration would be whether well 
argued conceptions of legitimacy would consist of obligations rather than rights. 
Indeed, stability, in terms of composing a normative conception of legitimacy, could be 
																																																								
272 John Tasioulas, ‘Saving Human Rights from Human Rights Law’ (forthcoming, February 2019 draft 
on file with author), 14 and more generally 12-2 under ‘Confusing Human Rights with Interests and 
Values.’ 
273 Ibid, 12 and 14. 





supplemented by rights or obligations. Since, relieved from flaws of international 
human rights law as mentioned above, human rights can function not as principles but 
as (claim) rights whose normative content is determined by obligations, a full overlap 
between rights and their correlative obligations would imply that the same content can 
be stipulated by rights or obligations narrative. If the narrative is chosen based on what 
is appropriate in context/circumstances, the correct conception could be reached in 
context, without unnecessary disagreements between conceptions which are equally 
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